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Summary 
This thesis addresses the relation between Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze, with 
reference to women. It argues that Deleuze's "methods" reveal an intensive dyanamic 
in Kant obscured by readings which concentrate on the molar structures in his thought 
and that this dynamic is implicated with the deployment by Deleuze (and Guattari) of 
becoming-woman as a middle line which escapes the rational tribunal. It insists that a 
philosophy of difference function as a positive elimination of relations to unity, to the 
subject and to other figures of power in philosophical thought and that Deleuze's 
oeuvre is a critical and creative engagement with the transformation of philosophical 
problems and the relation of thinking to history which emerge from this. 
The other theme, that of women, is addressed through Luce Irigaray's reading 
of Kant and Rosi Braidotti's reading of becoming-woman. I argue that whilst the 
former's critique of an uncritically assumed symmetry in Kant's work is effective and 
well-directed, she becomes caught in her own methodology of jamming, but that there 
are nonetheless strong and productive directions in her thought, many of which are 
parallel and/or connected to those of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-woman. 
Against Braidotti's interpretation of becoming-woman, I argue that it adopts a molar 
political strategy and as such does not connect with the force behind this thought. 
Lastly, this thesis is an argument against bilateral sexual difference, in favour 
of distributive or `n-sexes': the title, Breeding Demons connects the theme of demons 
in Deleuze's writing to the cycles which effect such distributions. 
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For Emily 
Introduction 
Side-Communication 
`Philosophie, rien que de la philosophic, au sens traditionnel du 
mot'. ' 
Two primary themes inform the direction of this thesis. The first is the 
relation of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze and the second, the position of women 
in philosophy, both as philosophers and as creatures with a philosophical design which 
women themselves have had no part in creating. The two problems connect in the 
concept of becoming-woman, found in Mille Plateaux (1980), the second of the two 
volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, which Deleuze co-wrote with Felix Guattari. 
I Revolution 
Each element - Kant, Deleuze and women - is attached in its own way to 
revolution. The French revolution `fords in the hearts of all spectators (who are not 
engaged in this game themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on 
enthusiasm', Kant wrote, sounding close to enthusiasm himself, from the safe, if by 
that time censorial Prussian State under the rule of Frederick William 11 .2 Under 
his 
uncle, Frederick the Great, Prussia had been shaped by a thirst for power and glory, 
rationalized through the medium of Enlightenment ideas. Unlike his mystically 
inclined nephew, Frederick was religiously indifferent, believing his authority rested in 
the State itself; and he set about shaping it in a way which would reflect this status. He 
instigated massive land-reclamation and colonization projects; he established a huge 
bureaucratic administration; his codification and uniformization of the law resulted in 
a new political character, the citizen; and he quieted the Prussian aristocracy, enlisting 
their services for the State with privileges and rewards. For Frederick, the idea of the 
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State as servant to the people was anathema: to Voltaire, he wrote: `I view my subjects 
like a herd of stags on some noble's estate[; ] their only function is to reproduce and fill 
the Space' .3 Kant 
flourished on Frederick's estate, and could observe from its safe 
pastures events unfolding in less stable areas of the world, revolutions with less order 
than that of Frederick. 
Deleuze's pre-1968 writing has the appearance of conservatism, in both 
language and tone. But the appearance is misleading, and to sustain it requires 
deliberate effort. His collaboration with Felix Guattari in the two volumes of 
Capitalisme et Schizophrenie effected a transformation in thought, taking it out of the 
academy and restoring it to life and desire, energizing language with fresh air. It sides 
with no politics; 'Democratie, fascisme ou socialisme, lequel n'est hante par l'Urstaat 
comme modele inegalable (democracy, fascism, or socialism, which of these is not 
haunted by the Urstaat as a model without equal)? '4 Attacking, with joy, the oedipal, 
the familial, the statist, the fascistic, the ideological, the patrimonial and the repressive, 
L'anti-oedipe, the first volume, is thought as exterminating angel. To the extent that 
thought returns to the subject and to subjection, `L'anti-oedine a ete un echec 
complet'. 5 
Yet there are continuities which run throughout his work, consistent themes; 
an initial list might include intensities, the problem of critique as production, the body, 
the strangulation of thought by consciousness and conscience. And consistent names: 
Spinoza, Artaud, Freud, Nietzsche, Marx, Leibniz, Kant, Simondon, Canetti, Geoffroy 
St. Hilaire - again naming only a selection. May `68 and the collaboration with 
Guattari catalysed the assemblage of these characters and themes, together with many 
others, into an up and running machine of thought without image or single origin, 
which proliferates potential directions with each reading. There is treachery in 
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choosing to follow the continuities, as this thesis does, rather than emphasizing the 
break But: 
`Etre traitre ä son propre regne, titre traltre ä son sexe, ä sa classe, ä 
sa majorite - quelle autre raison d'ocrire? 
(What other reason is there for writing than to be traitor to one's own 
reign, traitor to one's sex, to one's class, to one's majority? )' (DP, 
1977: 56; 1987: 44) 
In an attack on the re-domestication of thought in France in the `70's, Deleuze 
points to the convergence of disparate and apparently contrary positions on one agreed 
point: hatred of May `68, and the declared impossibility of revolution, either explicit or 
tacit, in the enthusiasm for the principle of election. For this, one must first place 
oneself as a subject, a citizen -a Staatsbürger; for this man, Deleuze argues, revolution 
becomes `1'acte pur du penseur qui la pense impossible (the pure act of a thinker who 
thinks it [revolution] impossible)' 6A similar convergence can be seen today also, this 
time in relation to the reception of Deleuze's work, and this time the point of unity is 
possession. Those who do not live up to the revolutionary potential are castigated for 
their `craven submission to the Academy', whilst those less craven are charged with a 
range of crimes from mis-reading, philosophical inadequacy, outright lunacy, and 
desiring the impossible. ' Each side has its orthodoxies and its enemies, its image of 
revolution and of thought. A running theme throughout Deleuze's writing is that of the 
image of thought, and the stultifying effect it has on the potentials for thinking. This 
thesis claims neither right or wrong, truth or falsity. It is an idea, a problem which does 
not here pretend to a solution. Indeed, whether writing solves anything is doubtful. 
Introduction 
This brings me to the third theme, that of women. At the time of both 
revolutions, the Kantian and Deleuzian, the role of women was in transformation. 
What characterized female nature became uncertain towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, many qualities previously attributed to women became associated with 
maleness - the sublime and genius both attribute a femininity to men, and a relation 
with nature and imagination which had previously been associated with the wildness 
and unrestrained immorality of women. Christine Battersby writes: `there was no 
longer a consensus about which features of the psyche doomed females to perpetual 
inferiority', and traces their re-definition as culturally refined, self-controlled (when 
virtuous), and generally domesticated! 
Kant solves the problem of apparently contrary qualities of sexual wildness 
and cultural refinement by distinguishing between an anthropological and a cultural 
perspective on women. In an uncivilized state, superiority belongs to man, and the 
proper nature of women is as unrecognizable in a crude state of nature as `that of the 
crab apple and the wild pear, which reveal their diversity only when they are grafted or 
inoculated'! It is only through culture - the end of a reason which women do not have - 
that properly female qualities develop, a beautiful understanding and sensible virtue 
fitting her for marriage and legal reception of nature's true gift, the foetus. 
Concomitant with the culturally driven emergence of qualities which, in a natural state 
remain indiscernible, women appear to achieve a lind of activity, or power, which is 
exercised against or over men. However, the range of this power is limited to 
domesticity and expresses a desire for domination which is revealed through tears, 
nagging, manipulation and a shrewdness in the exercise of her charms, as a 
consequence of which man is `imperceptibly fettered by a child'. 1° Whilst she `should 
reign [herrschen]' 11, Queen of the domestic arena, `supreme command in the 
household' is the prerogative of `only one person who co-ordinates all occupations in 
4 
Introduction 
accordance with one end, which is his. i12 The apparent power of women is thus gifted 
by men through a cultural and socio-political order which is extrinsic to women's own 
desires; moreover, women's power is permitted within the framework of a space 
already divided into public and private spheres, limiting women's dominion to the 
latter and tolerating it only within the co-ordinated ends of man. 
That the gifted power ends on the doorstep is made clear by Kant in Der 
Metaphysik der Sitten, where he differentiates between active and passive citizens: the 
latter includes journeymen, household servants, juveniles, and all women. Passive 
citizens are those who, whilst included quantitatively as members of the State, are 
qualitatively differentiated from the legislating active members. Disenfranchised and 
playing no part in its constitution, they are nonetheless subject to its law. Whilst Kant 
holds out the possibility of transition from passive to active citizenship, this is clearly 
not an alternative for women: to become an actively legislative and vote-holding 
Staatsbürger, a woman would have to be able to become a man. " 
Women's truth, Kant says, comes from the world: what it says is true and 
what it does is good. They can as well learn theoretical principles as they can grow 
beards, he mutters; as for girls, they `must be got used to smiling in an easy, 
unconstrained way when they are still very young' for smiling `gradually moulds them 
within as well and establishes a disposition to joy, friendliness and sociability'. 14 
Moulding, growing, pruning, cultivating, women become problems of the landscape, 
country gardens created as a resource and for relaxation from the real life of public 
affairs. By encouraging smiling in girls, Kant seems to envisage the prospect of self- 
pruning women. Whilst his comment on smiling applies to children in general, it is 
`especially girls"5 at which it aims. 
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In the 1960's and '70s, Western women's lives were affected in radically 
different ways: the Pill removed sexuality from reproduction; women began to work in 
greater numbers (though still for the most part in menial "female" occupations); 
lesbian separatism developed; women began to attack their assimilation into class 
structures based on the social status of men; to question the exclusion of home labour 
from economics; to play with the images assigned to them on their own terms; they 
began to write and to be published; to uncover a richer and more diverse view of 
women's roles in history, and to move into territories previously defined as male, either 
positively so, or on the grounds that women's biology/minds/ hormones etc., naturally 
excluded them from large areas of life. Most importantly, women ceased to prune 
themselves in line with male expectations. Men began to concern themselves with the 
movements of women, and many could find no more original response to the changes 
than ridicule or tired appeals to the proper and natural function of women as 
reproduction animals. 
The most important argument is economic. In the West, the decline of 
industrial capital and the emergence of information technology has transformed the 
labour market: physical strength and brute force have lost their value, to be replaced by 
manoeuvrability, flexibility, ease of transition between different areas of life, interactive 
skills. One in four women in Britain chooses not to bear children, and many women 
who do have children prefer to bring them up without men. Fewer and fewer women 
are choosing to confine themselves within the legal bondage of marriage. The Internet 
has opened up space for playing with gender assignations, whilst cyberfeminism drives 
home historical connections between women and technology, messing up its image as 
toys for the boys. Oedipus collapses all around, as women begin (slowly) to gain the 
economic control over their lives which releases them from their historical dependency 
on men. 
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What, however does this have to do with the debate over Deleuze, from where 
this discussion of women began? The issue is treachery. The academic debate over 
Deleuze divides him into two parts, one revolutionary, of the streets, and the other 
institutional, of the university, but it can be paraphrased as an argument over which 
side is the most treacherous? Is there more treachery in throwing aside the constraints 
of the academy, rejecting its theory, descrying the ascription of labels, or in 
assimilating Deleuze with, for example, problems coming out of deconstruction. In the 
context of economic viability, there is no difference, since these debates occur for the 
most part amongst well-paid men. It is therefore not a debate into which women fit 
easily, anymore than they fit easily into philosophy, or into class structures. Rage 
against the academy is less clearly a revolutionary position for those who have been 
fighting against restrictions on their entry into it, and the rejection of theoretical 
approaches to Deleuze's work sits differently when history has spent much effort 
persuading women of their theoretical inadequacies. This is why remarks such as those 
of Rosi Braidotti's are problematic. She writes: 
`Philosophy creates itself through what it excludes as much as 
through what it asserts. High theory, especially philosophy, posits its 
values through the exclusion of many - non-men, non-whites, non- 
learned, etc.. The structural necessity of these perjorative figurations 
of otherness makes me doubt the capacity, let alone the moral and 
political willingness, of theoretical discourse to act in a non- 
hegemonic, non-exclusionary manner'. 16 
History has created itself through similar exclusions: science, economics, law, 
engineering, politics, - the list can be continued at will - all have exercised either 
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theoretical or practical restraints against women. Philosophical theory provides an 
abstract structural account of these exclusions and is, as Braidotti says, created through 
them. However, unless one subscribes to the view that thought, as opposed to 
institutional philosophy, is generated by exclusion and the exercise of the negative on 
difference, the case against infiltrating theory as well as practice seems slight. 
Moreover, the theory/practice distinction is, once more, an artifice of the exclusionary 
mind. As will be discussed in the thesis, Deleuze's understanding of the theory/practice 
relation is not one which divides down a central line; it is instead one of mutual and 
reciprocal interaction, theory opening space where practices are blocked, and so 
transforming the potentials of practice, and practice mobilizing theory, breaking down 
walls and moving through crevices, and in so doing transforming what is understood 
by both theory and practice. 
Bedtime stories for children need not of necessity be peopled by fairies, and 
uncut minds understand power with ease, since it is exercised upon them without the 
possibility of escape. Children are pragmatists too: generating variations without 
regard for rule, in response to the situations they discover, transforming language into 
a toy, a game which changes whilst it is played, a field of edible words. Leaving girls to 
think so they can smile for themselves, rather than re-furbishing historical tales of their 
necessary exclusion from certain women's, whilst at the same time leaving boys to do 
the same, rather than imposing the burden of history of their backs; these seem most 
profitable for the future becoming-woman. It is for these reasons, amongst others, that I 
am uninterested in the attribution of reactionary/revolutionary labels and the fight for 
possession over Deleuze (or Kant). Revolution belongs to the young. Cold indifference 
to opinion is something one learns. 
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II Critique 
`Copernicus said: 
"When you have once seen the chaos, you must 
make some thing to set between yourself and that 
terrible sight: and so you make a mirror, thinking 
that in it shall be reflected the reality of the world; 
but then you understand that the mirror reflects 
only appearances, and that reality is somewhere 
else, off behind the mirror, and then you remember 
that behind the mirror there is only the chaos. " 
Dark dark dark'" 
Kant effected a revolution in philosophy, through the introduction of time into 
the subject, effecting its disjunction into two elements, the `I think' and the `I am', the 
relation of which is neither logical or empirical, but transcendental. This means real 
conditions, for the transcendental is materially conditioning, rather than merely logical 
- that is, it does not simply impose epistemological restrictions on the possibility of 
understanding the world, but is implicated in its material order. The relation of 
indeterminate existence - "I am" - to determining thought - "I think" - is determined in 
or as time; that is, the existence of the subject is determined in time and consciousness 
of this existence is represented as time - that is, as the subjective and psychological 
experience of succession. The condition of this determination is transcendental, rather 
than either logical, through the medium of a "therefore", or theological, through the 
medium of pre-established harmony. The introduction of time as a transcendental form 
is, to use an anachronistic term, part of Kant's anti-logicist project, and the movement 
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away from a rationalist epistemology devolved from concepts. Leibniz, for example, 
says of time (and space), that, in the absence of living creatures they `would exist in 
ideas only, as mere possibilities'18 whose truth is grounded in God. The difference to 
the Kantian conception of time as a form of intuition whose ideality is immanent to the 
constitution of human knowledge, and a condition of its real possibility - that is, a 
transcendental condition - is quite clear. For Leibniz, the essence of time is continuous 
succession, this being generated by the aggregation of monads, the ultimate and simple 
elements of reality. One might go on to inquire about a succession of perceptions 
within a monad. The complexities implied by this question are too great to pursue in 
depth, for two reasons. Firstly, the matter is tangential to the thesis, and secondly, 
Leibniz himself has little of an explicit nature to say about time, and nothing which 
supports the claim that it can be discussed in terms of what happens within a monad 
which does not also include the world. However, the direction in which this question 
might be explored can be suggested by the following. Each monad includes the entire 
world: `in every particle of the universe there is contained a world of infinite 
creatures'. 19 Separation of the temporality of a point of view or perspective within a 
monad from that of the aggregate which it includes it thus illegitimate, in Leibniz's 
own terms. As he writes, it is impossible `to conceive of the possibility of any internal 
motion being started, directed, increased, or diminished within it, [a monad] as can 
occur in compounds, where change among the parts takes place. '20 Although the 
principle of change comes from within a monad - necessarily, since they have no 
windows - each monad is a universe and time (and space) are nothing `other than 
certain orders of things. s21 That is, they cannot be thought in the absence of the 
physical relations amongst bodily organs, which the soul or monad represents. 22 
Through abstraction from phenomenal relations, or appearances generated 
through the monadic activity of appetition, Leibniz draws his mathematical conception 
10 
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of time, which, whilst well-founded, is nonetheless an useful intellectual fiction - that 
is, it cannot be intuited, or perceived phenomenally, but can, nonetheless, be 
understood. This intellectual fiction is non-contradictory - that is, it's truths are 
necessary - and distinguishes mathematical time, as a possible fiction, from the 
impossible fiction of supposing that time is other than certain orders of things. 23 A 
physico-mathematical view of the world, from a Leibnizian perspective, is thus a view 
imposed on an already given world of determinate extension and change, the "already 
given" being an ideal consequence of the co-ordinated activity of the only real elements 
in Leibniz's system, the monads. Mathematical consistency thus occupies a different 
order of ideality than phenomenal coherence. The universality of both, however, is a 
function of the mirroring by every monad of all the activity of all others, in a network 
of interconnections: if this mirroring were only partial, no universal systematic 
physico-mathematics or public phenomenal world would be possible, since there would 
be different orders of temporal and spatial co-ordination amongst different groups of 
monads. What guarantees the interconnectedness of all monadic activity is pre- 
established harmony, or God. 
There are interesting directions in which to take this formulation: the idea of 
an infinitely interacting network, so important to Deleuze's understanding of Kant, is 
already plain from this brief discussion and such a system, as will become clear in the 
thesis, is integral to Deleuze's understanding of the Kantian faculties. However, the 
function of this brief excursion into Leibniz is to mark his difference from Kant with 
relation to time. Kant turns the Leibnizian view upside down and re-formulates the 
situation and value of its terms: the well-founded and useful fiction (in the sense that it 
does not refer to any real properties of the world) of Leibnizian mathematical time 
becomes in Kant a presuppositional form of experience, a condition of the possibility of 
knowledge of the object. In this way the separation of phenomenal and mathematical 
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time is closed, mathematics becomes immanent to the production of phenomenal 
knowledge, rather than abstracted from it and the empirical world is immediately 
physico-mathematical. This allows Kant to say that time is empirically real, whilst for 
Leibniz it is only ever ideal. Moreover, for Kant, the universal status of mathematics, 
and the claim of a single time of which all different times are parts, is no longer 
guaranteed by pre-established harmony gifted by God, nor does it `remain when 
abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of its intuition. "' Not even as a 
possibility in the ideas of God. Independently of these subjective conditions, `time is 
nothing'. 25 
A last point is that for Kant, the pure form of time as such must be 
distinguished from time as succession. `Time has only one dimension', 26 and that 
dimension is experienced both subjectively and objectively as succession. However, if 
the pure form of time is confused with the experience of time as succession, which is a 
mode of time, the transcendental import of the Aesthetic is lost; time is conflated either 
with its conceptual formulation in terms of causally determined motion, or with a 
psychologistic, and (apparently) arbitrary sequence of subjective states in inner sense. 
'Motion, as an act of the subject ... first produces the concept of succession'; succession 
is part of a temporal language, as are co-existence and duration, but as pure form, it is 
a condition of the possibility of that language, so whilst succession can be described as 
a mode of time, the form of this mode - time - cannot itself be described as successive. 21 
If succession is ascribed `to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the 
sequence would be possible' 28 Succession pertains to the parts of time - that is, to the 
experience of determinate quanta of intuition in inner sense - and thus to a limitation 
of the pure form of time; `different times are but parts of one and the same time', but 
that one and the same time is not itself successive. 29 
12 
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In one of the four metaphysical expositions of time in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes: 
`Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves 
a number of things as existing at one and the same time 
(simultaneously) or at different times (successively). '30 
Different times, or as Kant says `parts of time', are successive31: however, different 
times - points or instants - are limitations which presuppose the transcendental and 
pure form of time. But once more it must be emphasized that this does not imply that 
the pure form of time can be collapsed into succession: for whilst the parts of time are 
successive, the pure form of time is a continuum not comprised of points or instants. 
Whilst it can be divided into parts, which exists only as a function of this division, it is 
not equivalent to these parts or to their successive addition. To think thus would be to 
lead Kant back towards a Leibnizian perspective on the problem. This is a critical 
difference, not only for a rigorous reading of Kant, but also for understanding the 
attention Deleuze pays to the pure form of time. 32 
It is time which opens up the problem of the transcendental, and the 
differences which flow from it, between phenomena and noumena, appearances and 
things-in-themselves. Kant's criticisms of Leibniz for intellectualizing sensibility, for 
not thinking forms of intuition outside the relations of things and for conceiving of 
`time as the dynamical sequence' of the states of substance, leading to its formulation 
as something akin to confused concepts, may not be drawn from direct contact with 
Leibniz's writings: nonetheless, the latter offer no support for any reconciliation of the 
Kantian and Leibnizian positions on time. The Copernican revolution evicts God from 
theory and removes the form of time from reason, logic, meaning and psychology. 
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Kant's work covers a huge range; science - including physics, biology and 
chemistry, the latter two first emerging as sciences at the close of the eighteenth 
century -, aesthetics, history, politics, morality, anthropology, logic, mathematics, 
geography and pedagogy and more. Despite this vast spread of interests, however, a 
single problem might be said to drive both the direction of his thought and its 
immediate reception -the problem of critique, as a demand for immanence of criteria. 
`Our age is, in especial degree, the age of critique, and to critique everything must 
submit', he writes in the Critique of Pure Reason, the first of the three critical works. 33 
A critical tribunal, in which reason functions as both subject and judge, was to 
legitimate all claims to knowledge, and its necessity for Kant was paramount: in the 
absence of such a legitimation, he argues, reason lapses into its natural state, a state of 
war. 
Response to the critical challenge was swift: why must everything so submit, 
from where does the authority of reason come? On what does it base the privilege of its 
first principles? That it was no longer God was recognized immediately: indeed, there 
was an injunction against the teaching of Kant's work at Marburg, pending a report on 
the dangers of its scepticism - epistemological as well as theological. It was lifted, 
however, on the basis that even if his work was sceptical, `undermin[ing] the certainty 
of human knowledge' it was so obscure as to be largely unintelligible, and thus of no 
danger. 34 But the response to the implications of critique were swift. As Beiser writes 
in The Fate of Reason. post-Kantian philosophy begins with the meta-critical question 
of the authority of reason, and `looked critically at the possibility of criticism itself 35 
Schopenhauer, a philosopher who titles himself the first Kantian, dismisses 
the post-Kantians, (mostly through polemic, seldom with argument): 'serious 
14 
Introduction 
philosophy still stands where Kant left it', he declares, `I therefore take my departure 
from him' 36 Schopenhauer sets off in a direction very different to that of the meta- 
critical challenge. He is uninterested in the arguments over reason and responds to the 
practical philosophy with the comment: 
`[W]hen Kant demolished old and revered errors, and knew the 
danger of the business, he had only wanted to substitute here and 
there through moral theology a few weak props, so that the ruin 
would not fall on top of him, and he would have time to get away' 37 
Instead, Schopenhauer privileges the Transcendental Aesthetic, calling it the 
diamond in Kant's crown; the thing-in-itself, which he calls will; and Ideas, which he 
calls Platonic, but which are more Kantian than this suggests and than Schopenhauer 
himself will allow. He is critical of Kantian Ideas for their remoteness from perception, 
and of Kantian perception for being pure, in the sense of divorced from empirical data: 
for Schopenhauer, Ideas are inseparable from perception, and `perception is 
throughout the source of all knowledge. '38 It is this insistence on a perceptual and 
objective element to the transcendental, which is both impersonal and pre-individual, 
(prior to the pnncipium individuationis and the subject-object division) that Deleuze 
shares with Schopenhauer. Nonetheless, despite their relation with perception, 
Schopenhauerian Ideas retain the Kantian characteristic of not being objects of 
representation, or phenomena subject to the forms of space, time and causality. 
Schopenhauer eliminates the possibility of conceiving of the thing-in-itself 
either as an object somehow `behind' representation, or as the implicit cause of 
sensation, this latter being a purely subjective component of perception, - under the 
sldn, as he puts it; he also rejects the association of Ideas with the theological- 
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metaphysical register in which Kant places them, whilst retaining what is essential to 
the Kantian notion of the transcendental, which is that it expresses immanence of 
criteria and real conditions as opposed to those which are purely logical. For 
Schopenhauer, however, Ideas are not immanent to reason, but are immediate and 
direct expressions of relations of variance of the will. In effect, he is opening up a 
thought of relation (the transcendental being concerned with relations, not objects) 
which is neither conceptual or psychologistic; a rigorous thought of the transcendental. 
A Schopenhauerian Idea is defined as an adequate objectification of the will. 
By adequate objectification, Schopenhauer understands the material manifestation of 
the will, its corporealization, not as mediate knowledge, worked through the secondary 
functions of the brain, or intellect, but as a condition of experience, as material, non- 
conceptual and impersonal, expressing the activity of the will in-itself outside the laws 
of experience. In this sense, Ideas and their adequate objectification function as real 
conditions of empirical experience rather than, as for Kant, regulative tools for the 
delimitation of speculative reason and place-holders for its practical legislation. 
Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian Ideas aims at their subjective 
formulation, in terms of the focus imaginarius, and is thus in line with his more 
general criticism of Kant's failure to consider the objective, or physiological aspects of 
knowledge. This leads him towards consideration of the material conditions of 
empirical perception, in the direction of the thing-in-itself, or will. Part of his 
attachment to the term Platonic as a qualification of Ideas is to highlight their relation 
with perception and emphasize the borrowed reality of the phenomenal world; Plato's 
Ideas, unlike Kant's, are empirically manifest in copies. He writes: 
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`To the brook which rolls downwards over the stones, the eddies, 
waves, and the foam-forms exhibited by it are indifferent and 
inessential; but that it follows gravity, and behaves as an inelastic, 
perfectly mobile, formless, and transparent fluid, this is its 
essential nature, this, if known through perception, is the Idea. s39 
(original italics) 
The inessential aspects of natural phenomena belong to borrowed reality, to the 
unfolding of the Idea through the functions of the brain, whilst Ideas are `the whole 
thing-in-itself, only under the form of representation'. 40 Under this form, and at the 
lower grades of objectification, Ideas are represented under the title of laws of nature 
which allow for their recognition in particular cases: gravity, electricity, crystallization, 
magnetism, fluidity, elasticity, chemical properties, sexual desires. However, the nature 
of the forces that these laws express is `something entirely strange and unknown'; for 
Schopenhauer, force is thought on an intensive register, as a qualitas occulta emerging 
from immanent relations of the will, a residuum of which always remains exterior to 
the formal description of law. 4' The will or thing-in-itself is antecedent to these laws, 
not causally so, but as the blind quantitative drive of the will, outside measurability and 
formal description. Ideas are the direct objectivity of this drive, standing between the 
representation of particulars referred to by laws of nature and the `variance with itself 
essential to the will' . 
42 
Effected through the incessant immanent self-variance of the will, the world 
as representation is manifest with ever-increasing complexity - from blind forces of 
nature to inorganic structures to organic entities such as plants, and then on to animals 
and man. Variance of the will is expressed also in conflicts of Ideas, the resolution of 
this conflict involving the analogical assimilation of the conflicting orders into higher 
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Ideas. (This is not to say that this complexity can be read back into the will. ) Each Idea 
is thus both the resolution of problematic relations of the will at lower grades of 
objectification, and is itself a problem. `Each attained end is at the same time the 
beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum. s43 Each Idea is abstract, eternal, and 
unchanging, yet nonetheless, each `gains an entirely new character just by taking up 
into itself from each of the subdued Ideas an analogue of higher power', expressing a 
different set of abstract relations. 44 
So whilst Schopenhauer describes Ideas both as archetypes, and as Platonic, 
the facility for analogically assimilating prior grades of adequate objectification in 
such a way that their character is transformed also marks a definite difference from 
Plato's theory of forms. Moreover, Ideas and the adequate objectification of the will are 
differentiated not in kind, but by degree: as has been said already, they are intensive, 
and exterior to the forms through which the ideal world of representation is ordered. 
Secondary qualifications of the intensive gradations of the will introduced from this 
ideal perspective are thus not pertinent to exploring the real constructions of the thing- 
in-itself. 45 It is in this sense that they are problematic, in a Kantian sense, since they 
cannot be referred to a universal law. Rather, they express the resolution of a conflict of 
the will at a certain degree, and the emergence of a qualitative force, which 
representation ('a very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain'46) 
universalizes with the term "law of nature", but whose real conditions can be referred 
to only as qualitas occulta. It is in this sense that Ideas are abstract and diagrammatic, 
since they articulate the essential aspects of a real problem which cannot be expressed 
in terms of representation, but which is nonetheless only manifest empirically. Ideas 
are thus abstract, problematic and diagrammatic expressions of the will, whose solution 
is materialized through blind and non-cognitive striving. 
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Schopenhauer also collapses the elaborate architecture of the Analytic through 
the Aesthetic, the conjunction emerging as a single principle of sufficient reason 
comprising time, space and causality, the three formal elements of the world as 
representation. The material element of the will or thing-in-itself, at the adequate level 
of objectification of which the animal is the phenomenon, is the brain, and its 
intellectual functions, which structure the world as representation are secondary control 
and guidance mechanisms, which he refers to as parasitic upon the will. It is this 
physiological aspect of the will which, as has been remarked above, Schopenhauer 
chides Kant for neglecting, and which Nietzsche, first as student then as critic of 
Schopenhauer, develops more fully, taking it further from its Kantian source, and re- 
formulating critique in terms of the will to power. Its importance, both for reading 
Kant, and for reading the relation of Deleuze and Kant is to emphasize the difference 
between a psychologistic rendition of the transcendental, in terms of subjectively, and a 
rigorously critical formulation, in terms of material conditions. Schopenhauer's 
philosophy drives in the direction of the transcendental empiricism which Deleuze 
refines. 
Deleuze's second book, written in 1962, nine years after a slim volume on 
Hume, is Nietzsche et la Philosophie. In this book critique is addressed as a problem 
concerning the quality and relations of forces: `tout le reste est Symptome (everything 
else is symptom)' 47 The will gives, Deleuze writes: `eile n'aspire pas, elle ne recherche 
pas, eile ne desire pas, surtout eile ne desire pas la puissance. Elle donne (it does not 
aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It 
gives)' 48 The genetic or critical principle of the will gives sense and value - quality - to 
the relations of forces immanent to the will. That is, the qualitative expressions of 
quantitatively differentiated relations are not qualified by anything extrinsic to those 
relations: sense and value emerge from real relations, manifest, as Schopenhauer made 
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clear, as forces, and outside the scope of conceptual cognition, rather than being 
qualified according to the requirements of a philosophy of representation - the most 
basic of which are identity and the subject-object division. 
Sense and value are thus no longer functions of a systematic disjunction 
between theory and practice, which legitimates the separation of (scientifically 
objective) fact and (morally objective) value, but become immanent to the 
determinations of relations of the will, or thing-in-itself. The subject becomes 
integrated into the network of relations generated through the determination of force 
relations immanent to the will, and has no values separable from its empirical effects. 
There is no longer a single territory under two contrary sets of principles, those of 
speculative reason and those of practical reason, and a vertical and hierarchical series 
of conduits leading to and from a rational subject, but a horizontal plane of relations of 
which the subject is a late and peripheral effect. Since the relations immanent to the 
will are understood as differential and conjunctive, rather than contrary and disjunctive 
(as is the case when the noumenon/phenomon axis in Kant is taken to be the critical 
one), and these relations become generative of the transcendental, rather than the 
consequence of its conditioning, the transcendental becomes entirely vacuous until 
empirically constructed, but is not to be confused with that empirical construction. 
Hence Deleuze's attraction to the pure form of time and his demand for a 
`properly transcendental empiricism' 49 And hence, also, his criticism of Kant for 
being overly psychologistic in his formulation of synthesis; it is not that Kant is too 
empirical, according to Deleuze, but that he is insufficiently empirical, since he 
hypostatizes the senses and values of human (male) experience and universalizes them, 
as conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the object, and a unified experience, 
and then reduces the empirical to representation. The empirical is constructed through 
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the lens of a set of conditions which are specific to a subject defined as active, 
spontaneous, rational, morally legislative and scientifically objective: all 
characteristics, as will be seen later in the thesis, specific to white males. 
The transcendental, taken from this perspective, is traced from the values and 
senses of a specific and psychologically coloured empiricism. Deleuze insists that the 
transcendental is impersonal, pre-individual, a field of singularities and a problem 
which cannot be solved through the instances of its solutions; that is, it is produced as 
the relation of the empirical with something which is not empirical, and which cannot 
be defined as either the negative limit of the empirical, a conditioning principle 
extrinsic to experience or as a priori. Instead, it becomes a relation with the will, or 
thing-in-itself, understood as pure exteriority, the immanent threshold of sensible 
experience. (A fuller discussion of this will be found in a later chapter. ) In this way, 
rather than critique being legitimated through an image of thought as rational and 
legislative, it becomes a positive principle of genesis. 
It also destroys. Critique becomes something new in Nietzsche, and something 
which, in conjunction with the typology of forces, turns back on the questions raised by 
the post-Kantians, with results which would confirm their misgivings about its implicit 
atheism. The division of the world into the real and the apparent is attacked, the 
subject becomes an effect of the will, and critique becomes immanent, not to reason, 
but to the will, a genetic principle which thinks against reason, against itself, against 
conditioning and against the image of thought; against truth, error and method. 
The problem of the critical relations of forces, as quantitative degrees of the 
will to power which effect a particular quality, that quality which is willed, is one 
which remains with Deleuze throughout his writing, and which finds its consummate 
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destructive force in L'anti-oedine, the first volume of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, as 
the machinic or desiring unconscious, and its most positive and creative expression in 
the second volume, as the machinic phylum. It is this latter book that Deleuze describes 
as philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word, as the creation of concepts; which 
does not interpret, nor call for interpretation, and which works, without labour, and 
plays, with all seriousness. 
III Demons 
This thesis addresses the relation of Deleuze and Kant in terms of these 
problems: forces, the image of thought, the principle of recognition, the question of 
production, the materiality of the thing-in-itself, the genesis of sense and immanence of 
criteria. An additional element, which comes from Deleuze's book La philosophie 
critique de Kant, is that of a network. The network of faculties, Deleuze says, is the 
true transcendental method, and the Kant book (1963) is structured around their 
changing relations in each of the three Critiques. Systematic variations in these 
relations correspond to different methods of realizing an interest of reason. This notion 
of system runs throughout Deleuze's work He understands systems as open, nested and 
interconnected: everything connects to everything else, everything is implicated in the 
genesis of everything else, not as a universal principle or conditioning element, but 
through the rhizomatic interaction of forces. The concept of an assemblage, which 
emerges through his collaboration with Felix Guattari, molecularizes the notion of a 
faculty system, of body as a complex and articulated construction of interconnected 
components whose operations shift depending on the bodies into which they plug and 
the nature of relations into which they enter. 
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However, these are not simply images, for Deleuze shares Kant's insistence on 
the importance of science for philosophy. His theory of forces emerges from work on 
embryology, biology, technology; amongst the vast range covered with Guattari in 
Mille Plateaux are genetics, geology, the movement of populations - both molecular 
and animal, evolution. Whilst these themes are not explored in this thesis, Deleuze's 
insistence that his own work, and that with Guattari, is empirical, must be kept in 
mind. `[E]n verite, l'inconscient est de la physique (in reality, the unconscious belongs 
to the realm of physics)' 50 There are no metaphors; if something works, it is because it 
is real. 
So what of becoming-woman? This too must be real. Philosophy has 
associated women with nature, matter, space and babies, ever since Plato spoke in the 
Timaeus of the receptacle or womb whose neutral plasticity accepted without 
discrimination the impress of eternal forms. The receptacle nurses becoming, but is 
itself immutable. It is this supposed permanence of function attendant on women which 
becoming-woman seeks to break away from; from women as reproductive and 
essentially sexual creatures to women as self-organizing systems which are effected 
only through their interactions with other machines in their environment, which is no 
longer defined as nature, indeed, which has no definition until it is generated. 
Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards 
the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describes herself as 
a Deleuzian, but nonetheless accuses his position on women on the grounds that it 
comes from a male embodied subject. Yet criticisms such as these have limited 
purchase on the impulse infecting Deleuze's work, which is to expose the mechanisms 
by which transcendence is produced, as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive 
mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory, as a 
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theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or auto- 
critique. Essential to the diagnosis of limitations imposed on desiring or machinic 
production through the negative real generated by transcendent, or illegitimate 
syntheses, to the destruction of the forms which perpetuate these limitations, and to the 
formation of a radical and positive critique, becoming-woman has no organic location 
or social image, aesthetic norm or political motivation. 
`It ya un devenir-fenune qui ne se confond pas avec les femmes, leur 
passe et leur avenir, et ce devenir, il faut bien que les femmes y 
entrent pour sortir de leur passe et de leur avenir, de leur histoire. 
(There is a becoming-woman which is not the same as women, their 
past and their future, and it is essential that women enter this 
becoming to get out of their past and their future, their history)' . -51 
It is comments such as this which have, unsurprisingly, led to women 
questioning the use of becoming-woman, especially at a time when women are 
uncovering the extent of their historical involvement, and the degree to which it has 
been obliterated by the macro-histories of the subject. Yet Deleuze's comments always 
function in two directions at once. Women's history, on a macro-level, has been 
couched in terms of their relations with the subject: getting out of this history and the 
future it projects means at the very least changing the elements in relation to which 
women are understood, and it is this transformation of the assemblages into which 
women move, and through which they are created which becoming-woman effects. 
The other question, of course, might be; what right has a man to tell us what 
and what is not essential for us? And there are occasions on which Deleuze (and 
Guattari's) philosophy takes on a prescriptive air, look out for the fascist within you, 
they say, suggesting everyone has a hidden policeman. Moreover, distinctions such as 
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that in L'anti-oedipe, between legitimate and illegitimate synthesis suggest a bilateral 
disjunction and a potential re-vitalization of dialectics, against which the whole tenor 
of their work drives. However, this thesis does not challenge or address these problems, 
for three reasons. Firstly, because one of the most important and fruitful effects of 
Deleuze's writing lies in its generosity towards those thinkers he admires. If the 
conflictual approach of dialectics, and the operation of the negative as a mechanism of 
movement is to be dissolved, such generosity is necessary as a strategy of reading. 
Secondly, because to address the molar sexuality of an author as a reason for 
discounting elements of his or her writing seems precisely what feminism must not do, 
and cannot, without reproducing precisely that against which it has argued What a 
book does, and what movements it effects, are more important than the specifics of the 
physical bodies which wrote it. And lastly, to quote a friend: 'The problem is one of 
thinking the included disjunction of the legitimate and the illegitimate; of thinking the 
transcendent such that its relation to the immanent is itself one of immanence. 'SZ If this 
is misunderstood, the movement of becoming-women, as Deleuze and Guattari use it, 
is also misunderstood, because it is this problem which underlies the AND logics of 
Deleuze's empiricism, and which mobilizes the movement of desire outside the 
conditions of its production without generating transcendence. 
This perspective demands a new understanding of the body. Nature, matter, 
affection, passion, etc. are not static terms, and as technology drives the perpetual 
reformulation of their scientific conceptualization, so too must the understanding of 
their relations and interconnections with woman change. One aspect of the problem of 
a philosophical feminism is the generation of a response to these transformations: 
beginning from the perspective of "real women" as fully formed socio-political, 
cultural, ethical or aesthetic entities does not constitute a response, because it cannot 
negotiate changes which impact on the machinic production of bodies. 
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As they are philosophically formed, women, like God, are always around, 
usefully, and sometimes not usefully, creative and of great consolation. 53 Schopenhauer 
attributes the dramatist, Jouy, and Byron, a poet, with `the correct viewpoint for 
estimating the value of women'. The former writes: `Without women, the beginning of 
our life would be deprived of help, the middle of pleasure, and the end of 
consolation. 954 The latter omits the middle pleasure zone, concentrating instead on 
women's role as breeder and educator of the young, and as nurse with patient ears for 
the dying sighs of men. Women are cast as altruists, essential components in framing 
the construction space within which humans live and die, whilst they themselves 
appear to be neither born nor to die. 
Observation of actual women is mediated by a litany of exclusive disjunctions, 
each specialty or discipline incorporating its own version: if you don't have a penis, 
you must be castrated; you may have facial hair, or you shouldn't; you don't have 
testes, you must have ovaries; you have no y chromosome, you must have two x's; you 
have a flat chest or you have breasts; you desire men or you don't; you raise your 
consciousness or produce an argument; you are either a woman or a man. Variations 
on the endless series of alternates which sift uniformity over bodies like a caul are 
considered accidents, the result of systematic errors in the interpretation and 
implementation of codes given in advance. Integrations of the body with non-organic 
matters are tolerable only to the extent that it is curative of these aberrations. You can 
get a pace-maker or have your penis involuted into the cavity of your body only if you 
are judged sufficiently sick first. 
Deleuze calls the gods operating these exclusive disjunction the forms of 
recognition and their statement is 'C'est done moi, le roil c'est done ä moi que revient 
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le royaume (so I am the king! So the kingdom belongs to me)1'55 There is something 
remaining of this statement in the argument over possession of Deleuze's thought. The 
lineage of the gods is one of repetition of identity, the occurrence and recurrence of the 
same analogies, myths and fears, whereas becoming-woman is a line of material 
invention, of `connexions qui sautent d'arbre et arbre, et lui deracinent (connections 
that jump from tree to tree and uproot them)' The problem is not how to distribute 
the fruits on an equal basis with men, but how to destroy the trees on which they grow. 
Deleuze calls the jumping signals flashing between the trees demons: demons 
are `puissances du saut, de l'intervalle, de l'intensif ou de l'instant et qui ne comblent 
la difference qu'avec du different (powers of the leap, the interval, the intensive and the 
instant; powers which cover difference with more difference)'. 57 With no identifiability 
or function separable from their productive synthesis, demons become signs only on 
assemblage, in the formation of matters into intensive patterns, communication 
structures. Immanent to its function, nothing other than what it does, and it does and 
thus is nothing except through interaction, a demon is a pure information point, a 
pixel. 
De Landa expands the theme of demons in his book War in the Age of 
Intelligent Machines. Demons create a space called a Pandemonium, where `control is 
never passed from a higher authority to a lesser authority. There are no hierarchical 
levels, but only a heterarchy of demons capturing control whenever they are invoked 
into action. '5" What invokes them into action are data patterns: indeed, they are 
themselves no more than data patterns, or packets of information, which function as 
both messages and addresses. The survival of a demon is a function of its interaction 
with other demons in its locality, where locality is not a geographical position given in 
advance, but the consequence of connections generated amongst demons in the process 
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of developing problem-solving strategies, whose duration is a function of the patterns 
they form, rather than imposed by external criteria, or a function of the life-span of a 
single demon (indeed there are no such things). It is from here, from Deleuze and 
DeLanda, that the title of this thesis comes. It seeks to uncover the demon potential of 
Kant, the play of forces immanent to an actual continuum, an intensive and tactile 
space, which, if Kant is read "appropriately" - by which I mean, in line with the 
formulation of problems in Kant as they are articulated from the perspective of a 
subject, remain imperceptible. 
*** 
The range of the thesis is kept deliberately close: there are few other players 
than Kant and Deleuze. This is undoubtedly a betrayal of both Kant and Deleuze, since 
both can be addressed from a myriad other perspectives. There is no Marx and little 
Freud, no Fichte or Hegel, no Lacan or Lyotard, all of whom connect with both or 
either of Kant and Deleuze. However, there are reasons for this, which arise from the 
theme of feminism, or perhaps more accurately, the situation of women in and by 
philosophy, which is not of necessity equivalent to feminism. For women, the problem 
is not that of the subject: it once was, when feminism positioned itself as the victim of 
the power of a subject which it was not. Women have been situated by this subject 
alongside the object, as more or less its equivalent, in terms of being exchangeable 
commodities, and alongside nature, defined in terms of material reproduction rather 
than conceptual production. My intention is not to argue with this, but to utilize 
Deleuze's method of eliminative deduction: to eliminate the subject and its perspective 
and discover the movements through which the object is formed, and to diagram the 
intensive field which the construction of a subjective space covers up (and which, as 
will be seen, makes Kant nauseous): to suggest a breeding ground for demons. 
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Chapter 1 
`a book on an enemy... ' 
Le discredit dans Icquel est tombee aujourd'hui la doctrine des 
facultes, pig ce pourtant tout ä fait necessaire dans le systeme de la 
philosophie, s'explique par la meconnaissance de cet empirisme 
proprement transcendental, auquel on substituait vainement un 
decalque du transcendental sur 1'empirique. 
(Despite the fact that it has become discredited today, the doctrine of 
the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of 
philosophy. Its discredit may be explained by the misrecognition of 
this properly transcendental empiricism, for which was substituted in 
vain a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical). 1 
The slenderness of Deleuze's book on Kant - his book on an enemy, he says - 
seems to belie the immensity of the task implied by its title, La philosophie critique de 
Kant: Doctrine des facultes. Yet in little over a hundred pages, Deleuze produces an 
elegant and efficient map of the three Critiques which is far from a simple commentary 
or introductory text. 
`[L]a betise... est la faculte des faux problemes, temoignant d'une inaptitude ä 
constituer, ä apprehender et determiner un probleme en tant que tel' (stupidity ... 
is the 
faculty for false problems; it is evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or 
determine a problem as such'). 2 The intelligence in Deleuze's reading of Kant lies in 
his constitution of critique as a real problem, on his selection of elements and in his 
concentration on its systematics. Focusing on the network of the faculties, on the two 
senses of this word in Kant's own writing, on their disjunction into higher and lower 
forms, and on their illegitimate and legitimate employment, he deduces a consistent 
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geography of Kant and takes up the keen edge of critique. This first chapter looks 
briefly at La philosophie critique de Kant and then more broadly at themes in Kant of 
importance to Deleuze's philosophy. 
I System: Faculties in Theory and Practice 
Two senses of the word faculty are always in play, faculty as source and faculty as 
relation. Each faculty is understood both as a type of relation between a representation 
and something else (an object or subject), and as a source of representations. To each 
relation corresponds an interest (or disinterest, in the case of aesthetics) of reason and 
each source legislates a means of realizing this interest, since `rien ne nous garantit 
que la raison se charge elle-meme de realiser son propre interet (there is no guarantee 
that reason itself undertakes to realize its own interest)' 3 Where reason is disinterested, 
it is because it has no affective relation with the world, nothing to either gain or lose; 
this allows feeling to achieve its higher and culturally dignified form, as a pure 
operation of judging of which pleasure is a consequence, independently of desire and 
knowledge. Faculties in the first sense, as relation, are knowledge, desire and the 
feeling of pleasure and pain, whilst faculties in the second sense, as source, are 
sensibility, understanding and reason. 
It is immediately clear that the correspondence between the two senses of 
faculty is not straightforward. Establishing a relation of correspondence between 
knowledge and an object involves input through sensibility, the accord of sensibility 
and understanding relies on the schema of imagination; systematizing knowledge 
requires the aid of reason. So two problems emerge. Taking the faculty of knowledge as 
an example, there must first be a convergence of sources, each contributing a unique 
component to the production of objective knowledge - intuition, in the case of 
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sensibility, concept, in the case of understanding, synthesis (according to schemata), in 
the case of imagination, and Idea in the case of reason. There is a further difference, in 
that three of the faculties are active, whilst sensibility is passive. So the common accord 
of the elements of knowledge involves a dynamic as well as a formal element; it is a 
problem of forces as well as of form, of the relation of passivity to activity. 4 This 
relation cannot be thought through the concepts of substance or cause, since this throws 
the problem into the domain of understanding, rather than understanding it in terms of 
relations amongst faculties as powers which must be thought antecedent to the specific 
constitutional order of any of them individually. It is clear that both sensibility and 
imagination operate, in the first Critique, under the management of understanding - 
Kant writes, for example, of a `synthesis which does not belong to the senses' by 
which `understanding determines the sensibility'. 5 But passivity here is constrained, in 
that it is constituted through the relation of sensibility to the activity of understanding, 
from the perspective of understanding, and thus not transcendentally, as Kant writes, it 
is `a matter of fact' that the unity apparently belonging to sensibility, through which 
the forms of intuition become formalized and conceptual, is determined by 
understanding. 6 A matter of fact, rather than a problem of the real conditions of the 
possibility of facts. This means that this determining synthesis is not transcendental. 
As the Introduction made clear, the transcendental as a problem must be 
thought in relation to the Aesthetic rather than the Analytic, in order to preclude a 
psychologistic interpretation thought in terms of the subject. In order to understand this 
dynamic relation of the faculties, therefore, a thought of passivity not delimited in 
advance by understanding needs to be formulated: this is the topic of a later chapter, 
however, so will not be pursued here. A further point is that the type of activity 
associated with understanding differs from that attaching to imagination: the former is 
described by Kant as spontaneous, the latter as productive. In order to preclude the 
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collapse of the Kantian architecture into the dry zones of concepts and understanding, 
these differences need to be articulated; if they are not, the dynamic relation amongst 
the faculties is subsumed under formal constraints imposed by the operations of 
judgement and the functional unity of the categories, and the problematic aspects of the 
system of faculties, together with the manner in which Deleuze understands this as 
integral to critique, to critical method, are lost. 
The second problem addresses the first, that of convergence in a common 
form. The achievement of common sense - whether logical, moral or aesthetic - is 
dependent on an attitude of reason - interest in logical and moral common sense, and 
disinterest in aesthetic common sense. Common sense is a managed convergence of 
faculties on a shared task of recognizing an object as the Same. In the first Critique. 
Kant refers to a `common function of the mind (gemeinschaftliche Funktion des 
Gemfits]' by which the disparate components of knowledge are combined into one 
representation. In the Critique of Judgement, the idea of common sense [Gemeinsinn] 
provides the criteria by which subjective judgements of taste can be presented as 
objective, removing taste from the private domain of the individual, legitimating the 
demand for universal assent to aesthetic judgements on the beautiful and attributing 
them with the modality of necessity. ' Common sense is the means by which the quality 
of sensation can be conceived of as uniformly and universally communicable; taste, 
Kant writes, `could be called a sensus communis aestheticus, and common 
understanding a sensus communis logicus. '8 Under the idea of common sense, 
therefore, a subjective quality of feeling, different to sensation, becomes the ground for 
an objective statement of aesthetic value. 
Common understanding `is regarded as the very least that we are entitled to 
expect from anyone who lays claim to the name of human being'9; it functions both 
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vertically, as a means of differentiating man from the animals, as a creature who rises 
above sensation, and horizontally, as a means of ensuring the propagation of `truth, 
propriety, beauty, or justice', as shared human ideals which define a community of man 
as a creature with `higher cognitive powers'. 1° Membership of this community is thus 
predicated on assent to its cultural values, its epistemological norms and its moral 
laws: as will be seen, all these are problematic in relation to women. 
Common sense, a uniform accord amongst the faculties such that knowledge, 
taste and morality become public zones, rather than personal and private, becomes a 
question not only of establishing relations, but also of ensuring that they reflect (for a 
naturalized common sense) or realize (a priori common sense) an interest (or 
disinterest) of reason. `L'idee d'une pluralite (et d'une hierarchie) systematique des 
interets... domine la methode kantienne (The idea of a systematic plurality (and a 
hierarchy) of interests... dominates the Kantian method')': this community of interests 
is the `principe d'un systeme des fins (the principle of a system of ends)' unrealizable 
by nature. 12 Immanent critique, as the method of transcendental philosophy in a 
Kantian sense, sets out the nature and realization of these ends. 
The balancing of interests of reason does not form common sense, but good 
sense: privileging speculative interests threatens practical interests, and Kant's 
statement of good sense, of limiting knowledge to make room for faith, indicates two 
things. Firstly, that achieving equilibrium of interests requires both limitation and 
negation, which, as will be seen later in this chapter, are two of the functions which 
Deleuze argues corrupt the critical method and lead to a degenerate formulation of the 
transcendental. And secondly that good sense and common sense complement each 
other, in the formation of a single Image of thought, another line in Deleuze's relation 
with Kant which is addressed in chapter two. 
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To ensure the balance of interest and system of ends, one faculty (in the first 
sense, as relation) must play two roles: it must contribute, on a horizontal plane of 
integration, to common sense, and also, through the discovery of an autonomy from 
natural common sense and an internal legislative capacity, determine the relation of 
common sense to its objects, legislating vertically, from above, for the realization of an 
interest of reason. That is, one faculty provides the a priori conditions of natural 
common sense, colouring it as logical, aesthetic or moral. In the case of knowledge, it 
is understanding that legislates: it determines imagination to synthesize schematically, 
according to the concepts, and generalizes over intuition. In a `synthesis which does 
not belong to the senses' but to an imagination constrained to schematize by universal 
rule `the understanding determines the sensibility', defining it as a receptive channel, 
and as contributing to the delimitation of differences, between objective and subjective 
knowledge, and between legitimate and illegitimate theoretical claims. 13 To contribute 
to theoretical or logical common sense, sensibility must be free of subjective sensation - 
pleasure and pain - but nonetheless have a form of immediacy with the real in 
experience which legitimates the claim of objective knowledge, confirming or 
contributing towards a speculative interest of reason. 
Determination of sensibility by understanding also produces a limiting device, 
the noumenon, the representation of an object in a purely intelligible, non-sensible 
world. At the same time as understanding `entitles an object in a relation mere 
phenomenon ... [it] ... forms, apart from that relation, a representation of an object in 
itself (Gegenstande in sich selbst)', on which the concepts have no legitimate purchase, 
but which, nonetheless, the understanding `must think'. 14 Thinking in the absence of 
sensibility - and so in the absence not only of intuition, but also of intensive 
magnitudes, the real in experience, understanding thinks of a negative object which 
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forms a conceptual limit of the objective validity of sensible knowledge, preventing the 
intellectualization of sensibility, (an Aristotelian failing which Kant accuses Locke of 
perpetuating). Although Kant appears to assimilate the thing-in-itself and the 
noumenon, the function of the two is quite different. The noumenon concerns limits, 
and the negotiation of a single territory under the forms of two different laws, and is 
not unknowable in principle, only in relation to the limitations of human cognition. 
Articulated in relation to phenomena which are objects constituted according to the 
unity of rule of categories, the noumenon is a gap which can be filled and made 
positive only by practical reason. The thing-in-itself, however, attaches to problems of 
thresholds, to matter and sensation, and so to intensities. Deleuze does not discuss the 
thing-in-itself explicitly. However, as has been seen in the Introduction this Kantian 
problem feeds through the Schopenhauerian will and on into Nietzsche's will to power. 
Whilst there are clearly differences to be argued between the thing-in-itself, the will-to- 
life and the will-to-power, the fundamental problem is that of an impersonal, non- 
transitive and unconscious process inseparable from but not identical with, force. 
Deleuze will call this process machinic or desiring-production. Having declared this 
thread as common throughout the different formulations provided by these three 
thinkers, a lengthier discussion will be left for chapter two. 
The noumenon, as the negative doctrine of sensibility, is an object produced 
by understanding when it claims determinate knowledge of something in general, 
extending its legislation beyond the aggregation of particulars in experience and 
seeking knowledge independently of sense. Since the accord of the faculties in 
knowledge is not free, as it is in aesthetics, the production of common sense must 
involve not only mechanisms for convergence amongst the various sources but also the 
exclusion of differences which are either not commensurate with realizing a speculative 
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interest of reason, or which trample on other interests of reason. The noumenon is a 
solution to the co-ordination of speculative and practical interests. 
The transcendental use of understanding, its claim to know something in 
general, or the negative noumenon, converges with the transcendent use of reason, and 
reason's claim of knowledge of an object corresponding to an Idea. Under what 
conditions of possibility? It is this latter uncritical `supposition qui entrain 
1'entendement lui-meme Bans son usage transcendantal illegitime (supposition that 
draws the understanding itself into its illegitimate transcendental employment)''S. Or 
as Kant puts it, speculative reason is `compelled to assume' the noumenon, pressed by 
law to provide the negative space for the transfer of one kind of causality into 
another. 16 The Critique of Pure Reason militates against the confusion of these two 
zones. Whilst different legislative powers are involved, they occupy a single territory, 
and only by acting negatively against the passivity of sense is the negotiation of this 
space between reason and understanding successful in realizing an end of reason. 
Understanding utilizes the noumenon negatively, limiting sensibility by 
providing a foundation for appearances, only if it does not also suppose itself to have 
legislative authority over this object: it must, at the same time as limiting sensibility 
`set["1 limits to itself. " Reason allows understanding to operate in its speculative 
interest only if, whilst legislating over experience it also recognizes the limits of its 
jurisdiction: so understanding legislates in two senses, both in relation to the 
convergence of faculties in common sense, and in relation to itself. In relinquishing the 
claim to know an object in general independently of sense, understanding leaves free a 
space which, in its positive sense is filled by morality: understanding projects a 
negative surface on which practical reason inscribes its positive face, the pure form of 
Law. 
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II System -A Gap 
In exploring relations amongst the faculties in his book on Kant, Deleuze makes 
marks: that is to say, certain problems are flagged or differences made precise, spaces 
made clear, which are taken up, in radically different form, in his later work For 
instance, he writes: 
`chaque foil que nous'nous placons ainsi du point de vue d'un 
rapport ou d'un accord dejä determine, dejä spccifie, il est fatal que le 
sens commun nous paraisse une sorte de fait a priori au-delä duquel 
nous ne pouvons pas remonter. 
(each time we assume the perspective of a relationship or an accord 
which is already determined, it is inevitable that common sense 
should seem to us a kind of a priori fact beyond which we cannot 
go), '8 
In other words, common sense cannot answer the question of its own genesis, 
of an a priori subjective accord, a balance of difference not predicated on unity and not 
determined by experience. Deleuze's criticism of Kant is, at its most naked, that whilst 
he provides an account of the production of representation, he fails to provide an 
account of the production of production, and in the book on Kant, the question of the 
genesis of the faculties and of their accord is opened. What produces the effect of 
formal laws extrinsic to experience, which determine universally its nature, shape, 
pattern and order through the various determinate relations amongst faculties? Kant 
rejects a Leibnizian solution through pre-established harmony and indeed, the first 
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Criitique provides no solution at all. The problem is deferred until the Critique of 
Jud y, e ment, where it can be seen that the common sense relations of differentiated 
faculties brought about by the legislation of one faculty over others are dependent on 
their prior free and indeterminate accord. The universal, necessary and public space of 
cognition has its genesis not in law, but in a proportionally differentiated `attunement 
[Stimmung] of the cognitive powers', the differences being conditioned by `what 
difference there is among the objects that are given. '19 From the free accord of 
imagination and understanding in judgements of taste in the beautiful, and from that 
which arises out of the discordant and unregulated relation of imagination and reason 
in the sublime, a public space of communicability is formed, 'the necessary condition 
of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in any 
logic' 20 In judgements of the sublime and of the beautiful, reason is disinterested. 
However, the possibility of disinterest itself testifies to their security. Judgements of 
taste on the beautiful have a logical form commensurate with understanding and the 
idea of a norm or standard of beauty is achieved through an averaging process which, 
whilst not conscious, is nonetheless mechanically repeatable. And judgements on the 
sublime require culture. 
The problems of the genesis of the faculties is one amongst others which will 
find, through labyrinthine routes, a solution in machinic production, and the relation of 
machinic assemblages to the body without organs, and is addressed in chapter two. 21 
The beginnings of this solution follow on in chapter two, but it is not fully explored 
until a later one, when more of its elements have been provided. 
Another mark made on the Kantian system in La philosophie critique de Kant 
pertains to Deleuze's empiricism, and the space that Kant opens up for a pre-legislative 
dynamic - the dynamic which Schopenhauer will take up and call the ai11. 
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Theoretically, this is not possible: objects of knowledge constructed in contradiction of 
natural law are impossible, outside the limits of understanding, this latter being 
defined as giving the law to nature. It is illegitimate for understanding to make a claim 
over the empty space of the noumenon on behalf of knowledge, a claim to know the 
object in general. It treads on the feet of practical reason and breaks the systematic 
unity of the ends of reason apart: `nous perdons seulement la condition sous laquelle 
[notre existence intelligible] fait partie d'une nature et compose avec les autres un tout 
systematique (we lose the condition under which [our intelligible existence] forms part 
of a nature and composes, with the others, a systematic whole)' 22 Practically it is not 
possible either. Practical reason gives the law to freedom as absolute and categorical, 
and pure practical reason has no choice but to act legitimately - that is to say, within 
the realm of law. Practical reason is meant to realize its Law in action. But the space 
that Deleuze opens up is against Law not through intent or choice, but through 
reference to a pre-legislative economy - that economy of the will which Schopenhauer 
will draw from Kant and which seeds one of the directions which feeds into Deleuze's 
thought. 
Whilst the previous mark was concerned with the production of harmony 
amongst the faculties, here it is a question of what conditions the good sense union of 
sensibility and intelligibility and the coherence of theory and practice. What ensures 
that good sense is good in itself, rather than merely a means to some other, not 
necessarily good, end? What ensures that restriction of one legislative domain by the 
affairs of another is limited to their territorial effects, whilst the domains themselves 
remain separate? Only insofar as a creature is both legislator and obedient subject of 
the Law, in its pure form, does there arise `a systematic union of rational beings under 
common objective laws - that is, a kingdom [ein Reich]'23 and this end is possible only 
insofar as good sense is categorically defined as `necessary, in virtue of its principle, 
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for a will which of itself accords with reason'. 4 What conditions the union of 
sensibility and intelligibility as good sense is Law, the positive side of Kantian theory. 
Where good sense is absent, or there is a positive failure to recognize the ideal 
of the Reich, we `cessons d'etre sujets, mais d'abord parce que nous cessons d'etre 
legislateurs (cease to be subjects, but primarily because we cease to be legislators)', so 
transforming our relation with both sense and desire. 5 It is this transformation of sense 
and desire outside the framework of both the subject and law which points towards a 
pre-legislative domain, for which Kant opens a space. Making a point which is integral 
to a later theme in his work, regarding the impossibility of a completed system - he 
says often that something always escapes - Deleuze argues against the identification of 
practical reason, as pure form of Law, and freedom, as a problematic idea. This is not a 
point about Kant's moral theory. It is indeed the case that the space between freedom 
and legislation opened up by Kant is immediately closed, and that it must be assumed 
that obedience to maxims contrary to the categorical imperative nonetheless still 
constitutes a choice. What is important in Deleuze's use of Kant is the selection of 
gaps and breaks within the construction of the critical system; that is, he does not 
produce a reading or interpretation of Kant but rather constructs a machine which 
utilizes those breaks and gaps, putting critique to work beyond the limits of reason, 
speculative or practical. 
In his reading of Kant and his movement of critique beyond the threshold of 
reason, these smallest differences generate global effects on the system, because they 
are mobilized intensively, across the actual continuum and not extensively, through the 
lines scored on space by its theoretical demarcation. In this case as in others the issue 
concerns the real nature of problems, or the nature of real problems. Not: what 
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conditions experience, or our knowledge of objects, but what principles are inunanent 
to the genesis of a concrete world? 
In an interview with Foucault, Deleuze talks of the relation of theory and 
practice; instead of a defined and immovable limit demarcating the two, he refers to a 
mobile connection. Under the conditions of representation, practice is at times the 
application of theory, its technical consequence, a theory applied to matter, whilst at 
others, theory is a consequence of practice, drawn out of the empirical or through the 
subjective maxims of the pure form of Law. However, Deleuze wants to fragment their 
relation, and to reformulate theory as local, relative only to the domain it describes and 
exhausted by its practice, rather than universal and legislating beyond the concrete 
exhaustion of its terms. It may have application to other domains, but the theory itself 
does not involve the necessity of this. In other words, it is contingent, encountering 
obstacles, problems which necessitate side-ways moves, the incorporation of new 
elements, which do not function as buttresses to the theory, additional hypotheses in 
support of a major claim, but whose addition feeds back into the theory to transform its 
nature. It is in this sense that Deleuze's work might be called theoretical: rather than 
providing a single set of rules which encompass all concrete machines, and in terms of 
which all empirical contingencies can be hypothesized, he provides radically abstract 
rules, whose functioning is not pre-inscribed in their articulation, but contingent and 
differentiated according to the domain of practice. Practice is described as an 
assemblage of relays, which mobilize a theory, moving it across domains, through 
walls, whilst theory allows for the relay of practices. The relation is one of mutual 
reciprocation and interaction, rather than of fixed rule and principle. There is an action 
of theory and a passion of practice, a series of transformations by which theory 
becomes practice and practice becomes theory. 'Mn systeme de relais dans un 
ensemble, dans une multiplicite de pieces et de morceaux ä la fois theoriques et 
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pratiques (a system of relays in an assemblage, a multiplicity of parts and fragments 
simultaneously both theoretical and practical)' 26 As is often the case with Deleuze's 
reformulation of philosophical orthodoxies, such as the separation of theory and 
practice, the distinction becomes untenable once it is reconfigured; instead of a 
distinction one is left with an assemblage, a machine which constructs both theory and 
practice, but which is definable in terms of neither. 
This digression on theory/practice relations explain Deleuze's attention to the 
gap which maintains their separation in Kant, and the utilization of the tiniest interval 
teased open between freedom and law as an interzone of autonomy, where desire is not 
constrained by law to produce objects, nor sense similarly constrained by 
understanding. The idea (here, of freedom) remains problematic, as it is in the 
theoretical philosophy, but practical Law provides no solution to it, because it is no 
longer an idea produced under compulsion, familiar and repeated, and governed by 
duty, obligation and pain, but one which mobilizes the potential for departure from this 
particular territory. 
Kant writes of the occupation of the `vacant place' of the noumenon by the 
moral law: 
`Speculative reason does not herewith grow in insight but only in 
respect to the certitude of its problematic concept of freedom, to 
which objective, though only practical, reality is now indubitably 
given. ' 21 
The `zone de libre-arbitre (zone of arbitrium liberum)', however, is unknown, 
uncertain, and the nature of its reality is not indubitably given: that is, it is 
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contingent, its conditions are unknown and its effects are not played out on the territory 
where the laws of theory and practice operate mutually restrictive devices against each 
other. It is neither a negative theoretical device limiting sensibility nor a positive 
practical device. 
The logical test of practical reason is made by analogy with theoretical laws: 
`the maxim which I adopt in respect to freely disposing of my life is 
at once determined when I inquire what it would be in order that a 
system of nature could maintain itself in accordance with such a 
law. 29 
A theoretical model of a form of law is a test for pure practical reason; the 
subject judges the truth or validity of the law he applies to himself by an analogy 
between the two domains of theory and practice: a correlation of the two confirms the 
unity of natural causality and freedom under the law, and the noumenon is the name 
for this correlation. As Kant says, `the concept of freedom is meant [der 
Freiheitsbegriff soll] to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws'. 0 
This meaning would translate into theoretical nonsense, if the laws of the sensible 
world were incommensurate with those of the practical. If the two domains of theory 
and practice did not resolve into - at least in principle - an unconditioned unity, the 
territory which they share would crack apart: this is what Kant recognizes when he 
calls for a critique of reason as a means of preventing a lapse into a state of nature as 
warfare, and what he is underlining in his references to nomads and barbarians who 
cross the terrain of thought without having first secured possession of a ground. 
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In the Prolegomena, Kant says that discovery of the a priori concepts of 
understanding demands no greater insight than detection of grammatical laws: in no 
case is it possible to say `why each language has just this and no other formal 
constitution' 31 Theoretically, one must assume it is contingent. However, that it is not 
contingent but bears a necessity predicated on moral law is made clear by the statement 
above: the meaning of freedom, and the fact that it makes theoretical sense - that 
analogies between moral maxim and theoretical law are possible - is a function of the 
Law. 
The autonomous interzone in freedom on which Deleuze picks up escapes this 
analogy and the meaning of law: it is intelligible (which means no more than it 
expresses sense) and sensible (which means that it is intensive and that it is not 
legislative - sensibility does not legislate, being immanently passive, where passivity is 
not understood in relation to activity, but as passional and generative of affects). It thus 
cuts a transverse line across Kant's system which escapes the systematics of reason, its 
cultural, moral, political and theoretical ends, and describes a different diagram of 
critique, one of practice and pragmatics, and a contingent autonomy. It is sensible; 
relative in the sense that it is attached to the concrete, but not relative in a liberal sense 
whereby one is necessitated to respect alternative opinions, alternative approaches; 
intelligible, but not rational, problematic but not subjective, effective but not caused 
and patterned but not meaningful. Falling on the side of neither theory nor practice, 
having unhinged sensibility from its reliance on various forms of imposed activity and 
disassociated autonomy from the freedom to impose Law on oneself, something escapes 
reason but not critique, nor indeed the problem of the transcendental. 
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III Deleuze's Escape Route 
The interconnections amongst the faculties and across the three Critiques produce a 
`veritable systeme de permutations (complete system of permutations', at once both 
static and creative, which distributes amongst itself the immanent problem of its own 
construction. 32 This latter point is of importance: Deleuze's reading of Kant is not 
comparative - his interest is not in whether Kant produces a more theoretically 
consistent epistemology than another philosopher, or in how apposite his practical 
philosophy is to the late twentieth century, but in what is immanent to the production 
of Kantian philosophy. So there are no (or very few) accusations of unjustified 
assumptions, Scholastic hangovers or claims that some other thinker has generated 
more satisfying solutions to problems with which Kant deals: nor does Deleuze engage 
in corrective analyses, suggesting "improvements" to Kant's thought in order to rectify 
apparent inconsistencies. There are `pas d'idees justes, juste des idees (no correct ideas, 
just ideas)', some of which are illusions, but none of which are wrong. 33 The little Kant 
book begins with Kant's own definition of philosophy, as `the science of the relation of 
all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason' 34 And Deleuze reads the system 
of faculties within these terms; but through the additive effect of the marks he makes 
and the selection and connection of elements which, unhinged, elude these ends, he 
removes the thought of a faculty system from its contained place within a subject, and 
opens it up to the world. This is the beginnings of an assemblage, or desiring-machine. 
Whilst he calls the book a book on an enemy, Deleuze is neither destructive nor 
aggressive, but camouflaged, disengaging the Kantian machine from common sense in 
the process of analyzing its production as such. 
The problems of critique are production and the real, synthesis and sense, and 
the transcendental method concerns how, rather than what, or in which direction, to 
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think not how one must, or how it is possible to think, but what are the conditions of a 
genealogy of thinking, how does practice mobilize theory, through walls, outside 
departments, beyond institutions and into the streets? How does theory diagram 
practice, transforming its potential directions? Because Deleuze understands the 
transcendental in a rigorously critical manner, it does not function as a conditioning 
presupposition; as will be seen more clearly in a later chapter, it becomes an abstract 
machine, evacuated of structure and immanent to the production of the concrete, a 
genetic rather than conditioning element. This is the route that Deleuze takes, 
connecting the marks and gaps in Kant and using the machine he constructs to undo 
common sense and depart from the direction of good sense, his language changing as 
the system produces its own escape lines, becoming less academic, faster, more dense 
as it picks up speed, until in L'Anti-Oedipe his practice escapes philosophical theory 
and builds a different, strange machine. But I am running ahead of the problem of this 
chapter. 
`[I11'y a des Ides qui parcourent toutes les facultes, n'etant l'objet d'aucune 
en particulier (there are Ideas which traverse all the faculties, but are the object of none 
in particular)'; Ideas which `vont de la sensibilite ä la pensee, et de la pensee A la 
sensibilite (go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility)' 35 But pass 
not through theory, practice, or their completion in an Image of thought. It is this 
problem, of thought as the superior or transcendental exercise of sense, the practice of 
sense, rather than its theoretical description, which Deleuze pursues, and the remainder 
of this chapter explores further aspects of Kant's writing which support his claim that 
sense is the real discovery of transcendental philosophy. 
The system of faculties, Deleuze argues, points towards a transcendental 
empiricism implicit in Kant, the discovery of sense as a transcendental faculty being 
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radically incommensurate with the general logic of the understanding. Kant betrays 
this discovery on three counts at least. Firstly, through the convergence of knowledge 
into a form of common sense; secondly, by directing thought teleologically, 
complementing common sense with good sense; and lastly by installing a form of 
conditioning which dictates that problems are understood in terms of the possibility of 
their solution. These components - an emphasis on the network or system of faculties, 
the problem of the vector of thought, and the discovery of sense as the properly 
transcendental element - are at the basis of Deleuze's relation with Kant. 
IV Problem I 
In Difference et Repetition, Deleuze writes that what is essential to any problem is 'the 
genesis of the act of thought, the operation of the faculties'. 35 A problem, or Idea, is 
defined not through the possibility of its solution, through a need to provide a correct, 
or true response to a question, but transcendentally. Understood in terms of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, this remark suggests that the transcendental as a problem 
cannot be characterized in terms of the Analytic, since this instances only a solution, 
the functions of judgement providing a conceptual framework for a set of propositions 
true within a given and limited field. The transcendental problem, or Idea is one for 
'which there is no solution' in advance, no common sense answer, and, according to 
the limits of knowledge established by Kant, no solution in principle. 37 Each solution 
is complete, but problems are abstract - Deleuze is critical of Kant for naming the 
Ideas, a move which defines an area or possibility of solution. How else, for example 
could God, freedom and immortality be solved other than by religion or morality? 
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Yet whilst a problem cannot be defined in terms of its solutions, just as the 
concrete practice of theory never resembles the theory itself, nonetheless a problem 
determines and is inseparable from its solutions; there is thus a paradox. Tracing the 
outlines of a problem from the instances of its solution and trying to solve paradoxes 
with a reversible and symmetrical logic falls foul of natural or philosophical illusions, 
leading to a misunderstanding not only of the sense of an Idea, but also of the nature of 
the transcendental. One ends up oscillating between two domains, without the two 
every meeting or interacting. Deleuze takes the transcendental as a serious problem, 
and is rigorous about the need to understand it in terms of immanence. However, 
unlike Kant, it is not immanent to reason, but to critique; it becomes the principle of 
critical practice, the abstract thought of zero presuppositions. This is one reason why, 
as theory, it is not traceable from its solutions, since solutions are empirical, 
contextual, temporary, and their discovery feedsback into their conditions and 
transforms them, as different. 
Deleuze's problems are sense and thought, Ideas inseparable from their 
solutions, yet not traceable from the instances of these. Problems are given as produced, 
as empirical and produced as given, immanently, this relation being neither 
symmetrical nor bilateral, each element being continually displaced and destabilized in 
a becoming which is not anchored to being. A solution is unilaterally differentiated 
from its problem: `Ic distingue s'oppose ä quelque chose qui ne peut pas s'en 
distinguer, et qui continue d'epouser cc qui divorce avec lui (something which 
distinguishes itself - and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish 
itself from it)' 38 The paradox of this relation, of a surface rising from itself, folding 
within itself and involuting, is inseparable from Deleuze's thought. 
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Deleuze marries Kant's insistence on immanence with a Leibnizian system, 
which he plugs into the crack within the Kantian subject effected through the 
introduction of time, a sense which fractures general logic. 39 The Transcendental 
Aesthetic becomes a problem whose genesis is connected with the unfolding of an 
infinite plane of immanence, and with material relations which produce rather than 
presuppose time and space. From Kant, there is the illegitimation of a transcendent 
determining form and from Leibniz a system whose elements are nested; `Each portion 
of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But 
every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop of their 
liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond. i40 This opens out a radically 
different Kant, and begins to characterize Deleuze's critique as a microanalysis of 
power: of the mechanisms by which signs are inverted, positive to negative or negative 
to positive: of the slightest deviations from the systematics of reason, which, when 
connected, escape the damage of law. By marrying systems against reason, and by 
cutting across Kantian territory, rather than following the lines of its structural 
organization and the rules of his thought, Deleuze begins to uncover the genesis of the 
transcendental in sense, imperceptible to the conceptual generalizations to which it is 
reduced in the Analytic in the first Cr taue. Rather than functioning as a set of 
conditioning principles, the transcendental becomes a part added alongside the 
concrete machine, not as a whole in terms of which the machine can be explained, but 
as another working element immanent to the empirical, but not definable in its terms. 
By connecting critique and the network of the faculties with an open 
systematics of nested and differential elements not co-ordinated by or subordinated to a 
centralized subject, the whole assemblage functioning instead as an intensive 
magnitude modulated through the pure form of time, Deleuze flips Kant onto an 
intensive synthetic axis, connecting time with the discussion of intensity in the 
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Anticipations of Perception, using only the smallest intervals and differences in Kant's 
writings in the creation of an effect which does not leave Kant intact, but opens him 
up, as a surface of variation and change. It is important not to understanding nesting 
extensively: each "nest" is not inside another, in the sense that, by analysis, one could 
discover and lay out a coherent and total system. Because the system is intensive, each 
movement changes the relations of all parts, the distributions and densities of space. 
Deleuze follows a critical vector which is neither mechanically nor organically 
structured - that is, it is neither a system of understanding or an architectonic of reason 
- but `an unconscious in finite understanding... that Kant will himself be forced to 
discover when he will hollow out the difference between a determinant and a 
determinable self 41: the problem of time, sense and the thing-in-itself. 
Because Deleuze does not argue relations between the three Critiques, or 
internal to any one Critique in terms of contradictions or resemblances between them, 
critique becomes an open system which is `merely transformed by the different foldings 
it receives', a plastic and mobile space 42 The transcendental becomes an abstract 
distributed surface of flows and assemblages rather than a hierarchical edifice enclosed 
within the bounds of reason, and each Critique becomes an engagement with a reason 
whose sense constitutes a response or solution to transformations in the abstract space 
of the transcendental: a machine. 
This move is of crucial importance, since it implies infinite variations 
generated immanently to a finite open system by intensive elements: a system in 
continuous displacement. By bringing what is imperceptible and analytically 
intractable within Kant's philosophy to its surface and allowing it to function 
synthetically, by connecting and interweaving lines and elements from philosophies 
and philosophers, stealing something from here, something else from there, Deleuze 
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assembles a nuanced, fluid Kant, no longer the stolid moralist and oppressor of 
difference but unknowing inventor of a problem. 
The critical treason in Deleuze's reading of Kant is double, in two senses. 
One, chronologically, because although the potential of the transformation is 
implicated in the early work, it is only in Deleuze's later writings that the components 
selected and connections effected interact without reference to their source, critique 
becoming an impersonal and abstract machinic force, auto-critique, or as it comes to be 
called in Anti-Oedipus, schizoanalysis. By which time it is as legitimate to claim that 
Kant has nothing to do with Deleuze as it is to claim that Deleuze has produced a 
Kant-becoming. And secondly, because Deleuze splits Kant across an unfamiliar axis 
which connects intensities with differential relations, so drawing the problem of force 
into the dialectic, and Ideas with individuals, so the latter become solutions to the 
former. 
Again, a paradox, Deleuze's critique being both immanent to the system of 
faculties, as an intensive depth, whilst at the same time differentiated from Kant, not as 
a single line of departure, but through the selection of tiny intervals, and their 
connection in a movement which transforms the nature of the conditions, and opens 
out the potential for a Kant whose problems are not locked into a subject. His concern 
is not to establish a doctrine of faculties, but to determine its presuppositions and 
discover its machinery. In the next chapter, the image of recognition which blocks this 
move will be circumnavigated. 
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Losing Face 
`La noologie, qui ne se confond pas avec l'ideologie, est 
precisement 1'etude des images de la pensee, et de leur historicite. 
D'une certaine maniere, on pourrait dire que cela n'a guere 
d'importance, et que la pensee n'a jamais eu qu'une gravite pour rire. 
Mais elle ne demande que ca: qu'on ne la prenne pas au serieux, 
puisqu'elle peut d'autant mieux penser pour nous, et toujours 
engendrer ses nouveaux fonctionnaires, et que, moins les gens 
prennent la pensee au serieux, plus ils pensent conformement ä ce 
qu'un Etat veut. 
(`Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely the study of 
images of thought, and their historicity. In a sense, it could be said 
that all this has no importance, that thought has never had anything 
but laughable gravity. But that is all it requires: for us not to take it 
seriously. Because that makes it all the easier for it to think for us, 
and to be forever engendering new functionaries. Because the less 
people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with 
what the State wants)'. ' 
In its broadest sense and throughout, Deleuze's writing constitutes a critique 
of images which have protected the assumption that everyone knows what thinking 
means. In the early book, Nietzsche et la Philosophie, he summarizes three theses 
essential to the dogmatic image of thought: truth is the formal possession of sincere 
thought; error is in opposition to truth, the effect of forces alien to thought; method is 
the means by which the formal possession of truth is protected from the distractions of 
error - `corps, passions, intdrets sensibles (body, passions, sensuous interests)' 2 Truth 
is abstract and universal, method is independent of context, and always remote from 
the errors of the senses. 
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Deleuze writes that it is disturbing that thought understood in this way `n'ont 
jamais fait de mal ä personne. Le fait est que l'ordre etabli et les valeurs en cours y 
trouvent constamment leur meilleur soutien (has never hurt anyone. In fact the 
established order and current values constantly find their best support in truth 
conceived in this way)' 3 By not taking seriously the professed innocence of thought, by 
not exploring the prejudicial nature of an image which protects itself by negating the 
body, the senses, the passions, desire and the potential cruelties of thinking, philosophy 
embraces stupidity, and even this is misunderstood, as bestiality or laziness or error. 
Stupidity is not these, however but the condition under which misadventures in thought 
are categorized as either truth or error: leading to thought as quiz-show, Deleuze says. 
Stupidity is a structure of thought as such: hence Deleuze's question: why has stupidity 
never been considered as `l'objet d'une question proprement transcendentale (the object 
of a properly transcendental question)' 4 Whilst the legitimacy of thought as a juridical 
and image-bound process is deduced, the intelligence of this process, of this sort of 
deduction as a legitimation of the real nature of thought, is never made the object of 
critique. 
Deleuze targets several prejudices: that thought has a natural rectitude; that 
amongst the undeniable elements of thought are included subjectivity, representation, 
and discourse; that a common sense proper to the nature of thought distributes a form 
of the Same, an identity continuous throughout the diversity of empirical fields: that 
good sense determines a principle of direction which forces choice and eliminates 
alternative routes and patterns of thought: that thought has a form of interiority 
modelled on the State which, once given, is universalized: and finally, that the value of 
thought is established - that it is, indeed, we who think, who know who we are and 
what we think. The first person plural indicates not modesty or reticence in the face of 
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saying `I think', but illustrates that thought has been consigned to regurgitating the 
particular in the light of what is generally thought, of what thought holds in common. 
Deleuze's reading of Kant is twofold, however: the critique of the dogmatic image 
simultaneously engages elements of critique which are not under the regulation of good 
sense, nor constituted by common sense, and so not under the grammar of the "we". 
This minor treatment of Kant strips out the power structures, culture, doctrine, dogma, 
the ends of reason, sense and thought, so efficiently and elegantly mapped out in the 
little Kant book, to expose critique's potential becomings. s 
I Recognition 
The principle presupposed by the image of thought, Deleuze argues, is that of 
recognition. Recognition implies a transcendental model which orients thought 
according to rules of distribution which function specifically to limit and control its 
relation with sense by requiring thought to be thought of an object, of something, 
something in general, something = x. The element of generality, of both scope and 
direction, is essential to the dogmatic image of thought, since it allows for the 
substitution of particulars on a horizontal plane, each and every object being 
exchangeable for any other object, and the subsumption of particulars on a vertical 
plane, each relation being contained under emptier but more general laws. There is no 
need for caution, thinking on this plane, because it is a general space organized 
identically throughout. No danger, no surprise. Extrinsic to sense, the form of the 
object in general lays claim to the empirical in advance of experience, and prejudices 
the potential force, direction and distribution of synthesis by explicating it along 
generally familiar lines. 
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Recognition of the particular depends on the field of sense becoming an object 
in general for the understanding. As Kant says, `the combination (conjunctio) of a 
manifold in general can never come to us through the senses' and produce recognition, 
since sensibility is passive, intuition is singular and the real is a posteriori 6 The 
conjunction of heterogeneous sensible presentations into a field of generality must 
therefore be an act of understanding, the faculty of representation. However, by 
generalizing the manifold diversity of sense under the form of an object, the real 
elements of sensible relations are inverted and hidden, and the transcendental 
problematic is lost. Conceptual determination according to the unity of rule special to 
understanding generalizes over difference in order to lock it into a relation with 
identity: sensible relations are thus formalized according to the categories of substance, 
causality and community, and the material interactions of bodies are covered over, each 
relation being a particular instance of a formal and general rule. 
In the Aesthetic, Kant says that the parts of time and space, which are pure 
intuitions, presuppose the whole: time is not composed of times nor space of spaces. 
Howm-er, according to the axioms of intuition `All intuitions are extensive 
magnitudes'7, which is to say `the representation of the parts makes possible, and 
therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole'! When predicated of 
the object in general, as empirically real, intuitions - which `rest on affections'- 
become fixed quantities, discrete quanta with particular values which are a function of 
neither sensible nor real relations but of the formal concept of magnitude, and their 
affective genesis formalized, generalized and brought into relation with unity. 9 
According to the concept of magnitude, space and time are divided into metric 
intervals, quanta. As the experience of space is rendered axiomatically extensive, all 
real data becomes subject to cardinal measurability, the former indirectly, through 
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reference to extensity, and the latter directly, and can thus be summed according to an 
additive (+1) principle. 
Matter, in this context, is condensed into a point, and the qualities of forces 
are evaluated independently of real differences in the intensities from which they 
emerge. '° Since the judgement of which the concept of quantity is a function is 
universal, this segmented Euclidean spatio-temporality becomes the field of thought to 
which understanding is limited, the surface on which the image is organized and across 
which a single subject expresses itself in an object in general. In this way a nested and 
intensive system, which is ordinal without the order of the sequence being determined 
by anything extrinsic to the system, becomes subject to a principle of succession 
which dictates that each element counts as a unit of the same magnitude. Ordinal does 
not mean first, second, third... etc., but first, ninth, twenty-third, second, seventeenth: 
not as arbitrary leaps, but as expressions of relations structuring a problem, of qualities 
of force rather than quantities of substance. " 
Only by unhinging the Aesthetic, together with imagination, from 
understanding and its empty conceptual boxes can the empty form of time become a 
carrier of intensive distances and depths of a space without uniformity, which is 
produced as it is crossed, rather than being there before you arrive. This is what 
Deleuze means when he calls the pure line of time a labyrinth: it is spatially intensive, 
just as space is temporally differentiated, and there is no single and uniform time 
which comprehends all space. But one must be careful to differentiate - as Kant does - 
between intensity and intensive magnitude. Intensity is correlated with the material 
qualities of the real: 
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`Appearances contain in addition to intuition the matter [Materien] 
for some object in general... they contain, that is to say, the real [das 
Reale] of sensation as merely subjective representation, which gives 
us only the consciousness that the subject is affected and which we 
relate to an object in general. "2 
Kant is referring to the real here, and not to the concept of reality: the real in 
sensation, or matter of perception, is that qualitative aspect of empirical experience 
which, unlike conceptual reality, cannot be known or anticipated a priori, but without 
which the form of the object in general remains empty and logical. A posteriori and 
intensive, the singular qualities of real relations are, as remarked above, masked, 
diverted and distributed according to conceptual rules extrinsic to their production; the 
qualities of forces are qualified under the general conditions of possibility, making 
them commensurate with subjective unity through their relation to the object in 
general, or transcendental object, correlate of the transcendental subject. 
Through this relation, degrees of intensity become re-describable as intensive 
magnitudes. Intensities effect (but are not equivalent to) sensation, or affects and Kant 
thus ascribes them (not their genesis, but their effect) to the subject; intensive 
magnitude, `a degree of influence on the sense', is ascribed to `all objects of perception, 
in so far as the perception contains sensation. 913 The problem of the generation of 
intensities, as singular and instantaneous effects which testify to relations of bodies 
and of real forces, is lost in this move, which follows that same split described at the 
opening to the Transcendental Aesthetic, which isolates an objective and subjective 
element of sensibility. The intensive and real continuum of which all quanta are 
composed is rationalized through the form of the object, which is folded back over 
intensities, splitting them into sensations on the one hand - subjective, unmeasurable, 
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private experiences of a closed body, and degrees of intensive magnitude on the other - 
objective, measurable, public experiences of qualitative motions by cognitive subjects. 
Kant can only then make the claim that though it may 
`seem surprising that we should forestall experience, precisely in that 
which concerns what is only to be obtained through it, namely, its 
matter-none the less, such is actually the case. "4 
Intensities experienced as sensation are instantaneous. If succession, a concept 
first produced by `[m]otion, an act of the subject [Bewegung, als Handlung des 
Subjekts]' 15is not taken into account, then intensities have no extensive magnitude, 
because their apprehension `does not involve a successive synthesis proceeding from 
parts to the whole representation. 16 That is, they are real qualities, but are not 
commensurable with the axioms of intuition; instead they are discrete and singular, yet 
complex, since the real is infinitely divisible. In the move from intensities understood 
thus to intensive magnitudes as general and anticipatable qualities corresponding to a 
degree of influence on the sense, infinite divisibility is formulated on the extensive 
axis, the pure form of time becomes the form of succession, the act of a subject, and the 
intensive continuum becomes correlated with the successive continuity of time, 
determinable either subjectively, in terms of inner sense, and thus as directional, or in 
terms of the body, and thus without relevance to cognition, or objectively, 
epistemologically, in terms of quanta, and thus as rational and extensive. In all three 
cases the real problem of intensities - of an infinitely divisible, impersonal and pre- 
individual heterogeneous manifold of real qualities - is lost. 
Deleuze is critical of Kant's use of recognition in the Analytic of the first 
Criti e not only for its specific employment in that context, but for its wider function, 
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which is to provide thought with a model of the `concordance des facultes fondee dans 
le sujet pensant comme universel, et s'exercant sur l'objet quelconque (harmony of the 
faculties grounded in the supposedly universal thinking subject and exercised upon the 
unspecified object)'. " Common sense, the collaboration and convergence of faculties 
on the shared task of recognizing an object as the Same, limits thought by requiring 
that, to be legitimate, it adhere to this model. Recognition of the object thus becomes 
the means by which the real relations of sense are differentiated from the formal 
relations of judgement and understanding. That is, recognition is the mechanism by 
which the truth of image and the errors of the body are distinguished. 
But: `11 ya dans le monde quelque chose qui forceä penser' (Something in the 
world forces [us] to think' 18. The limitations imposed on thought by the principle of 
recognition and on sense by its generalization under the form of an object imply a 
paralogism at the heart of Kantian epistemology: sense is separated from what it can 
become by a regime of relations which reduce the real to a condition of general 
possibility, and negate its genetic We in thought. In the first Critique, sense's only 
logic is conceptually conditioned What forces thinking is discounted by this condition, 
which separates a content of thought from a form, and then determines the former on 
the basis of the latter, endorsing hylomorphism. 
*** 
The above gives a negative aspect of Deleuze's Kant, and as such is derivative 
of the positive aspect of critique. "[D]evant un tel genie, il ne peut We question de dire 
qu'on n'est pas d'accord. It faut d'abord savoir admirer, it faut retrouver les probl8mes 
qu'il pose, sa "machinerie ä lui" (in front of such genius, perhaps it is not only a 
question of sa3ing that one does not agree. First of all, you have to know how to 
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admire; you have to rediscover the problems he poses, the "machinery in itself")'. 19 It 
is this positive and generous consideration of the machinery, of the network of 
faculties, which gives Deleuze's critique of Kant its force: he operates with courtesy 
towards his enemy, camouflaging the movements which effect the turn of the result 
against its origin, forging a strange alliance and producing a monstrous offspring. Of 
his practices in the history of philosophy at the time of writing the Kant book he writes 
that he looked on it as a process of screwing (enculage) 2° 
His reading of Kant is, once more, double, a Kant of recognition and the 
image of thought, bureaucratic and moralizing, counterposed with a Kant of synthesis, 
insistence on real conditions and sense as the problem and discovery of the 
transcendental. Unless the network of faculties is simplified, and the critical machinery 
collapsed back into understanding, (in which case the real problem of the 
transcendental is also lost) it is quite plain that imagination is the productive engine of 
synthesis, and that it is only in its epistemological operation that it is legislated by 
understanding, and annexed to recognition. Understanding does have a facility for 
synthesis: however, this is an empty and merely formal combination in the absence of 
data provided through the synthesis of imagination. This latter brings `the manifold of 
intuition into the form of an image' by taking `impressions up into its activity'? ' The 
manifold of intuition, even if pure, is not empty, but nor is it uniform or necessarily 
commensurate with the possibility for recognition: that this is the case is clear from the 
third Critique, where concepts have no purchase, on either aesthetic or natural 
production. 
As Buchdahl writes, this synthesis of imagination is a 'pre-categorised 
process' u If recognition is allowed to infect synthesis at the level of transcendental 
imagination, the import of the schematism for the relation of sensibility and 
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understanding is lost. Kant writes that the `application of categories to appearances 
becomes possible by means of transcendental determination of time' (italics added). " 
Recognition works at the level of the image, whilst the schema, `a product and, as it 
were, a monogram of pure a priori imagination' is a mediating function, a "third 
thing" clearly distinguished from the image, which allows for the application of 
categories to the appearances synthesized in apprehension. In other words, as is 
indicated by the words `becomes possible', the relation of the concepts to appearances 
is transcendentally conditioned by the determination of time through imagination; 
understanding has no immediate relation with the manifold of intuition, and only 
because, in the epistemological task of the first Critique, imagination is functioning 
under the management of understanding, is the determination of time consistent with 
the concepts. Were time only and necessarily determinable according to the pure 
categories of understanding, all experience would be exhausted by the architecture of 
the first Critique. Synthesis does not require recognition; recognition presupposes 
synthesis. The combination of representations by understanding and the spontaneous 
addition of a formal rule to material data presupposes the synthesis of imagination. If 
this important role of imagination is missed, then the real problem of synthesis is also 
missed. 
Mapping the Kant of real problems and sense involves both an abstract 
problem, that `does not explain, but must itself be explained', and an empirical 
problem, of `analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent 
concepts can be extracted from them'. 4 Abstract and empirical together and at once, a 
singularity, and not a particular. Explanation in Deleuze's sense is not, however, 
discursive clarification or interpretation. Analysis of a substantial multiplicity, of the 
state of a "thing" made up of `a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one 
another' is neither exhaustive nor definitive, because the lines tangled in a multiplicity 
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are becomings, material solutions or explanations to real problems of matter and 
energy flows . 
25 There is, for an empirical logic of multiplicities, no "thing", only sets of 
inseparable and continuously varying relations, and analysis is at once synthesis, since 
plugging into a multiplicity effects its reconfiguration, and any change in relation is, 
for an intensive, nested and real system, also a change in nature. There is always an 
escape: indeed, if critique were not immanently creative, Kant would be a dull enemy 
and a feeble ally. 
11 Sense 
In Difference et Repetition. Deleuze differentiates between the given (le 
donne) and 'ce par quoi le donne est donne (that by which the given is given)' 26 
Difference is `ce par quoi le donnd est donne comme divers (that by which the given is 
given as diverse)' 27, the virtual and real condition of concrete appearance, substantial 
multiplicities. Sense is thus both abstract and concrete simultaneously, perceptible and 
imperceptible; it neither explains nor hides itself by forced conduction along pre-given 
co-ordinates but is self-organizing, actualizing the differential relations of the problem 
as a distribution of multiplicities, or diversity-, and whilst space is always to varying 
degrees segmented and partitioned, ordered and structured, there is at the same time 
something that always escapes. 
Deleuze's formulation of the relation of difference and diversity addresses the 
paralogism mentioned above; sense is not separated from what it can become by the 
form of possibility, nor channelled by a r6gime into providing the content for logical 
meanings and forms imposed from outside sense. Instead, it individuates a body, 
making solutions to problems perceptible whilst simultaneously adding the 
imperceptible alongside, not as a unifying or unified element, or as causally related to 
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what is perceived, but as an additional component, which differentiates this assemblage 
from that, not extensively, according to properties or characters attaching to identical 
units, such as organisms or persons, nor through comparisons of differences on the 
basis of a prior commonality, but as the immanent condition of a body as a singularity, 
or haecceity, the term used in Mille Plateaux 
Deleuze distinguishes two senses of difference; differentiation, which belongs 
to a problem, and differenciation, as the concretization of the differential relations of 
the problem. Where these are confused, and the process of actualization is taken to 
instantiate the relations of the problem, the problem discussed earlier, of confusing 
solutions with problems, and attempting to trace the nature of the problem from the 
instances of its solutions arises. 
This early formulation in Difference et Repetition of two communicating 
orders of difference which cannot be referred to a single unifying principle carries 
through, though in different terminology, into the later work. In Mille Plateaus. for 
example, the concrete individual is named an assemblage, whilst differential problems 
become abstract machines: in both cases, what is important is the relation between the 
two. The variables negotiated by the assemblage effectuate the machine, and the latter 
does not exist independently of the former, whilst the former does not function 
independently of the latter. There are passages of communication between the two, 
variations in the variables selected which in turn change in nature of the variables. It 
was said above that there is no time uniform for all space, and no space distributed in 
advance of its occupation: each assemblage or body effectuates a singular machine, 
realizing a space and time without comparison. (The system, needless to say, does not 
wear democracy with ease. ) 
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Kant is criticized, as has been seen, for isolating his abstract components from 
the empirical, his practice from his theory, disallowing their communication and the 
transformation of the problem, or abstract machine, as it interacts with its solutions. 
The Kantian transcendental is folded back over the empirical, appearing as a 
miraculous condition of its order, independently originated and establishing a set of 
invariant constants. Deleuze, however, sets the constants in motion, so that a problem 
becomes a set of variables, the difference amongst things which have nothing in 
common, and itself varying in relation to the concrete. He describes philosophy as the 
creation of concepts, but concepts which remain contingent 
That by which the given is given is not time or space, but their genesis, a set 
of intensive syntheses immanent to the formation of a pure straight line and a 
rhizomatic distribution -a labyrinthine, ant-like line, the effect of time unhinged from 
cardinality, of passive syntheses. 28 These latter are the imperceptible and contingent 
cycles of the sufficient reason of sense, the molecular patternings of perception whose 
emergent effect is the concrete world, not as a theatre of representation, but as a 
shifting and mobile field of directions and tendencies. In unhinging time from 
cardinality, logic and the order of succession, Kant is also disconnecting it from 
generality, making it autonomous of understanding and of consciousness - of 
movement, succession, co-existence, etc., - which are modes, or consciousnesses of 
time. As has already been remarked in the Introduction, to confuse the pure form of 
time with one of its modes is to reduce it to a psychologistic notion. It might be argued, 
with reference to the Second Analogy, that subjective succession is definitive of the 
form of time. However, succession is merely subjective consciousness of time, tied up 
with the apprehension of perceptions rather than with their materiality; the function of 
the Second Analogy is to demonstrate that objective relations amongst appearances, as 
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opposed to the arbitrary successions in inner sense, are governed by the concept of 
causality. Kant writes: 
`The objective succession will therefore consist in that order of the 
manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a 
rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the 
apprehension of that which precedes. Thus only can I be justified in 
asserting, not merely of my apprehension, but of appearance itself, 
that a succession is to be met with in it. '29 
The distinction being made is not that between the pure form of time and a rule- 
determined causal and objective order, but between a subjective, conscious experience 
of time-relations as successive and arbitrarily ordered and an objective conscious 
experience of time-relations as causally determined To confuse the pure form of time 
with succession is to commit the critical error of formulating conditions in terms of the 
conditioned. 
Kant's insight, Deleuze argues, demands `une nouvelle definition du temps (et 
de 1'espace), (a new definition of time [and of space])', which considers it within its 
own terms, as aesthetic and as singular, rather than in terms of understanding, as 
conceptual and general30 This in turn necessitates a different theorization of 
imagination in relation to time, and sensibility, in which it is no longer rigidified by its 
common sense function of schematizing along channels of conceptual unity. This break 
up of common sense is one amongst other problems that Deleuze works out in 
Difference et Repetition. beginning to seed the apparatus of Anti-Oedipus, where the 
sense of a faculty has been melded onto that of real distributions, and becomes a 
function of the relations of a substantial multiplicity, or assemblage, which is not 
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definable as a unity or as in relation to a unity. The assemblage is the basic unit of 
machinic critique, composed not of an aggregate of extensive units, a sort of clutter of 
randomly collected bits and pieces, but as a series of inter-related affects, continuously 
mobile and in variation; rather than existing in time, an assemblage is chronogenetic, 
generating a temporal and temporary metastability as an effect of the infinite firings of 
intensive difference which comprise its substance. 
There are `des facultes non encore soupconnees, ä decouvrir. Car on ne peut 
rien dire d'avance, on ne peut pas prejuger de la recherche' (faculties yet to be 
discovered, whose existence is not yet suspected. For nothing can be said in advance, 
one cannot prejudge the outcome of research'), or of relations amongst senses with 
nothing in common. 31 In Difference et Repetition, Deleuze's productive interest in 
Kant focuses on what forces sensibility to sense, on the relation of sense, as both 
sensation and intuition, to the thing-in-itself, which Deleuze re-names a dark precursor 
and disconnects from the unity which Kant allows himself to postulate in relation to it. 
What is important for the dark precursor, or `1'en-soi, c'est que, petite ou grande, la 
difference soit interne (the in-itself, is that the difference, whether large or small, be 
internal)'. 32 Difference is not a function of the relation of an identity to its external 
environment; indeed the determination and definition of something as a boundary or 
limit becomes increasingly problematic. Without moving outside the terms of the 
problem, components whose sense is purely extensive cannot be introduced as 
mechanisms for its solution. As remarked above, two senses of difference are in play, 
that of the problem - differentiation, and that of its concretion or actualization - 
differenciation. Where the difference of the in-itself, or dark precursor, is confused 
with the concrete order of differences, the critical move of the transcendental is lost: 
subjectively experienced features of experience are mistaken for real relations, which 
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in turns suggests that representation is understood not as a mode of construction or 
production, but as production of the real. 
Deleuze does not refer specifically to the thing-in-itself or to its formulation 
within the Kantian system. Similarly, remarks concerning the thing-in-itself made here 
do not constitute an interpretation of the term or of its particular functioning within the 
first Criitigue. It is under any circumstances important not to present a crude 
formulation of the thing-in-itself as an object, as the concept of an object, or as 
synonymous with the noumenon; it is crucial that it is not understood in such terms in 
order to track the manner in which Deleuze takes up this problematic. Whilst 
Deleuze's formulation of the "in-itself'of difference appears much transformed from 
the few and inconsistent references to it in Kant's own work, it is nonetheless 
implicated with the same problem, which as discussed in the Introduction, are 
addressed first by Schopenhauer in his deployment of the thing-in-itself as the will. 
That is, the problem of a blind (in the sense of non-teleological, non-directed, 
unconscious, non-intentional) dynamic force or drive antecedent to law. 
As such a drive, the thing-in-itself is immanent to the empirical, since without 
it the empirical is no more than a logical form devoid of objective (material) reality, 
that is, it does not function as a limit to the empirical. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
thought through or in terms of the empirical without this leading to a transcendent 
formulation. It is against such uncritical tendencies that this reading of the thing-in- 
itself operates. There are only two elements to be considered - firstly, a continuum of 
intensities, a full space of varying degrees of density and compression and secondly, the 
empty form of time. It is in this context that the dark precursor needs to be understood. 
In Kant's own terms, this is not a problem for consciousness, since from the position of 
consciousness there are no relations other than those which appear, and those which 
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appear are, for consciousness, axiomatically extensive; so whilst it may be true to say 
that consciousness is also intensively differentiated, the qualities of intensity are 
extensively qualified. Nor is it a problem equivalent to that of the noumenon. The 
noumenon is `something in general' distinguished from sensibility and leaving as 
residue `a mode of determining the object by thought alone -a merely logical form 
without content' which firms the ground for the analogical conversion of natural law 
and maxims of moral law. 33 But the thing-in-itself as precursor is a differenciator, 
however, the `in-itself of difference, which Deleuze also calls demon, signal or leap. 34 
A majoritarian reading of Kant boxes the thing-in-itself into a single problem: 
this is how it becomes assimilated with the noumenon and conceived in causal terms, 
as both a principle of the convertibility and exchange of subjective terms - moral 
maxims into general laws of science and back again - and in relation to the strange 
causality of freedom under the Law. It characterizes it negatively, too, as a concept of 
a sensuously perceived thing in so far as it is not perceived in space and time. The leap 
is thus no longer a flash-flow but a labour. Not an autonomous interval but freedom 
and equality under Law. Deleuze precision engineers critique, stripping it down whilst 
remaining rigorously transcendental (in the sense of immanence of criteria) by 
deploying sense against conversion and exchange, by not pre-supposing unity, and by 
illegitimating the resignation of thought to illusion, philosophical or physical. The 
thing-in-itself ceases to be a single problem with a single solution, but becomes a 
singular matter immanent to and indistinguishable from its collective solution in a 
concrete assemblage, but imperceptible, and not explicable through reference to that 
assemblage. It cannot be thought in terms of (Kantian) substance -a concept, and thus 
not in terms of permanence either. It is through the interrogation of this relation 
between an intensively differentiated continuum, the in-itself of difference, and the 
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pure form of time that Deleuze teases critique from reason and the transcendental from 
the subject. 
Illusions are to be dismembered, not resisted. As the process of shifting the 
ground and uncovering elements inverted by negation and constrained by limitation 
continues, the nature of the transcendental and of the thing-in-itself become 
transformed, as each is divorced from the structures of unity, recognition and the image 
of thought. The transcendental - by which Deleuze means the pure empty line of time 
unhinged from cardinality - becomes increasingly abstract, whilst the thing-in-itself 
becomes an intensive problem, synthesized as the variables of the transcendental are 
selected in the formation of a body, or assemblage; the thing-in-itself becomes 
produced as the imperceptible, or inaccessible, produced through the given, as the 
difference of the given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by 
definition imperceptible. 
Kant introduces the problem of the thing-in-itself in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, in an argument pitched at Leibniz, against the confusion of the forms of 
space and time with properties of objects of representation or things-in-themselves. 
`The true correlate of sensibility, the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich 
selbst] is not known, and cannot be known, through these 
representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard 
to it. '35 
There are some clues here as to the direction in which to explore the thing-in-itself. 
Firstly, the apparently trivial remark that the thing-in-itself cannot be known through 
the representations of space and time serves as a reminder that the problem attaching to 
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the thing-in-itself, unlike the noumenon, is not primarily epistemological. When Kant 
refers to the thing-in-itself as underlying the appearance of matter, 36 - which, as 
Chapter Three discusses, is composed of forces - this substrate cannot be thought in 
terms of substance, since the thing-in-itself is definitionally not within the possibility of 
conscious human knowledge. Nor can the forces which compose it be understood in 
terms of causality, for this again would be to give it an illegitimate attachment to the 
categories and once more to formalize it as an intelligible but non-sensible object, and 
eject the material problematic of the thing-in-itself out into the practical zone of the 
noumenon. It is not known through space and time since they are aesthetic forms 
rather than cognitive formalisms, but it also cannot be known; that is, whilst Kant 
postulates a non-human form of intuition which could provide access to the noumenon, 
no such intuition is postulated for the thing-in-itself. This moves one away from any 
serious consideration of the thing-in-itself in conceptual terms. Secondly, by calling it 
the correlate of sensibility, but distinguishing it from the forms of space and time, Kant 
is implicating the thing-in-itself with sensation, and thus with intensity and with 
matter. 37 In other words, the thing-in-itself attaches to the problem of real possibility - 
that is, to the unique problem addressed by the transcendental - rather than to that of 
logical possibility. Thirdly, the thing-in-itself is not a problem which arises in 
experience; experience is its solution. This means it is not a problem which can be 
formulated in terms of consciousness, either, since Kant understands experience solely 
in terms of consciousness. These three points suggest, then, that it is in the areas of 
intensity, matter (not understood in terms of the logical concept of substance, but rather 
as the unspecified and undefined "given") and the unconscious that solutions to this 
problem might be discovered 
Sensation, as Kant explains in the Prolegomena, does not contain space or 
time, nor `occupy any part of space or of time' 38 It neither has time or space, nor is it 
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inside time or space. And as an intensity, sensation is not a quantity, in any 
straightforward sense, but a degree, the quantity of quality. The concept of quantity is 
non-relational - it is the Subsumption of appearances as intuitions in space and time - 
whilst degree is the expression of a relation of intensity, the singular real of any 
perception, a differential, and that element which cannot be anticipated but which 
becomes the content of the form of intuition when expressed through the axiom of 
extension. Only insofar as it is correlated with sensibility, and the forms of intuition 
can degree be estimated quantitatively - that is, only when brought into relation with 
possible experience in general can the qualitative intensity be formulated 
proportionately with any other qualitative intensity. 
It was said in the Introduction that Schopenhauer eliminates the possibility of 
conceiving of the thing-in-itself as an object "behind" representation, formulating it 
instead as antecedent to the formal and secondary aspects of the world which are added 
by the intellectual functions of the brain - that is, those functions which generate the 
world as representation. This is moving in the direction of the perspective of the object 
- which, it will be recalled from the Introduction, was the perspective from which this 
thesis addresses Kant, the perspective of women - and towards a positive formulation of 
the thing-in-itself, since it directs attention towards intensities, (for example, qualitas 
occulta) and away from the borrowed reality of the conscious representations of the 
subject. The thing-in-itself is no longer explained negatively - that is, as the concept of 
a sensuously perceived thing insofar as it is not perceived in space and time, but 
becomes implicated with a positive and unconscious dynamic which is imperceptible - 
that is, not part of the visible world of representation, which is structured through the 
secondary functions of the intellect - but which is nonetheless immanent to perception, 
in that it is connected with sensation. The thing-in-itself becomes produced as the 
imperceptible, or inaccessible, produced through the given, as the difference of the 
72 
Chapter 2 
given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by definition 
imperceptible. 
This does not mean in any sense that it is outside representation; indeed, the 
problem escapes the limited theatre of that doctrine. The thing-in-itself or demon 
becomes immanent to perception as the imperceptible, though not for empirical reasons 
such as might be overcome by more sophisticated microscopic instruments, or more 
powerful telescopic devices. This reduces the problem back to extension. It has rather 
to do with movement, not as the motion of an object in extension, but as a stationary 
process or principle of composition, which is at once both secret and transparent, 
continually escaping perception, but nonetheless effecting it. It is in this sense always 
in advance of perception, a source of time rather than a movement in time. It has thus 
less to do with an economy of vision than one of affective or intensive differences, with 
variations in heat, in pressure, in density, in the tone of a voice, in clandestine 
changes which escape perception, which go unrecognized but whose effects are, of a 
sudden, there. 
The difference of diversity from that which gives diversity is intensity, the 
`raison du sensible (reason of the sensible)' 39 which forces thought, which is not 
caused nor causal in any simple sense, nor outside the world, but immanent to its 
production: an abstract vector which distributes a surface, rather than an origin and 
source of knowledge. Rather than the faculties being independently defined, they are 
measured empirically, according to 'ce qui revient ä chacune sous la forme de leur 
collaboration (to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration)' 40 
This means that faculties emerge, flash and die, as inconstant variables, rather than as 
the constants in terms of which variations can be defined. Faculties become the effects 
of relations into which a body enters, and thought becomes a game whose rules 
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change in the playing, where the pieces come and go, where anything can move in any 
direction and the point is less to win than to maintain a line and to keep a space open, 
play by play, rather than according to a single over-arching strategy. The demon, or 
dark precursor operates in the intervals, a practice which leaps theoretical boundaries, 
confounding recognition, relating disparate systems, determining `ä 1'avance le 
chemin renversd (a path in advance but in reverse)'. 41 It is a form given but not a 
priori: which is to say, it is a signal of material-forces given immanently to the 
formation of a path or line of flight, to the labyrinthine line of the pure form of time. 
The form of the dark precursor is not, as was the noumenon, a logical form 
without content, a shadow compelled from without, nor, like the thing-in-itself is 
theorized, a causal problem, or something outside the system, but an immanence of 
field, a critical and material provocation, a demon, incitement to alliances and 
distributions of difference. Deleuze is diagramming a keen critical unconscious of 
Kant: not The Unconscious, which is a theatre for the staging of conscious 
representation, but a principle of sufficient reason for sense, the genesis of thought. 
III Problem II 
For Kant, the principle of sufficient reason is a logical relation of grounds to 
consequences; `it is quite customary', he writes to Reinhold, `for the conjurors of 
metaphysics to make sleights of hand, and before one realizes it, to leap from the 
logical principle of sufficient reason to the transcendental principle of causality, 
assuming the latter to be already contained in the former. '42 So whilst it may serve 
understanding as a formal justification of synthetic connections amongst concepts, this 
principle says nothing about the effective genesis of real conditions and relations 
amongst things - the objective problem of transcendental philosophy. `That every thing 
74 
Chapter 2 
must have its reason is the transcendental (material [materielle]) principle', and to 
move from the logical principle of sufficient reason to the material or transcendental 
principle as if they occupied the same domain is a critically illegitimate step, confusing 
the reason for the genesis of things with the logic governing propositions. 43 
The principle of sufficient reason rests on the principle of contradiction, a 
negative condition of analytic judgements, and governs judgements; 
Mat every proposition must have a reason is the logical (formal) 
principle of knowledge, which is subordinated to, and not set beside, 
the principle of contradiction. '44 
The principle of sufficient reason as Kant understands it is a logical principle 
governing propositions about experience, rather than a material or transcendental 
principle implicated in the construction of experience. No one has, or ever will prove, 
Kant continues, the transcendental (material) principles of things from the logic 
governing propositions, or judgements or in `general from mere concepts without 
relation to sensible intuition. i45 As has been said previously, it is in Aesthetic that the 
real problems of critique, and of transcendental philosophy lie. 
Transcendental principles, express the real, rather than merely hypothetical or 
possible conditions of things, and involve both a formal and a material component, to 
which correspond, subjectively, intuition and sensation. Kant writes, again to 
Reinhold, (in a letter which elaborates on the manifold errors in Eberhard's 
understanding of critical philosophy): 
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`the real ground [i. e., not the logical principle of sufficient reason] is 
again twofold: either the formal ground (of the intuition of the 
object), e. g., as the sides of the triangle contain the ground of the 
angle - or the material ground of the existence of the thing. The latter 
determines that whatever contains it will be called cause. ' 46 
Deleuze's argument with Kant is directed less at the distinction between transcendental 
and hypothetical conditions, than towards the latter's differentiation of sensibility 
according to a disjunction which belongs properly to understanding rather than to 
sensibility. That is, Kant compromises the radicality of the distinction between real, or 
transcendental conditions, and hypothetical, or logical conditions. He divides 
sensibility into an objective component, intuition, which is necessary for mathematics, 
and provides content for concepts, and a subjective element, of sensation. In strictly 
aesthetic terms, in terms of the pure line of time, however, this distinction plays no 
role. Difference cannot be articulated according to an exclusive disjunction in this 
manner, Deleuze argues, without subjecting it to transcendent operations. Nor can the 
transcendental, as an abstract material principle, be articulated in relation to 
understanding: it must rather be immanent to the production of sensibility, perception, 
sensation, bodies and passions. He takes the transcendental into the heart of the thing- 
in-itsel& as matter, and in doing so, dissolves its structural containment within the a 
priori. 
The problem to which sensation and intuition correspond is intensity, not as 
an empirical matter, - that is, not couched in terms of sensation, which tends to leads 
towards its formulation in terms of a subject - but as a transcendental principle, and its 
sufficient reason is a logic of sense -a diagrammatic and material aesthetic. Within the 
conceptual or formal understanding of time and space, which generalizes over intuition 
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in order to render it commensurate with rational or cardinal divisibility, intensive 
magnitudes can be anticipated, because the axiom of extension affects not only forms of 
intuition, but also matter and the dynamics of the real in space; as has been said, 
intensive magnitude is a constructed category, whilst intensities are qualities of force, 
and Kant does not understand force as constructed. It is not that the perception of 
matter can be anticipated, but that any perception of matter can be anticipated to be 
obedient to the axioms of intuition and the laws of phoronomy. Forces, for Kant, move 
across the straight lines of extension. With time and space logical constants integral to 
the form of generality which rationalizes sense in terms of uniformity, the quality of 
material forces becomes open to the claim that it too can be anticipated, and moreover, 
that what is anticipated can in principle not fail to arrive. 
In the Schematism, Kant says: 
`that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is the 
transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves 
(thinghood, reality) [alle Gegenstände als Dinge an sich (die 
Sachheit, Realität)]'. 47 
Kant defines matter in the following terms: quantitatively, as motion in 
extended space, along lines between points; qualitatively, as the filling of space 
through intensive forces - attraction and repulsion -which have a determinate degree 
(force limited by an a priori point-line system) and, beyond that determinate degree, as 
infinitely divisible. 48 The infinite divisibility of this "beyond" is where the problem of 
the real filling space is evacuated to: that which cannot be analyzed to exhaustion or 
made determinate extension. Theoretically, matter appears as either randomly chaotic 
(beyond), or dead (determinate). Whilst the space and time of determinate degrees of 
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force and motion is conceptual, the problem of infinite divisibility, as an intensive 
matter, is transcendental. The line or limit is only theoretical, a beyond of determinacy, 
of matter already dead, and only theoretically do the two sides of the system, 
determinate here and infinitely divisible there, sum to unity. The line is conceptually 
extensive, a limit, but intensively it is a threshold and changes in nature as it changes 
in degree, rather than delineating a rational succession of states, a modulation and not 
a mould. '[U]ne pure ligne droit (a pure straight line)' of time is not a successively 
constructed extension, but a vector tracking the autonomous involutions of a surface 
without extrinsic given condition. 49 Any limit is thus only relative, and not definitive, 
marking a penultimate beyond which is not chaos and disorder, but which necessitates 
modifications in the structures which populate the space within the limit. 
The pure form of time is not defined in terms of motion or point, nor space as 
line or organized plane. Kant says that `extension and figure ... belong to pure intuition', 
but without common sense there is no conceptual definition of either, no image 
according to which extension and figure are recognizable. 5° In the Aesthetic, intuition 
is given, not constructed so unhinged from common sense, there is no necessity 
immanent to time which dictates its functional convergence with Euclidean axioms, 
nor to forces which dictate their functional convergence with gravity or 
thermodynamics, nor to material production which forces its functional convergence 
with mechanism. These are purely contingent solutions, historical answers to questions 
from consciousness. 
In L'anti-oedine, Deleuze (and Guattari, here) write: 'cc qui met si longtemps 
ä arrive ä la conscience, c'est la nouvelle que la mort de Dieu n'a aucune importance 
pour ! 'inconscient' (what takes so long in coming to consciousness is the news that the 
death of God makes no difference to the unconscious') 51 It is understanding this 
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which allows him to travel so efficiently through Kant's network of faculties, and 
discard elements which make no difference to the transcendental as an abstract and 
naked surface on which the diagrammatic solutions of problems immanent to relations 
of force are recorded, but merely impede its potential solutions by intervening with 
demands for recognition, with a prior format for recording, an image of thought. In 
Difference et Repetition, Deleuze begins to diagram an impersonal and unconscious 
consistency of sense, mapping the forces of thought, the sufficient reason of the 
sensible: the death of God is as irrelevant here as is his life. The line beyond which is 
the beyond of representation - and thus +1, the inverse image of representation, 
stupidity face to face - is dissolved in a threshold or surface which folds into itself, 
continuously changing in nature and form. What is so intelligent in Deleuze's reading 
of Kant is his selection of the elements which express this indifference, even though 
many do so only negatively: for Deleuze, `la negation, c'est l'image renversee de la 
difference' (the negative is difference inverted, seen from below)'. 52 The in-between, or 
middle, or AND logics of machinic or rhizomatic sense which function in the two 
volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are assembled through the inversion of the 
negative through difference, rather than through an identity which would restore it to 
unity, as the single positive term. Demons string variables and sequence connections, 
and are nothing other than those variables and connections, functioning only through 
relations and never as the terms related, not recognizing or recognized, exploring a 
pure straight line of time, a line of flight, without monogram, profile or name. 
Within the general field of understanding, the intensive real in experience, `is 
viewed as a cause... [and] ... the degree of the reality as cause is then entitled... the 
moment of gravity' 5.3 Viewed as a cause means viewed hypothetically: that is, intensity 
as an issue for the principles of understanding is not problematic, and any absence of 
information which could confirm an hypothesis and determine causality is merely a 
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subjective insufficiency in knowledge, and correctible. `[N]o misunderstanding 
is... possible which cannot easily be removed', since the dynamic or quality of intensive 
magnitudes presupposes the axioms of extension conducting force potentials and 
qualities across the striated, linear and punctuated metric of a general and extensively 
quantified space. 54 What is differentiated from the general is recognized just enough to 
confirm that it is self-cancelling, given enough time: that it has internalized the control 
systems appropriate to it, and will apply them, given sufficient time. Aberrations are 
only ever temporary. 
`Et ce qui est en jeu dann cette difference, c'est toute la repartition, 
toute la determination, toute la destination, tout l'exercice des 
facultes Bans une doctrine en general. 
(At issue in this difference is the whole distribution, the whole 
determination, destination and exercise of the faculties within a 
general doctrine' 55 
Rational science systematizes connections amongst empirically gathered data 
according to a coherence of grounds and consequents. The aggregate unities distributed 
by understanding, in its legitimate use immanent to experience, would not unite into a 
systematic whole, if Ideas of reason did not provide an ideal focus outside experience 
for the convergence of concepts of understanding. But this perspective on distribution 
is subjective: the focus imaginarius regulates for formalism, which is to say, for 
syllogistic relations, maxims of theoretical reason which have judgements for relations 
and conceptual representations for their content. For a formal system, it is `not the idea 
in itself, but its use only, that can be either transcendent or immanent'. 56 It is 
judgement as a tool of the subject - the application of logical principles - that errs. 
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Transcendentally - which is now immanent to sense and objective problems - there is 
no error, because there are no facts, but there are still illusions. 
One illusion is that there is an analog between the way understanding 
functions in the production of the object in general as correlate to subjective unity, 
unifying diversity within the form of the Same - (common sense recognition, in other 
words), and the way in which reason 
`unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain 
collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, 
which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity'. 57 
This analog is logical, rather than transcendental, but the transition from 
theoretical constitution to regulation is void of real relations, since its base is in 
concepts and generality rather than in singularity and sense. Firstly, real relations need 
to be distinguished from relations of reality, the real (das Reale) and the concept of 
reality (Realität) are not equivalent or interchangeable terms. This is important, firstly, 
because to understand the difference between real and formal grounds in terms of a 
concept (a formal and empty function, in the absence of intuition) is clearly to miss the 
force of this distinction. Real relations, those which engage with the problem of the 
transcendental, involve intuitions and existence, rather than concepts and cognition, as 
has already been remarked, and are associated by Kant with perception, actuality, 
matter and existence; in short, with issues surrounding the problem of intensities. `It is 
sensation. -that indicates actuality [Wirklichkeit] in space or time'; it is perception 
through which `the material [Stop] required to enable us to think objects of sensible 
intuition must first be given'm; it is the real [das Reale] `which constitutes the thing 
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itself [das Ding selbst]' and which `must be given - otherwise the thing could not be 
conceived at all'. 59 
These elements of experience are given through or in relation with the pure 
form of time. In the Logic, Kant writes of the difference between concepts and 
intuitions, calling the former general [allgemeine) or reflected presentations, and the 
latter singular [einzelne] presentations. 60 (Singular here must not be confused with 
singular judgements. ) In order to suppose that regulative judgements have a purchase 
on the material necessary for thinking empirical objects, it must be supposed that 
reason has access to the thing-in-itself, and to the real which constitutes it. Kant 
eliminates this as an answer, however, in experience, which for Kant means conscious 
experience, `no question is ever asked in regard to it' 61 Even if one chooses to suppose, 
in a theological mode, that this is God - clearly not an intellectual response - Kant 
illegitimates rational access to such an entity. Moreover, existence is not a matter to be 
resolved by appeal to figures of belief. 
Hypothetically, reason can move from comparative resemblances amongst particular 
cases in relation to a rule, in order to discover whether these cases follow from the 
rule; it can then generalize over `all particular instances, even to those which are not 
themselves given' 62 But problematically, it can't: there is no way of finding an Idea on 
the grounds of its general solution, amongst particular cases, since objectively, Ideas 
interact with sense and the singular logics of bodies, outside the possibility of 
constituting general conformity. Problematically, there is no universal account of the 
particular through which to protect its objective status or serve as a general rule for 
what is not given: there is, in other words, no substitution for a problem, the object of 
an Idea, whereas there are substitutions for representations, the objects of concepts. The 
analogy between understanding and reason illegitimately carries substitutability into 
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the Ideas. God, Freedom or Immortality: in Kant, if you pick one, you get all three. But 
Ideas are singular, and it is as singularities that Deleuze plugs sense into Kantian 
ideas. 
`Les Idees sont les problemes, mais les problemes apportent 
seulement les conditions sous lesquelles les facultes accedent i leur 
exercice superieur. 
(Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under 
which the faculties attain their superior exercise)' 63 
Problems are the abstract grid through which that which forces sense - 
difference in diversity, a demon or dark precursor - becomes concrete, not in terms of a 
previously settled model or configuration of faculties, but by becoming unhinged from 
all models. It is only so that they produce their own superior exercise, or immanent 
autonomy in relation to intensity, rather than in relation to common sense or the 
image. 
Deleuze's diagram of Kant draws problems of sense - of intuition and 
intensity - together with Ideas, but in the process the whole surface of critique is re- 
wired. In Difference et Repetition he defines transcendental and transcendent: 
`La forme transcendentale d'une facultd sc confond avec son exercice 
disjoint, superieur ou transcendant. Transcendant ne signifie pas du 
tout que la facultd s'adresse ä des objets hors du monde, mais an 
contraire qu'elle saisit dans le monde ce qui la concern 
exclusivement, et qui la fait naitre au monde. 
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(The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its 
disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise. Transcendent in no way 
means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world 
but, on the contrary, that is grasps that in the world which concerns it 
exclusively and brings it into the world)'. 64 
Disjointed, or unhinged from common sense, nothing legislating their 
convergence into analogical equilibrium, or, in the good sense formulation, 
thermodynamic equilibrium, the faculties give no hypothetical solution, only real ones. 
A faculty becomes the formation of a pipe, a connection in an assemblage or 
multiplicity, or a leap which snaps the order of Kantian sense, changing its nature and 
degree, and an Idea a system of connections between these differential genetic 
elements, a multiplicity or assemblage. A machine which grasps that in the world 
which concerns it exclusively, without substitution, singular and real. 
This is not to say, however, that the transcendent and the transcendental are 
the same: being indistinguishable from each other does not necessitate their identity. 
Kant is quite clear that they are not interchangeable terms. A principle which removes 
limits, `or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent'. 65 
They are actual, rather than transcendental principles, and incite the possession of 
unlimited domains, and their illegitimacy rests in their use of empirical, or actual 
principles to describe spaces outside the conditions of their generation: that is, they 
encourage the transfer of a solution from one problem to another, without regard for 
differences in the variables. This is why, for example, Ideas of reason have no 
constitutive value for theory, being only regulative in relation to the empirical. 
The transcendent is counterposed to immanence, which describes the 
legitimacy of the transcendental. The transcendental has two senses: there is the 
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transcendental use of the concepts, under the compulsion of reason, as described in 
chapter one, which produces the concept of an object in general and limits sensibility. 
This is illegitimate, Kant agrees, but since there are no actual principles informing 
such errors of judgement `not duly curbed by criticism', because understanding is in 
this case disconnected from sense, the transcendental use of understanding does not 
threaten the security of the system. 66 Because there is no empirical incitement to 
transgression - and it is thus not pathologically or affectively motivated - there is no 
danger from the transcendental use of understanding. Indeed, as has been seen, it is 
compelled by reason. The transcendent use of a faculty unhinged from its common 
sense relations, however, is precisely what the noumenon is designed to preclude: it 
limits sensibility. It is in this sense that Deleuze understands it, as transcendent with 
regard to established relations, exacerbated by a problem for which these relations 
cannot articulate a solution. He calls it indistinguishable from the transcendental 
because it is a movement incited by a singular abstract machine; it is transcendent in 
relation to extant empirical orders, in that it aggravates the limits of that order. In this 
sense it is related to practice, as a mechanism for moving through walls. It only 
remains transcendent if it carries the principle of possession - for example - specific to 
a particular configuration of the faculties across the threshold and over the wall. 
Because it does not then grasp what is exclusive to both its operation, bringing it into 
the world, but remains bound by principle outside the operation. It is in this sense that 
it is transcendental, immanent to the concrete genesis of a solution. 
*** 
`Plutot qu'ä ce qui se passe avant et apres Kant (et qui revient au 
meme), nous devons nous interesser A un moment precis du kantisme, 
moment furtif eclatant... 
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(Rather than being concerned with what happens before and after 
Kant (which amounts to the same thing), we should be concerned 
with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive 
moment... )' 67 
Deleuze calls this brief flash of thought without image `schizophrene du droit 
(schizophrenia in principle)' which leads directly to Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of 
Capital and Schizophrenia where critique has become schizoanalysis. " In Difference et 
titio he complains that Kant does not follow this moment: moreover, he implies 
that Kant was aware of it, but chose good sense and a philosophy compliant with 
common sense. `[Q]uitte ä compromettre 1'appareil conceptuel des trois Critiques (at 
the risk of compromising the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques)', he redeems 
and stabilizes it, civilizing thought and recognizing its image in Law. 69 
The critical project of L'anti-oedine is explicit: Deleuze and Guattari, 
referring to Kant, denounce 'Z'usage transcendant des syntheses (transcendent use of 
syntheses)' by psychoanalysis, today's cogitatio universalis. 70 Auto-critique, or 
schizoanalysis, plays in relation to psychoanalytic Law and myth a role parallel to that 
played by reason in the first Critique in relation to metaphysical dogmas and mystic 
enthusiasms: both critiques distinguish illegitimate and legitimate syntheses, extract 
thought from myth and ideology and above all emphasize immanence. Their essential 
tendency is eliminative and materialist. But one of the factors that differentiates 
Kantian critique, stilled by the hand of redemption, from auto-critique, is that whilst 
each invents its own destructions and invests in its own decline, the former does so for 
the sake of - what it is in the process of destroying -a metaphysics based on theological 
premises: God is not alive, for Kant, but nonetheless an unconditioned unity continues 
to operate as a limit, endlessly displaced and internal to the engine of critique, as an 
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axiom of productive synthesis. The system gives to itself with one hand what it takes 
back with the other. Auto-critique invents in destruction and invests in decline, but not 
for the sake of - anything. 
Kant's care is evident in his stabilization of the system of faculties at the risk 
of compromising the machine he has built, and it is the stability disciplined into a 
system which presents an image, not what escapes it. Deleuze's positive and sober 
critique of Kant addresses its instabilities, and it is from these that Anti-Oedipus takes 
its critical sense (though there are other senses too) fuelled by their refinement in 
Difference and Repetition. The method is one of the undisciplined micro-analysis of 
the disciplined microphysics of power. 
Noology, as a science of cognition whose principles derive from the Mind 
rather than from the richness and multiplicity of concrete experience, is a common 
target of both Kant and Deleuze. At the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant cites 
Plato as `the chief of the noologists', his philosophical error being to intellectualize 
knowledge and collapse intuition into cognitive functions. '' Kant's cure to the 
intellectualization of knowledge is well known: intuition and cognition become twin 
stems of knowledge, giving rise to an industry attempting to resolve this disjunction, in 
intellectual or aesthetic intuition, in God or the State. As has been seen, however, 
Kant's cure itself comes under criticism from Deleuze, the force of the explosive 
moment, of the introduction of time into the subject, being vitiated by its restriction 
within extension. As has been argued, it is this aspect of Kant from which Deleuze 
forges the force of his critique, taking the sense of synthesis together with the problem 
of Ideas and dissolving with consequent resolution the image of thought. Moving the 
aesthetic away from extension, refusing the division of sensibility into objective and 
subjective elements, and the postulation of the unity of the thing-in-itself, Deleuze 
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introduces sensibility to problems of force which cannot be reconciled with the image 
of thought or the conceptual mechanics of the understanding, and initiates a thought of 
movement which does not belong to objects, but is a kinetics of packs, populations, 
bodies that are multiplicities without relation to unity. 
*** 
`Perds le visage (lose your face)', Deleuze writes, because it is scarred with 
`les deut maladies de la terre, le couple du despote et du pretre (the two diseases of the 
earth, the pair of the despot and the priest)'. '2 Losing image, becoming vague without 
becoming homogeneous or unclear, speeding and slowing in continuous qualitative 
transformation, Deleuze is not a destructive writer, but one of camouflage; his tactic is 
to `glisser son corps comme une piece dans de pareilles machines (slip his body into 
such machines as one part among the others)'. 73 Philosophy as enculage. To flee, 
leave, evade are subjects of movement: to flee is to trace a line, but unlike the lines 
drawn explicitly by Kant, measured extensively through the addition of discrete units, 
lines of flight exceed the perspective of the image. Each line has its subtleties and 
nuances, qualities of speed and slowness, and Deleuze is explicit about selecting 
philosophical components to assemble machines which flee and make weapons of 
flight at once, rather than those which adopt a position or a stance. 
Kant, he declares enemy. As this chapter has shown, Kant is a problem, 
because he is himself in between, and because of this, open to diverse and contrary 
deployment. He is not properly enlightened, not properly idealist, not properly 
romantic, not properly Newtonian, not properly religious. Not only chronologically, 
Kant is a critical juncture between Spinoza and Nietzsche, the two thinkers who, 
Deleuze says, released him from his debts and who without doubt (though beyond this 
thesis) inform his re-writing of critique. 
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Forces and Deductions 
`Un espace dynamique doit We defini du point de vue d'un 
observateur lie ä cet espace, et non d'une position exterieure. 
(A dynamic space must be defined from the point of view of an 
observer tied to that space, not from an external position)'. ' 
In chapters one and two, Deleuze's identification of the network of faculties as 
constitutive of the transcendental method was explored, together with his attack on the 
principles of recognition and the image of thought in Kant's critique. His relation with 
Kant operates on (at least) two faces simultaneously. At the systematic level he 
explores connections, functions and operations amongst the faculties; questioning the 
repetition of the model of common sense as a mechanism for the stabilization of these 
relations, and its complementary, good sense, which is the common sense of teleology, 
Deleuze begins to expose his real relation with Kant. As the last chapter remarked, this 
is firstly and foremostly positive; Deleuze does not destroy without utilizing the 
components he has disarticulated to build new machines, and this is the second aspect 
of his employment of Kant. He occupies a space, and then redistributes it, from the 
inside, not from the position of an external observer. 
If one wanted to describe a method in this aspect of Deleuze's engagement 
with critique, it would be one of selection and connection; intensity is connected with 
ideas, and dialectics is re-distributed as a problem of real differences, of magnitude; 
thought is connected with sense, removing the former from the rule of concepts and 
identity, and relating it with the now objective problematic of ideas; the thing-in-itself 
is connected with difference, with that through which the given is given as diversity. 
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What forces thought is discovered in sense, rather than in the illusory figures of 
possibility, recognition, generality and the image. 
A question which emerges from the re-wiring of the system of faculties is that 
of forces. Kant doesn't explain the relations of forces in the first Critique in the 
distribution of intensive magnitudes; the real moment of a cause, as has been 
mentioned before, is simply described as gravity, allowing force to be conceptualized 
in relation to substance. Mille Plateaux, in a discussion of a difference between nomad 
and royal science, opposes two models; that of the Compars, whose primary distinction 
is a hylomorphic one, between matter and form, constructed through the selection of 
constants and law, and that of the Dispars, the relevant distinction of which is 
`materiau-forces (material-forces)' which compose themselves by `mettre les variables 
elles-meme en etat de variation continue (placing the variables themselves in a state of 
continuous variation)'? Each model is characterized by different distributions; the 
Compars by logos, which divides `un espace laminaire, strict, homogene et centre (a 
laminar, striated, homogeneous, and centred space) 93 and presupposes gravity, and 
Dispars by nomos, a tactile space of contact and affects, which is homogeneous only 
`entre points infiniment voisins (between infinitely proximate points)'4 yet which is not 
differentiated by pre-formed relations and connections. 
The most obvious model of science in Kant is that of the Compars: he is 
famously an admirer of Newton. However, Deleuze's relation to Kant and his 
deployment of critique as essentially economic suggest that the other model must also 
be implicated in Kantian critique. In Difference et Repetition. L'anti-oediue and Mille 
Plateaus. a continual emphasis is placed on the co-existence of the two models: the 
material-forces distinction does not replace the matter-form distinction anymore than 
the State replaces the nomads. `L'histoire ne fait que traduire en succession une 
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coexistence de devenirs (all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into 
a succession)'5. A purely historical perspective, leading to an evaluation of Kant's work 
in terms of what came before and followed after him, and the division of his philosophy 
as a whole into pre-critical and critical (and, in some cases, as post-critical and senile) 
writings, will discover only this translation. Deleuze looks instead for consistencies in 
the system, and for the weightings and privileges attendant on certain structures which 
repress or cover becomings, and translate them into chronological movements. His 
interests is in critique as a singular and economic problem, rather than in the 
successive attempts at solving this problem which run throughout Kant's work and are 
continued by his successors. 
For Deleuze, the machinic elements of critique are in its systematics, hidden 
in the theory of forces, in the problem of Ideas, and in the network of the faculties, and 
it is on these that he focuses. His critique does not progress from Kant, but rather 
abstracts out the various machines operating in his work, allowing forces and patterns 
hidden beneath and covered over by royal and state divisions of space and operations of 
power to be exposed. The regimes of molar and molecular (which for the moment can 
be taken to correspond roughly with the division of Compars and Dispars) are 
immanent to each other, what differs - as Kant always says - is not the ideas 
themselves, but the use to which they are put. Royal science deploys ideas 
reproductively: reduce something to a unit and make more of the same. Nomad science 
follows ideas, and an idea which Deleuze follows in Kant is that of repulsive and 
attractive force, in order to uncover further the conditions of real production. 
In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant discusses 
fundamental qualities of material forces - repulsion and attraction 
(Zurückstoßungslarafi/repulsive Kraft and Anziehungskraft). The latter functions in 
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empty extended space, as action at a distance, and is constructed through negation and 
limitation; it belongs to the Compars model. The former is a force which, like nomos, 
distributes a space of contact, intensive magnitudes filling space without determinate 
measure and belongs to the Dispars. In this chapter, Deleuze's method of deduction is 
explored, which functions simultaneously with his selection of the system of faculties 
as the real elements which constitute the problem of critique as such. But first, forces. 
I Attraction and Repulsion 
According to Kant, `the only two moving forces that can be thought' 6, and which are 
fundamental to matter, are repulsion and attraction. These are differentiated in a 
variety of ways: ' 
Force of Repulsion Force of Attraction 
Force of extension: Force of penetration 
Impenetrability = function of (of space) 
dynamic relation of repulsive 
forces - degree of compression. 
Driving [triebende], diffusive Drawing [ziehende]: 
compels approach 
Expansive: relation of repulsion & 
expansion is condition of elasticity 
Basis of matter as essentially Inferred on the basis 
space-filling (substantial) of the possibility of 
matter as matter in 
general; operates across 
empty space. 
Relation of repulsionlexpansion is 
condition of elasticity 
Not limitable by space 
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Repulsion 
`[B]y means of the sense of feeling [Sinnes des Gefrihls]' repulsive forces provide `the 
size and shape [Größe und Gestalt] of an extended thing's. Their magnitude is 
aesthetic and intensive, and contact amongst repelling forces is physical and 
immediate; there is `no actual distance of parts, which always constitute a continuum 
as regards all expansion of the space of the whole' 9. That empty space could not be 
proved through experience was made clear in the first Critique. in relation to both the 
Anticipations of Perception and the infinite divisibility of intensive magnitudes, and at 
length in relation to regulative judgement, which is governed subjectively by three 
logical maxims asserting the continuity of nature; the absence of a vacuum - non datur 
vacuum formarum; the impossibility of leaps in nature, transitions between species 
comprehending `all the smaller degrees of difference that mediate between them" O- 
datur continuum formarum: and the law of their conjunction, continuum specierum, 
which `recognise[s] a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the 
same stem' 11. Homogeneity and specification are thus joined in an arborescent form, 
leading to a problem of roots, and what grounds them. This logics of continuity 
presupposes a transcendental law, Vex continui in natura'12. Kant is at pains to avoid 
the suggestion that attraction at a distance is across a real empty space, or that 
variations amongst species correspond to real gaps. 
In the MFNS. Kant's concern is with an intensive continuum of force, and 
with the possibilities of constructing a concept of full space which will give material 
weight to the law of continuity in nature and support his claim that nature knows no 
vacuums. The distributions of bodies considered as expressing intensive qualities are 
not determinate, in relation either to themselves or to a geometric boundary, prior to 
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the construction of the concept of quantity the most one can say is that there are 
regions of density and patterns of flows. This follows quite clearly from the description 
in the first Criitiaue of intensive qualities as flowing, and from Kant's assertion that 
there is no legitimacy in the assumption that the real [das Reale] is uniform in degree. 
To understand this, it is necessary to differentiate between a body - `a matter between 
determinate boundaries', assumed to be intensively homogeneous, and density, which 
is a function of the relation between attractive and repulsive - that is, intensive - 
forces. " Density is unsuitable as a means of thinking relations amongst matters, 
precisely because of its heterogeneity and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
establishing proportionality amongst intensively differentiated regions of space 
without introducing a principle of determination - such as extension - which segments, 
orders and determines matter in space in such a manner that it is analytically tractable 
- which is to say, homogeneous with regard to its units of composition. `[N]o 
comparison can properly be permitted between heterogeneous matters with regard to 
their density'14; the determination of intensive qualities, and the relative 
proportionality of attractive and repulsive forces is a function of their relation with 
extensive quanta, their characterization as qualities of bodies confined within 
determinate boundaries, or, as Kant expresses it, their `represent[ation] as specifically 
homogeneous among one another'. 
In the Aesthetic Kant says that removal from the representation of a body of 
those aspects belonging to sensation leaves extension and figure; however, there is 
nothing in this remark that determines the nature and configuration of such figures, 
since determination is a function of understanding, and mathematical objects exist 
through construction in pure intuition, which requires productive imagination. There is 
thus no weight to the claim that Kant can be refuted by the existence of non-Euclidean 
geometries, or by forms of non-rational mathematics, since there is no formal 
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grammar, as it were, to the pure forms of space and time. They underlie the possibility 
of geometry and mathematics, but the process of numbering is prior to the concept of a 
number, just as the figuration of spatial bodies is prior to geometric axioms. Kant's 
elucidation of intuition is confined to a three-dimensional space and the one- 
dimensional line of time is axiomatically extensive and produced through the 
successive addition of units. But the forms of intuition themselves are empty. This is a 
complex issue and outside the scope of this thesis, so will not be pursued in any depth. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that pure intuition is vacuous and that the 
construction of spatio-temporal figures concerns the relation of imagination to 
intuition, so is implicated with the functioning of the former, a topic for the next 
chapter, and that intuition itself does not contain pre-given restraints on the potential 
for such constructions. As has already been seen, the pure forms of space and time are 
empty, what configures space along Euclidean lines - for example - is the feeding of 
axioms into the process of construction, and not any characteristic of intuition. As 
Buchdahl points out, it is necessary to differentiate between the principle of the axioms 
and the axioms themselves; the 
'latter do indeed presuppose the former, as providing a "proof" that 
extensional axioms have a synthetic a priori status in general. But 
this does not tell us what axioms there are, nor whether there is a 
single and unique set of such axioms. " 
At the level of principle - that is, transcendentally - there is no legitimacy in the 
assumption that space or time have any formal grammar or any specific axioms - 
Euclidean or otherwise - constraining the nature of the empirical. `[T]here is no 
contradiction in the concept of a figure which is enclosed within two straight lines'; 
however, given space - that is, the extended space of experience as experience of 
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objects - operates against the possibility of non-Euclidean, synthetic geometries, 
because it is already configured as three-dimensional and linearly co-ordinated. 16 The 
logical grammar of understanding and the principles of judgement construct one space, 
of which all spaces are parts; there is thus, as it were, no space for alternative 
geometries. But from the perspective of the pure forms of space and time, thought 
outside the constructions governed by definitions and axioms of understanding, there 
are no pre-given restraints on their potential configuration. Deleuze exploits this to the 
full. 
As the above list notes, repulsive forces are not limited by space; they have no 
exhaustive extension, but become infinitely diffuse, until `no assignable quantity of 
matter would be found in any assignable space. '" Repulsive force alone, therefore, 
gives no concept of the dynamic magnitude of a body, no concept of quantity is 
constructible from the diffuse indeterminacy of intensive magnitude; space is full but 
not denumerable, occupied without measure. It is not the case that repulsive force 
alone is an impossibility for Kant: he spends considerable time in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science discussing the qualities of repulsion, defining physical 
contact in its terms, as a problem of infinitely small distances, and characterizing it in 
terms of feeling. What is impossible is any determinate quantification of repulsive 
forces, in the absence of their relation to attractive forces and the mathematical 
punctuation of space. That is, any workable (in a scientific or epistemological sense) 
definition of matter depends on the construction of repulsive forces according to a 
metric which is not immanent to those forces themselves, but arrived at through the 
postulation of attractive forces acting at a distance across empty space according to the 
principles of phoronomy. 
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In Kant, this distribution of repulsive forces is subjected to negation; the 
multiplicitous difference of degree is `represented.. through approximation to negation 
= 0'18, and intensity becomes thought of as a unit, representable as a point, the real 
moment of cause. The actual intensive continuum filling space can then be 
mathematically conceived as a uniformly homogeneous field of points, all 
interconnected with each other, no part more distant than any other, because their 
relation is intensive, rather than extensive. Through the medium of the point, repulsive 
force can conceived of in relation to a uniform and undifferentiated mathematical 
continuum, extending to infinity. 
If, as Kant desires, repulsion is to become the basis of the movable, the topic 
of mechanics, then it cannot itself be thought of as mobile, just as, for time to be the 
form of everything which changes, it cannot itself change. The immanent dynamics of 
repulsive force have to be distributed uniformly, which means they have to be recorded 
in a manner different to their production, because the mechanical field into which they 
are to be folded is based on a principle of a unity of force, whilst intensity is 
immanently differentiated. The homogenization of force is the first move in this 
recording process, and forms the concept of substance. 
In relation to substance, force is determinately defined, as a state of matter, 
rather than as an intensive vector. In the latter case, the given as diversity and that by 
which the given is given as diverse are immanently entangled, rather than subordinated 
to the principle of an `ultimate subject of existence' and there is neither assignable 
origin nor end to the vector. ' 9 Empirical time and space are constructed through the 
movement of forces, rather than through reference to axiomatized quanta. Difference is 
thus virtual, or immanent to the actual continuum, and rather than being subjected to 
limitation, changes in nature as it changes in degree. It has been said that space cannot 
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limit repulsive force. Nor, however, is the filling of space self-limiting: immanently 
repulsive, matter is 'compelled-to continuously expand' its occupation of space. 20 In 
relation to substance, this expansion is necessarily a relation with unity, and thus of 
determinate and measurable extension. In relation only to itself, intensive expansion is 
not defined or conceivable, and hence becomes a problematic, rather than a theoretical 
issue. Deleuze, by critiquing the formation and assumptions of common sense and 
setting a different model of science against that of universal gravitation, opens up this 
space, and focuses on the problem of how repulsion is first set up (a matter addressed 
later in this chapter). 
Repulsive force is a force of surfaces: every part touches every part, and there 
is no empty space: `physical contact is the reciprocal action of repulsive forces at the 
common boundary of two matters' 21. But the boundary is only common in the sense 
that two matters are infinitely proximate, for it is immanent to the field of each. It is 
not common in the sense that both matters share a law which their relation instantiates 
nor is it formed through the subordination by one matter of another. The boundary or 
limit is not governed a priori by any element implicated in its formation, but produced 
as an effect of the relation of forces at different intensive degrees: it is common only in 
the sense that it is a difference common to all distributions. Contact, Kant says, is 
differential, a problem of `infinitely small distances' u. 
The model here is not hylomorphic, since the dynamic filling of space by 
repulsive forces is materially distributive, but there is as yet no differentiation of matter 
and form. For this, contact has to be referred to a limit, a point: it is the same problem 
as that of sensation, noted above, where the subjective indeterminacy of sensation 
appeared to void the possibility of objectively measuring intensive magnitude. `La 
geometrie et 1'arithmetique prennent la puissance d'un scalpel (Geometry and 
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arithmetic take on the power of the scalpel)'23, Deleuze and Guattari say in Mille 
Plateaux, and it is this function which orders the homogeneous and dead space across 
which the true force of attraction drops bodies and draws lines. 
Attraction 
Unlike repulsive forces, which fill space by means of the sense of feeling [Gefiihl], (and 
thus are in the sphere of aesthetic, rather than speculative or practical judgement) 
attractive force is characterized as ambivalent in relation to sensation [Empfrndungl: 
either there is `no sensation at all' or there is sensation, but no determinate object, and 
it is this that makes it appear at first problematic as a fundamental force, since no 
determinate quanta of intuition can be correlated with the spread or absence of 
sensation. There is either zero sensation of intensity, which as Kant says `would 
involve the representation of the instant as empty, therefore = 0', and repulsive forces 
necessitate the impossibility of this. 24 Or there is sensation but no determinate intensive 
magnitude, or `degree of influence on the sense' which would validate the objectivity of 
sensation, attributing to it an objective cause. ' So attractive force becomes open to the 
accusation of having only subjective validity, and of functioning in a space with no real 
dynamic qualities. 
No positive concept of real attractive force can be constructed: it is inferred, 
Kant says, but not derived, and on the basis of the possibility of a general concept of 
matter, so its positivity is not real but conceived. Independently of repulsion, attraction 
becomes purely mathematical: if there were only attractive forces, the parts of matter 
would `coalesce in a mathematical point' in empty space 26 As Kant says, mathematics 
`presents the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure reason, without 
the help of experience', and it is through mathematics that the heterogeneous 
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involution and division of repulsive forces becomes tied to points of attraction, 
becoming uniform and inert Z' Synthetic, and thus productive, but a priori and thus 
merely possible in relation to the real, Kant's mathematics grounds the royal 
description of space, as `strib par la chute des corps, les verticales de pesanteur (striated 
by the fall of bodies, the verticals of gravity)'. 28 
Space is inverted through the negation of dynamic intensities, and the real is 
sucked through an impenetrable point, its sign inverted. Its depth becomes empty, 
voided of continuously differentiated degrees of intensity and re-distributed as 
homogeneous, parallel, Euclidean, inertly receptive to the mechanical principles of 
order. the shift is from feeling to sight, from an intensive distribution to a determinate 
vision, from a real space unobservable from outside to an ideal space only observable 
from outside. There is a cancellation of indeterminate sensations in favour of a split 
sensibility according to a difference imposed from outside, by understanding, rather 
than one which emerges from intensive magnitudes. 
The force of attraction is defined in terms of the action of points at a distance, 
`through every space as an empty space'29, but only two bodies at a time defining, as 
Deleuze and Guattari say, `la forme d'interiorite de toute science (the form of 
interiority of all science)'. 30 In the construction of this form real magnitudes are 
assigned a negative value, and space is covered over with extensive lines, pillars of 
force, giving rise to a third form of compression, resulting from the relation of 
repulsive and attractive forces, which establishes a direction to flows of force, 
distributing a before and an after of time in relation to which a before and an after of 
intensive distribution can be determined. The point becomes a present, but a vacant 
one, which defines a direction of time `du passe au futur, comme du particulier au 
general (from past to future as though from particular to general)', from the 
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determinate point or state of matter, the moment of gravity, to the homogeneous chaos 
of uniformly dispersed intensity. 31 Kant's dynamics are thus commensurate not only 
with mechanics, but will support too a thermodynamics of good sense. The `themes 
d'une reduction de la difference, d'une uniformisation du diverse, d'une egalisation de 
l'inegal (themes of a reduction of difference, a uniformisation of diversity, and an 
equalisation of inequality)', fused in thermodynamics, established basic definitions 
satisfying, Deleuze writes, `tout le monde, y compris ä un certain kantisme (everybody, 
including a certain Kantianism)' 32 Deleuze, however, finds a third relation, generated 
through the conjunction of the purpose-driven directionality of force proper to teleology 
and thermodynamics (the force of good sense) and the determinate conceptualization of 
force as the moment of gravity (the force of common sense). This conjunction drives 
critique across the thresholds of rational ends and towards machinic or auto-critique, 
which is not principled by unity but according to a principle of difference: given 
nothing but difference there is nothing in common but there is still difference. 
Extension is the cancellation and covering up of intensities, their 
incorporation into an mechanical common sense and eschatological good sense, which 
organizes things `dann les conditions de 1'etendue et dann l'ordre du temps (in the 
order of time and under the conditions of extensity)' so that difference is encouraged to 
cancel itself, as time becomes subject to logic and material forces become 
hylomorphically arranged. 33 In order to understand this one must recall a remark made 
in the Introduction, pointing out that this thesis is not written from the perspective of 
the conscious Kantian subject whose capacity to intuit intensity is restricted to within 
extended homogeneous space and time. Rather, it takes a route driven by the position 
in which Kant has placed woman - that is, a position aligned with the object, with 
nature, with imagination and sensation, on the thresholds of the system of 
consciousness, neither wholly outside nor completely incorporated within it. From this 
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perspective, as Chapter Six makes more explicit, the mechanisms which construct 
extended homogeneous space - negation and limitation, the axiomatization of all 
magnitudes as extensive, the reference of all events (or accidents) to a permanent 
subject/substance - are mechanisms which cancel out and cover up the immanent 
movements of nature, sensation and imagination with the demands of order and 
uniformity, in order to produce a nature of regularity whose laws are given by the 
subject. 
From the perspective of the subject intensity is thought only within the bounds 
of extension. However, it is precisely because Kant does not completely eliminate those 
figures associated with intensity - the thing-in-itself, imagination, sense and sensation - 
with the logical demands of the concept that he presents the occasion for a different 
reading, one which does not require a woman reader to become a Kantian by becoming 
first an honorary man. If the theoretical writings are read in conjunction with Kant's 
writings on history and politics such a position is not, from the perspective of 
"orthodox" Kantianism, a tenable one, since women remain always the passive 
components in any theoretical, social or political space. 
The final moment in constructing a dynamic concept of matter, a substance 
commensurate with mechanical expression, is limitation, which defines and confirms 
the degree of negation necessary to generate a universal and permanently uniform 
containment of repulsion by a point of attraction, and form a general concept of matter. 
Attractive force splits into true and apparent. Attraction is apparent when the 
combined force of two bodies is not biunivocal, and their approach is not intensively 
symmetrical: one body `has been driven Lgetriebenl toward the first body from 
elsewhere by impact'. ''' But impact is an empirical and derivative concept of force, 
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rather than a fundamental property, and so includes an admixture of elements, both 
empirical and a priori. Yet although it results from physical contact rather than being 
a function of the relation across empty space of the bodies involved, the effects of 
impact can, given a generalized concept of matter and a science of forces, be 
anticipated a priori. Apparent attraction is the negative of repulsive force and `proper 
object of our external perception'35; in order to discover the true attraction at its basis, 
the mass of a body must be understood in terms of a point at its centre, and the relation 
of forces understood as constant for all variables. True attraction, Kant says, is 
estimated without the intervention of repulsive force or the need to accommodate 
intensive variations, and it is in this, its true and mathematical sense, that attraction is 
the ground of possibility of matter as matter in general. 
11 Lagoon Dynamics 
Kant gives two fine illustrations of the effects of disequilibrated forces, where the 
dynamics of full space do not slide unproblematically into points and striations and 
mechanical relations, and in both cases, imagination is involved as an exacerbatory 
process of the destabilized relations of repulsion and attraction. In the first chapter, the 
schematizing function of imagination under the determination of understanding was 
mentioned briefly, as was the focus imaginarius, a subjective focus mediating the 
transition from the distributive unity of understanding to the collective unity of reason. 
When the faculties are unhinged, and their relations not ordered by common sense, 
imagination comes to play a different role. 
In the sublime, the inadequacy of imagination to fulfil its two theoretically 
assigned functions of apprehension and comprehension, and thus provide a qualified 
quantum of intuition to understanding, is felt as pain and resolved by the superior 
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might of reason into negative pleasure. In its attempt to use nature as a schema for the 
presentation of the sublime, imagination becomes alternately attracted and repelled by 
natural might [1facht], and disengaged from sensibility and understanding, it moves 
vertically into a realm of incomparable quantity, the magnitude of the supersensible, 
where reason asserts its dominance [Gewalt] over the exertions of imagination. This is 
much written about however, so in this chapter a different example will be looked at. 36 
The sublime recurs, however, in the context of a discussion of imagination in the next 
chapter. 
Crossing water, `[o]n a trip from Pillau to Königsberg, if this can be called a 
voyage', Immanuel Kant, Professor from Königsberg, grows seasick. 37 Diagnosing his 
condition, he pins the nausea down to 'antiperistaltic movement of the intestines by the 
abdominal muscles' reversing the cycle of ingestion and evacuation through the 
organism. 38 Swelling waters on the lagoon interfere with the successive and automatic 
compression of the tubular pathways in the body, `repeated rising and falling' of the 
field of appearance, felt first as a disturbance in sight is, when `provoked, by 
imagination', exacerbated and thrown into reverse. 39 If this reversal is not 
countermanded, the organism exports matter, the process of which through the body 
has been unbalanced by dynamic distortions in its environment. Regulated and directed 
wave-like contractions in the vermicular canals through which the organism ingests 
and dispels waste are unable to negotiate an equilibrium with wavering uncertain 
waters, and excited to confusion. The proper organization, contents, and connections of 
the input/output channels running through the closed volume of a whole body become 
disordered. The irregular and unregulated flows of the waters play havoc with the 
regulated structure of the organism and under the provocation of imagination, sight 
turns back in on the organism and the outside world darkens. Kant's analysis of this 
problem is instructive, since it is one of the few occasions on which he can indeed be 
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said to occupy a dynamic space, not as an observer, but as an body interacting with the 
forces with which it connects. 
`Sight is the noblest of the senses' Kant writes, and `comes closest to a pure 
intuition' 40; the purity of the light medium being imperceptible except through its 
special organ, the eye, the object seems independent of sensation. As said above, 
sensation was initially problematic in relation to attractive forces, either lacking a 
determinate object, or not felt at all, and Kant solved this difficulty of an intensive 
distribution without determinate form or relation by negating the forces implicated 
with feeling and physical contact and collapsing matter into a point, a limit. On the 
water, however, such a resolution is precluded. The homogeneous space of universal 
attraction, the world organized as a laboratory in which sight is privileged, gives way 
to a turbulent and fluid heterogeneous field in continuous variation, to which none of 
the corporeal senses are adequate, and which effects their recoil back into the body in a 
refusal of their tentacular role on behalf of the empirical subject. The response is 
similar to that of the sublime; in both cases, what is looked for is a place of safety, from 
where the disturbance can be estimated as fearful, but the subject can be unafraid. In 
the case of the sublime, this is culture. Kant writes: 
`[T]he vast ocean heaved up by storms cannot be called sublime. The 
sight of it is horrible; and one must already have filled one's mind 
with all sorts of ideas if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling 
that is itself sublime, inasmuch as the mind is induced to abandon 
sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher 
purposiveness'. " 
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Out on the lagoon, does Kant experience the sublime? Certainly, his 
description suggests he is induced to abandon sensibility. Whether cultural ideas are 
sufficient to sublimate his nausea? - this is unclear. 
Light, the medium of sight, `unlike sound, is not merely a wave-like motion of 
a fluid element that spreads through space in all directions, but a radiation that 
determines a point in space for the object' 42 And in the MFNS: `nothing prevents 
one's thinking of light-matter as originally and indeed thoroughly fluid, without being 
divided into fixed particles'. 43 Whilst not composed of discrete quanta, illumination 
nonetheless determines a unit or quantum of intensity. In his discussion of forces, Kant 
contrasts a model of the diffusion of light provided by optics, `by means of rays 
diverging in a circle from a central point' with one depicting the diffusion of repulsive 
forces across a spherical surface. 44 
The optical model returns a problem of empty space, not as proposed by the 
concept of action at a distance, but between the real elements filling space. If diffusion 
is represented in terms of lines, the actual continuum of intensive force becomes 
segmented, broken into discrete elements, repulsion as the filling of space becomes 
confused with the enclosure of space, and the only light is that of the lines, `as if there 
were always to be found places devoid of light between the rays'. 45 Kant is of course 
anxious to prevent an account of material force in terms of monads, or atomic 
elements, or suggest the possibility of real empty spaces increasing as the rays are 
further extended. In his preferred model `light diffuses itself everywhere from an 
illuminating point in spherical surfaces', from one point to all distances, not as rays, 
but in divergent circular waves. The degree of intensity then becomes a function of the 
extension of the diffusion surface across which it is distributed; the greater the 
extension, the less the illumination, the illuminating point remaining constant. Space 
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remains full, in actual terms, but the conditions of its organization are given by a 
principle extrinsic to this space, which folds itself back over it and records movement 
on its surface in terms different to those which produced it. 
*** 
Deleuze's argument with Kant - that he provides possible conditions for the 
production of representation, and not real conditions for the production of production is 
focused on this folded back surface, on the stratified space it generates, and on the 
condition or idea implicated in the disjunction which elevates law above the real. In 
effect, his criticism is that Kant provides no real account of the conditions for the 
tactile and full space of the actual continuum, only ideal and possible conditions for the 
visual and empty space of continuous attraction in which these forces are enclosed. 
There is no transcendental account of the construction of the enclosure. Alex continuii 
in natura underpins an arborescent model of the species, in terms of which it is 
possible to `recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all spring from the 
same stem' and a linear model of forces, in terms of which each is a function of 
substance, as the radical of power, underpins a striated model of space. 46 
The point is a centre of resonance, `un point d'accumulation, comme un point 
de croisement quelque part derriere tous les yeux (a single point of accumulation that is 
like a point of intersection somewhere between the eyes)'47; sight and the coalesced 
intensive force figured as a mathematical point in the interests of theorizing action at a 
distance across empty space converge on the same model, the eyes of the subject, all 
implicated in the direction of the systematic ends of reason. In the case of sight, 
radiation determines a point in space for the object. In the case of action at a distance, 
force is represented `as converging at the attracting point from all points of the 
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surrounding spherical surface'48; in both cases, for the direction of determination to be 
objectively valid, it must be a function of `all points of the surface' and not determined 
by the illuminating centre. 49 Only thus can intensity be quantified as equal in all space, 
regardless of its compression or density, its connections, directions or speed. If it were 
a function of the illuminating centre, it would need to be understood as increasingly 
diffuse and, as mentioned above, would result in the absence of assignable quantity or 
position of intensive magnitudes. Besides, good sense may be eschatological, but it does 
not take its end as real: there is no real force of attraction, as seen above : true attraction 
is a mathematical construct, a point, and a basic point of Kantian philosophy is that 
existence - the real in knowledge - is not constructible. As Kant writes, `the real in 
space' is a distribution of repulsive force and `the proper object of our external 
perception'; its `negative, namely, attractive force' is not described as real, however, 
but as necessary for the `possibility of the concept of matter'. In order for a conceptual - 
that is, logically and mathematically tractable - formulation of matter, the real must be 
subject to negation and limitation. Attraction belongs to the possibility of matter as 
matter in general - that is, its possibility is formally rather than really configured. 
To describe the relations of horizontally diffuse and differential intensities in 
terms of a point, and `indicate the rectilinear direction, straight lines must be drawn 
from the surface and all its points to the illuminating point' S0 These are the lines 
described by falling bodies, the pillars which striate space, pegging difference to points; 
the central illuminating point does not determine direction, merely organizes a 
resonance amongst all points on the sphere, effecting their communication within the 
interior space behind the eyes. 
*** 
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Kant's nausea is the outcome of unanticipated alterations in the vectors of 
forces which preclude the smooth transformation from dynamics to mechanics or 
thermodynamics; there are aleatory lines departing from the rectilinear, directions 
outside anticipated variations, not forestalled by a rule or law, and the dynamics of the 
ocean do not translate into the substances and forms of the land. On Kant's lagoon, the 
regularity of the body begins to breakdown; no more pure logical movement, 
continuous quality of medium. Instead of completing an indeterminate aesthetic space, 
ein vorgriff, and driving objective production to the benefit and purposes of the 
ultimate substance of existence, intensities explode into the noise of the waves. 
Undirected and turbulent, they return on the body, also incomplete, only to be further 
exacerbated by an imagination unhinged, synthesizing without schema or rule. Kant's 
desire for symmetry becomes ridiculous as the incompleteness of the imaginative 
circuit is mimicked or mirrored by a similarly incomplete organic circuit. The 
geometric completeness of sight is unhinged, vision becomes waveform, and the body 
becomes a complex of channels and disordered reversals. 
Its anticipatory systems failing it, an organism becomes `more conscious of the 
organ's being affected than of the reference to an external object'51; 
`In other words, the intensity of the sensation, in both cases, prevents 
us from arriving at a concept of the object and fixes our attention 
merely on the subjective representation, namely the alteration of the 
organ'. 52 
In an organism `just as each part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we 
also think of each part as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, i. e., as an 
instrument or organ. 03 Its turbulence connecting with a zone of the body, fomenting 
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sudden, violent or unanticipated alterations of a single organ, here the eye, intense 
sensation disequilibrates the careful structure of the whole. Indeed, there is no whole, 
for the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body according to a principle of 
wholeness has broken down. Organs no longer exist for the sake of the others and of 
the whole, imagination no longer makes space for objects, and unity mutates into a 
chaos of traffic on a circuit, a congealed transformational zone, a direction and 
intensity of flows across an indeterminate non-organic body. The object is the constant 
of subjectivity, its fetish. With its point gone, what could a subject be? 
III Deduction I: Kant 
`[T]hat laborious deduction of the categories was needed for theology 
and morals and how fruitful it was for them. ' 54 
Dieter Henrich argues that the model for the deductions in Kant's critical 
writings comes not from logic but law. Whilst the steps in the proof may function 
syllogistically, its status as a deduction is not defined by this. " Deduktionsschriften 
(deduction writings), used in Germany since the late fourteenth century, were 
widespread by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and for the most part sought to 
justify claims of the succession of reigns or of territorial inheritance. Henrich points out 
that Putter, coauthor of the text Kant used in teaching natural law and defender of the 
imperial ideal of the Reich, was `the most admired deduction writer of Kant's time' 
and that its widespread practice gave Kant reason to think that the transference of `the 
term "deduction" from its juridical usage to a new, philosophical one' would be 
understood. 56 Henrich argues for a structural similarity too; Kant's deductions follow 
the requirement for brevity and solidity and the custom of appending a brief summary 
of the salient points of the case at the close of the argument - Henrich points to the 
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Brief Outline of this Deduction which closes the B edition of the first Critique as an 
example. 
Deleuze says of Kantian critique that it amounts `ä donner des etats civils A la 
pensee consideree du point de vue de sa loi naturelle (to giving civil rights to thought 
considered from the point of view of its natural law)'S' and Henrich also argues that 
Kant uses `Natural Right... as a paradigm'. 58 Beneath the regional specificities of civil 
rights lies a generic concept of natural right, a reference to an `original acquisition' 
which cannot be legitimated because no objective account of its possession can be 
provided. 59 No physiology could warrant the supreme situation of man in relation to the 
law, even if Kant thought such a physiology possible. Nonetheless, this natural right, 
whilst not being instrumental in the deduction of civil rights both grounds and is 
supported by them. The relation of natural right to civil law is analogous, in Kant, to 
that of the sublime to culture. Neither culture nor natural right ground either the 
sublime or civil rights. Nonethess, just as the sublime requires culture, civil law 
requires natural right. As has been seen, Law is meant to be exercised empirically, but 
this requires the natural capacity to do so: in talking of women, Kant refers to their 
physical weakness and to the superior strengths of men. Here is a direction in which 
the natural rights required by civil law might be found 
Natural right functions much as repulsive forces do in the discussion above, 
when brought into relation with attraction. The channels and conduits of the law define 
the civil rights of a body, but these have no real power in the absence of the natural 
right which underpins them, just as the striations of empty space have no real force 
independently of the tactile full space of the actual continuum. What counts as a 
legitimate and quantifiable action is in both cases defined in terms of its difference 
from a mobile diversity of intensive distributions on the one hand, and from a centre of 
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resonance on the other, and what is diverse in relation to action so defined is rendered 
uniformly exterior to the problem of law, as legally and substantially inert. The centre 
of resonance becomes the source of all form, of the power in its application and the end 
towards which true actions lead: possession. 
Extended corporeal space is established in the relation of repulsive and 
attractive forces, and compressed between true and apparent attraction. Whilst the 
court of reason constitutes its territory in the space between the two parallel series of 
natural and original right, the ground of the court, the substratum of so-called natural 
right, is formulated reductively through the evacuation of bodies, passions and 
sensuous interests: there is no feeling implicated in the proper exercise of law, for 
either subject or legislator, and just as feeling, or the physical contact of repulsion 
needed to be weeded out in the construction of royal science, so too must it be 
eliminated here. For nature to carry right a law extrinsic to it must govern its 
application. And it is through the critique of practical reason, for which as Kant says, 
the deduction was so necessary, that `the obligation to prevent the empirically 
conditioned reason from presuming to be the only ground of determination of the will' 
is legitimated. 60 
Henrich points out that deduction means `to carry something forth to 
something else' 61: it is thus implicated with a channel or duct, the dimensions and 
directions of which are defined according to principles of law which in turn define the 
legitimacy of empirical objects brought before the law, and the conditions of possibility 
under which actions are recognized in the court of reason. The deduction is thus also a 
reduction, compressing actions into legal form and eliminating intensities not 
commensurate with a juridical concept of action. The real possession of an original 
acquisition cannot be justified independently of factual data, but the data must be 
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formulated in a manner that 'suffice(s) to justify the claims attached to our 
knowledge. '62 And again, a principle of continuity is implicated, this time of 
possession. 
Parallel and complementary to the reductive formulation of substance as that 
in relation to which actions have juridical weight, and count as justification towards a 
claim - the subject has a de facto case -are interests of reason. As affective constituents 
are defined out, an empty space opens into which interests of reason are defined, 
transferring the ground of law from nature to reason, shifting right from nature to law 
and defining what is outside the law, in the sense of not being a recognized action, 
negatively. The same series of moves which constitute a body as a mechanically 
movable inert substance in space, define the subject as similarly movable, no longer in 
relation to a theory defined in teens of force, but in terms of a practice defined in terms 
of power. 
IV Deduction H: Deleuze 
`ce qui est soustrait, ampute ou neutralise, ce sont les elements du 
Pouvoir, les e16ments qui font ou representent un systeme du Pouvoir' 
(what is substracted, amputated or neutralized are elements of power, 
the elements which make or represent a system of power)' 63 
Deleuze understands deduction eliminatively. Real critique and real creation 
are not differentiated, and the destruction of the image of thought and the elements 
constitutive of its power are immanent to the real genesis of thought. There are always 
two things occurring simultaneously, and the negative is always an effect of the 
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positive, but there is no determination of signs in advance of the formation of the 
division: creation is not of necessity positive, anymore than destruction is of necessity 
negative. It is important not to confuse Deleuze's method as prescriptive of a better 
future, or as claiming more truth than any other: uncovering the real conditions of the 
production of production is not an exercise in curing the world of its ills, but rather of 
describing the mechanisms implicated in its construction, and it is in this sense that 
Deleuze's is a rigorously critical project. 
This method of eliminative deduction complements that of selection, by 
stripping out the signs of power in a writer or system or order, so allowing for a 
description of the development of virtual elements disguised or covered over by 
constructions submitting to the requirements of law and systematic unity. 'Soustraire 
l'unique de la multiplicitd ä constituer, ecrire A n-1 (subtract the unique from the 
multiplicity to be constitute; write at n -1 dimensions). '64 The method is positive, in 
that it is not simply a case of removing arbitrary components, but of selecting elements 
which collapse the necessities attaching to functions of power, unity, law, the State: the 
negative elimination is thus a function of a positive operation. He calls the method 
minoritarian and it differs from majoritarian thought, which operates on a principle of 
recognition and law, in the following ways: majoritarian law makes doctrine from 
thought, facts from events and normalizes by admiration; a minor literature disengages 
life from culture, becoming from history, thought from doctrine, and bodies from 
society. Minorities are defined not in terms of their denumerable quantity - which 
would, for example, exclude women from minoritarian status - but `par l'ecart qui les 
separent de tel ou tel axiome constituant une majoritd redondante (by the gap that 
separates them from this or that axiom constituting a redundant majority)'65 As 
minoritarian in method, Deleuze's deduction focuses on exposing the differential 
intensive elements and problematic sensations which attraction cancels by 
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condensation into a point, an axiomatic quantum immanent to real distributions, and 
tracking the tactile connections of the actual continuum, generating simultaneously a 
radical new description of space. 
In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari describe the coexistence of 
mechanisms in primitive and nomadic societies, which anticipate the State in two 
senses, both warding off or repulsing centres of resonance, and incorporating vectors 
moving in their direction. Before appearing, the State 
`agit dejä sous forme de l'onde convergente ou centrip&e... qui 
s'annule precisement au point de convergence qui marquerait 
V inversion des signs ou 1 apparition d'Etat. 
(already acts in the form of a convergent or centripetal wave... that 
cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the 
inversion of signs or the appearance of the State)' "6 
The model fits neatly with Kant's description of attraction as a wave-like 
convergence from all points on the surface of a sphere towards a point. The point made 
in Mille Plateaux is that this movement is anticipatory of the State, rather than effected 
by it, responding to it as something which does not yet exist, but which nonetheless 
`agit dejä sous une autre forme que Celle de son existence (is already in action, in a 
different form than that of its existence)' 67 The point of attraction is thus doubled, 
functioning both virtually, as a real potential to be anticipated and warded off, and 
actually, as concrete, effectuated. The inverse movement of a diffusive, divergent wave 
testifies to this actual operation, to the concrete striation of space and division of forces 
in terms of an order folded back over the surface of the flows, imposed from one point 
on all distances. 
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Rather than searching for the origins of the resonant central point, the State, 
or giving a chronological account of its emergence from pre-State societies, Mille 
Plateaux divides the existence of both - state and nomadic societies - into virtual and 
actual potentials, arguing that both have always existed, and that virtual potentials co- 
exist alongside concrete machines, but cannot be described in their terms. The move is 
familiarly Kantian: the transcendental cannot be described from the empirical, but is its 
condition. Where it departs from Kant is in its refusal to generalize over the virtual, 
and reduce it to a possibility recognizable in its concrete instantiations, and in the 
positive feedback from the concrete which functions as a selective mechanism, 
potentiating the actualization of virtual elements. There is no Law, no lex continut in 
natura, no Master, no Slave and no Rebel, and the economy is not visual, but tactile, 
affective, a matter of sensation and intensity rather than sight and extension. Every 
assemblage is individuated simultaneously as both singular and collective, virtual and 
concrete, and only by empirical exploration of the branchings, proximities, contacts 
and connections into which an assemblage enters is its mode of functioning disclosed. 
Thus, for example, when addressing the situation of women in relation to capital, no 
general statement is possible which comprehends the complexities and degrees of 
attachment to this system, and attributes a position of women as a whole. Instead, the 
actual situation of individual women has to be explored, and the micro-physics of 
power organizing and blocking lines of becoming followed at the local level, rather 
than from a global perspective. 
Kant defines points of contact, tactile proximities in full space in terms of 
relative degrees of compression, and Deleuze and Guattari focus in on this problem. 
Rather than uniformizing their distributions, a move which proposes both an initial 
and eventual equilibrium, initially that of unity, or the present, and eventually that of 
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homogeneous entropy, or the future, each is taken as singular. So a different concept of 
chaos emerges, one which is not unformed and uniformly homogeneous, but which is 
patterned, populated by haecceities, or `des modes d'individuation qui ne procedent ni 
par la forme ni par le sujet (modes of individuation proceeding neither by form nor by 
the subject', and which is immanent to the content and expression of bodies and their 
languages `8 Each plateau describes a singularity, a concrete date which effectuates a 
set of virtual elements in a configuration without precedent or model, a region of chaos 
sufficiently massive for exploration by human methods. Unformed matter is no longer 
the future generality of good sense, heat death or the kingdom of ends, but `une 
matiere-mouvement qui comporte des singularite s (a matter-movement bearing 
singularities)', the stuff of bodies, or content; and a nonformal functions diagramming 
a plane of consistency or abstract machine, is 'une expressivitt-mouvement qui 
comporte toujours une langue etrangere (an expressivity-movement always bearing a 
foreign tongue)', the stuff of language, or expression. 69 
An abstract machine is defined in terms of concrete flows on its surface, flows 
of air, breath, heat, food, sperm, shit, sex, words, sunbeams, money, stones, etc.: 
`continuums of intensity, blocs of becoming, emissions of particles, combinations of 
fluxes'. "' The theory of assemblages or multiplicities arises from these flows, from non- 
formal functions, tendencies to the limit, unformed matters and the atypical 
expressions of minoritarian sciences and literatures, philosophies and arts, which no 
longer refer to disciplines or faculties, but to the relative mix of elements composing a 
machine. The State is an abstract machine, and there has always been a State, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue, and nomadic societies, far from being precursors of the State, are 
always in some relation to them. Instead of separating the waves of attraction and 
repulsion, convergence and divergence into two separate tendencies Mille Plateaux 
seeks to theorize them as simultaneously concretizing different virtual tendencies, or 
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abstract machines, so that any assemblage or multiplicity is both attached to the strata, 
which are State apparatus of capture, and so interior to its territory and as transversed 
by a vector of escape, which eludes and evades that order. Applied to Kant, this 
exposes a third kind of line, which is neither that of convergence or divergence, nor 
that which biunivocalizes relations between two bodies, which Deleuze and Guattari 
call a line of flight. 
The surface on which forces are distributed is no longer made uniform by 
rectilinear lines striating space, and organized by a superstratum elevated vertically 
above it and functioning as a central resonator for all points on the sphere, but is 
instead a differential field of thresholds and gradients of intensities. This intensive 
space, or spatium connects with discussions in chapter one - with the given as 
intensive, the sufficient reason of sense which forces thought: with Deleuze's 
definition of the transcendent form of a faculty as grasping that in the world which 
concerns it exclusively, differentiating the transcendental: with Kant's definition of 
transcendental matter as that which corresponds to sensation: with the thing-in-itself; 
or in-itself of difference. Deducting the assumption of unity which covers over the real 
problematic involved in these elements, and attaches them to a subject-based 
epistemology and an ontology of being, Deleuze opens up the problem of 
diagrammatization of this differential field, populated by spatio-temporal dynamisms, 
torsions, drifts and larval subjects. Rather than, as with Kant, attempting to construct a 
concept of quantity which could contain magnitudes of intensity, and allow for their 
mechanical distribution through the medium of a subject, Deleuze concentrates instead 
on the nature of lines, flows, connections and distributions immanent to material- 
forces. 
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V Demon I 
In Difference et Repetition, difference of intensity, infinitely doubled differences 
potentiating infinities is called disparity, dispars, the dark precursor or demon: this 
function was met with in an earlier chapter, where the importance of difference as 
internal was noted, together with its röle as differenciator. The model of science as 
Dispars, as demonic rather than divine in nature, is thus never concretely completed: it 
does not present, like Compars, a finished world, but a cosmos in continual involution, 
perpetually variable, dividing into itself and with each division changing in nature. The 
demon is implicated with the causality specific to nomadic science, a reverse causality 
that testifies `d'une action du futur sur le present, ou du present sur le passe (to an 
action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past)'". Again, however, 
this is not a generalizable function, but is specific to each system; its connection with 
the concrete actualization of any distribution is always an effect, rather than a 
condition of its operation. The demon, or dark precursor `determine ä l'avance le 
chemin renverse, (determines their path in advance but in reverse)', functioning as a 
virtual attractor, the nature of which is only discernible in retrospect. 72 It is not 
something always already there, however, but generated in the process of its 
concretization, like the convergent wave or the anticipated potential. 
It is important not to confuse reverse causality with teleology, however: as 
mentioned before, machinic production expresses the conjunction of mechanism and 
teleology through difference, taking synthesis across the threshold of antinomic 
division, changing the assemblage and re-wiring the transcendental network, 
unhinging the faculties and differentiating the process of production from its source 
conditions. Reverse cauality is without finality: the future is not somehow there in 
advance, pre-determined and fated, rather it is virtual to the formations of the actual. 
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The demon is not a point or principle in advance of individuation, or a form 
governing beforehand the material constitution of a machine, body or system: it is 
instead a radically local function, an element in a science of intensities which invents 
orders of communication amongst differences for which no prior order exists, using of 
necessity the elements of a majoritarian form but speaking of necessity a foreign 
language. Whereas Kant reconciles differences in intensive magnitude by referring 
them to an extensive space which equalizes them out into a uniform field, Deleuze uses 
such differences as communicating principles amongst disparate series, which are 
themselves composed of intensive differences, and it is the complications of the 
relations generated in this manner which demand the invention of new concepts, new 
terms, new functions and new distributions and the creation of a foreign philosophical 
language. 
The re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of a plane of consistency, an 
intensive magnitude immanent to and simultaneous with the given does not cancel its 
status in Kant as an objective problematic; it continues to demand a solution. However, 
it transforms what counts as such. Jacobi said: 
`I need the assumption of things-in-themselves to enter the Kantian 
system; but with this assumption it is not possible for me to remain 
inside lt' 73 
Jacobi was responding to the thing-in-itself in the context of representation, 
as something which, in some undefined manner, is the cause of the content of 
representations, but is itself unrepresentable. Deleuze's method of deduction, and 
critique of representation changes the nature of the problem, however, because it 
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changes the field of its solution. Firstly, there is no problem of access in Deleuze: as 
has been said, any machine is already integrated on the strata, as well as facing away 
from it, on a plane of consistency, and thus potentiated by both actual elements 
comprising the State, and virtual elements which anticipate and repel it. No 
assumption of a content above and beyond that distributed on the strata, or composing 
lines of flight is necessary. Deleuze reminds continually that critique is immanent: a 
critique of the State cannot situate itself outside its object, and to do so would be to 
repeat identically old errors. Besides, Deleuze's understanding of system is in terms of 
openness; there is no outside to open systems. `Elles ne repondent pas ä la condition 
visuelle de pouvoir titre observees dun point de 1'espace exterieur ä elles (they do not 
meet the visual condition of being observable from a point in space external to 
them)' 74 
Secondly, Deleuze can be said to read Jacobi's claim that the assumption of 
the thing-in-itself ejects one from the Kantian system as positive. From within Kant, 
Deleuze subjects representation to a rigorous critique and deducts the components of 
power, generality, recognition and unity of image which restrict its operation, undoing 
common sense and good sense. The thing-in-itself can no longer be defined, following 
that critique, in relation to representation, as the unrepresentable, however, but must be 
re-formulated in terms of the production of production. It is in the process of deducting 
the power structures from Kant that the movement of feedback is released, and it is this 
which allows for the re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of difference and 
intensities. Instead of being a general problem, it becomes one of singular distributions 
of intensity on a smooth surface, of vortices and turbulences which have no definition 
outside their concrete swirlings and speeds, displacements and divergences. An infinity 
of demons, of molecular leaps, qualities, emerge from intensive magnitudes, and in 
differentiating themselves from that magnitude, also carry it with them, immanently. 
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This is why Deleuze is a philosopher of both surface and depth, and why the thing-in- 
itself retains its paradoxical nature, but instead of paradox being cancelled out in 
extension and representation, it becomes a prolific machine, an engine of the real 
without condition or presupposition. The positive feedback from the concrete to the 
virtual precludes there being "a problem of the thing-in-itself'; singularity is perhaps a 
more appropriate term for it, in the context of Deleuze. 
### 
The relation between Kant and Deleuze has become both closer and more 
distant in this chapter. Deleuze's deduction of the power components in Kantian 
critique and his deployment of a method remote from the juridical model force a gulf 
between the two. His concentration on the explosive moment within the subject 
(amongst the topics addressed in the next chapter) and his distribution of the network 
of faculties as an interconnected surface rather than an organic or hierarchized edifice 
imply a distinctly unKantian approach. However, his subtractive deduction uncovers 
directions and problems in critique which are missed when the structures erected by 
Kant are taken to be constitutive of the transcendental, and when the movement of 
critique is confined within the science and economics of the Enlightenment. It is 
Deleuze's attention to forces and flows, limits and thresholds, and synthesis (again, a 
topic for the next chapter) which re-connect him with Kant, and with the real problems 
of critique. 
Deleuze's relation with Kant is, however, more complex than the above 
suggests, including many elements for which this thesis does not have space. In his 
paper Sur quatre formule poetiques qui pourraient resumer la philosophie kantienne, 
Deleuze weaves Hamlet, Rimbaud and Kafka into the heart of Kantian problems. 
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Hamlet and Kant together achieve `1'emancipation du temps (the emancipation of 
time)'; Rimbaud and Kant, in their different ways, proclaim `Je est un autre (I is 
another)'; Kafka and Kant alike describe the practice of law on the body. Kafka 
illustrates the immediacy of Kantian law with the body, through this story, its vaulted 
magnificence subsides into the bureaucratic pettiness of the officer delighting in the 
perfections of a machine which writes law directly onto the flesh. It is not known, but 
met with in its execution, its application through pain and violence. 
In each case, when the strangeness of these alliances is pursued a problem of 
forces and of systematics is uncovered. Kantian philosophizing is remote from the 
spaces of force, however, a task rather than a movement, and whilst Deleuze describes 
him as the analogue of a great explorer, his exploration is limited to the surface, and 
does not travel the intricacies of its depth. He is concerned rather to prevent tunnellings 
and connections which do not follow the strict lines of extension or the strict rules of 
law. 
`The worker in the field of philosophy, especially pure philosophy 
(logic and metaphysics), must hold his object hanging in midair 
before him and must always describe and examine it, not merely part 
by part, but within the totality of a system as well. 75 
This contrasts directly with the opening of this chapter, and Deleuze's 
comment about the need to occupy space without measuring it: Kant's method is to 
take each part and refer it, through a variety of means - analogy, resemblance, 
comparison, proportionality, directionality, numerical identity, and so on - to the ends 
of reason, to the totality of the system. All the seasickness in the world could not, it 
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seems, persuade him that attraction at a distance across empty space is inadequate as a 
theory of force. 
The next chapter looks at Kant's theory of synthesis, as an act of the subject, 
and Deleuze's deduction of unity from synthesis, leading to its formulation as passive, 
together with the changes effected within imagination as a result of these changes. 
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Passive Synthesis 
`Profondement schizoide est la theorie kantienne d'apres laquelle les 
quantites intensives remplissent la mauere sans vide ä des degres 
divers. 
(The Kantian theory according to which intensive quantities fill up, 
to varying degrees, matter that has no empty spaces, is profoundly 
schizoid)'. ' 
In L'antiýedine themes from Deleuze's earlier works are not lost, but by 
virtue of its language and his alliance with Guattari, they are transformed; the 
academic tones of Difference et Repetition give way to a compilation vocabulary, built 
from fragments stolen from a variety of sources, Artaud, Marx, Freud, Lacan and Kant 
being amongst them. 2 (Theft is another of Deleuze's methods. ) However, the apparatus 
of the book is familiar, and situates it in the context of Kantian critique: three syntheses 
as the productive machinery, a distinction between their legitimate immanent use and 
illegitimate transcendent use, a transcendental principle, paralogisms. To select 
familiar elements is to run counter to the sentiments the book expresses (Destroy! 
Destroy! being one); however, to understand why Kant's theory of intensities is called 
schizoid by Deleuze and Guattari, it is necessary to look at the way in which synthesis 
works, and at the transformation of the transcendental. This will connect it with Kant, 
and the previous two chapters. Women are also introduced in this chapter, but only by 
identifying in passing those terms with which philosophy has associated them, 
precursory to the longer discussions in the two following chapters. 
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In his preface to the English edition of L'anti-oediue, Foucault cautions 
against looking for a philosophy in the book, for `a flashy Hegel '3; no more should a 
flashy Kant be looked for. Although the book expresses an explicit alliance with 
Kantian critique, and with the transcendental method, the networks it deploys are not 
those of common sense, and the criticism is not confined by reason. The central 
Kantian themes are immanence of criteria and synthesis. Immanence not to synthesis, 
or machinic processes, but of machinic processes. That is, there is no containment of 
syntheses within something which is not synthesis, and nor is there a goal. The 
language of the book is not flashy either, but integral to the problems with which it 
deals. In Kant, imagination synthesizes; however, the psychological overtones of 
imagination cannot be killed, no matter how careful the attempt. Whilst exploring the 
Kantian imagination and unhinging it from its proper speculative, aesthetic and 
practical uses exposes a way of connecting Kant and Deleuze, the peculiarities and 
nature of this linkage are missed if terminology particular to human machines is used. 
Deleuze and Guattari have been criticized for exploiting the term 
schizophrenia. Elizabeth Grosz writes of objections to their investment 
`in a romantic elevation of models of psychosis, schizophrenia, and 
madness, that on the one hand, ignore the very real pain and torment 
of individuals, and, on the other hand, raise pathology to an unlivable, 
unviable ideal for others. '4 
It is indeed not difficult to see the schizo as an image or model, if one is 
searching for such things. However, the vector of Deleuze's writing militates against 
this; his critique of the image of thought was referred to in chapter two, and on a more 
general level, the nature of his writing changes from book to book, using new 
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vocabularies which continuously draw in new elements and open different holes. If one 
is inclined to personal sympathy rather than to making things work - which is not the 
same as interpreting what Deleuze means by schizophrenia - then no doubt there are 
criticisms to be made. But schizophrenia, as it is employed in L'anti-oedipus, refers to 
a machinic, rather than a human operation, of inclusive disjunction. Rather than the 
either/or of exclusive disjunction, the schizoid intensity both differentiates and includes 
difference, in a continuous variation of variables which shucks off orders imposed from 
the outside; it refers to the release of intensities, the emission of spores. 
In Difference et Repetition, Deleuze writes: 
`11 ne s'agit pas d'opposer ä l'image dogmatique de la pens6c une autre 
image, empruntöe par exemple ä la schizophrene. Mais plutöt de rappeler que 
la schizophrönie nest pas seulement un fait humain, qu'elle est une possibilitä 
de la pensee, qui ne se revöle ä ce titre que Bans 1'abolition de I'image. 
(It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought 
another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather 
of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also 
a possibility for thought - one, moreover, which can only be revealed 
as such through the abolition of that image)' 5 
`[N]ot only a human fact' is crucial. L'anti-oedipe is neither an anti-humanist 
nor post-humanist text, as some enthusiasts would claim; it is simply not interested in 
this argument, in the same way that Deleuze is uninterested in tiresome discussions 
over whether philosophy is dead, whether we live in a post-philosophical age. 
Machinic synthesis is impersonal, and indifferent to human divisions: it does not 
differentiate man and nature, nature and industry, industry and history, but is 
immanent to the cycles it synthesizes, generating difference but not presupposing any 
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pre-given and conditioning articulations of its nature, adding difference at each level of 
production, rather than cancelling it in extension. Deleuze and Guattari are engaged in 
formulating an abstract account of production that does not isolate production from 
desire, nor privatize desire within the family in order to leave a social field free for 
labour. To say that schizophrenia is not only a human fact is simply to issue a 
reminder that the term is not used with reference to the social construction of the 
schizophrenic, but as a potential of thought. Much as Kant says that the transcendental 
is illegitimate if conceived of in the image of the empirical. 
Humanity is a term for a' particular mode of production, involving the 
rationalization of processes on the grounds of universal necessity, global superiority, 
exclusive binaries (reason/nature, man/woman, sanetinsane, good/evil etc. etc. ); 
insofar as `eile fait du luxe meme un moyen d'investissement (it makes luxury itself 
into a means of investment)'6 and operates with an arsenal of rules within a 
complementary framework of cynicism and stupidity, impotence and power. However, 
L'anti-oedipe is a critical book and as such not sentimental about the values that this 
mode of production protects and requires. Its problem is to find out how they work, 
how to undo them, and let a bit of fresh air into thinking. The schizo is not an image or 
model, but an illustration, a working attempt to expose the uncritical assumptions in 
philosophical dogmas. 
Deleuze is critical of images of thought which are based on 
`I'extrapolation de certains faits, et de faits particulierement 
insignifiants, la banalite quotidienne en personne, la Recognition, 
comme si la pent e ne devait pas chercher ses modeles dans des 
aventures plus etranges ou plus compromettantes. 
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(extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as 
Recognition, everyday banality in person; as though thought should not seek 
' its models among stranger and more compromising adventures)'. 
The schizo is not a metaphor, but a principle, but rather than being based on 
everyday facts, it is the principle of their criticism, as empty of meaning as God; the 
schizo exists no more than does God, just as madness exists no more than reason. 
Everything can be banalized, and at this we are particularly adept. Both are made, 
under different conditions, according to different modes of production, along different 
lines of thought. There is not a choice between a world modelled on the schizo and one 
modelled on God; the processes and relations deployed in L'anti-oedine are past the 
opposition between the multiple and the one. There are only markets, connections, 
breaks and flows, blockages or escapes, consumptions, distributions. To the question: 
do you believe in God? Deleuze and Guattari write: `bien sür, mais seulement comme 
au maitre du syllogisme disjonctif (of course, but only as the master of the disjunctive 
syllogism)' .8 God, like the schizo, is a machinic operation, a production; 
because there 
is no unconscious material, no theatre staging myth and fantasy, only the cycle of 
production, there is no schizo in the unconscious, just as there is no God. Both are 
produced as effects of machinic synthesis, which either over-code it, and direct it 
towards defined ends - exclusive disjunction, in the case of God; or displace and 
differentiate it, intensifying synthesis and proliferating identities, in inclusive 
disjunctions which add difference and so shoot relations outside the terms related. 
In this chapter synthesis, as the basic apparatus of L'anti-oedine will be 
looked at, and drawn out of its connections with Kant and the activity of a subject. 
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Kant takes this conclusion into a discussion of the noumenon. The noumenon, 
as argued in Chapter One, is an object produced by understanding when it claims 
determinate knowledge of something in general, in its search for knowledge 
independent of sense. The claim to determinate knowledge of a substantial 
transcendental subject is just such a move on the part of understanding; the 
transcendental, rather than immanent employment of the concepts compels speculative 
reason to assume the noumenon, limiting sensibility and initiating the transfer from 
epistemological to moral law. Yet following on from his clarification of the error 
which leads to the psychological paralogism, Kant remarks on the legitimacy, in the 
practical field, of assuming the substantiality and freedom of the subject, as logical 
functions of ground and consequence. In a different legislative domain, a non-sensible 
but intelligible rational principality, theoretical illegitimacies find a practical utility. 
Yet this move is not necessitated by Kant's conclusion as expressed in the 
comment quoted above, for as has been argued, the noumenon and the thing-in-itself 
are not synonymous, nor do they fulfil the same function. The conflation of the 
noumenon and the thing-in-itself relates to the collapse of the important difference 
between productive imagination and synthesis as thought without identity on the one 
hand, and understanding and the unity of synthesis effected through the formal logic 
of the concepts on the other. It is this latter formulation of synthesis which leads 
towards the noumenon. The former is implicated with intensity and thus with the 
material qualities of the real rather than its formal values. This allows a different 
direction to be drawn from the quote above regarding the heterogeneity or otherwise of 
the thing-in-itself as a substratum to the materiality of appearances. For it cannot be 
confused with either substance or causality and thus taken towards the epistemological 
limit of the noumenon, the realm of practical reason and a moral subject. Rather one is 
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I Synthesis 
`It is to synthesis... that we must first direct our attention, if we would 
determine the first origin of our knowledge. i9 
In chapter two, Deleuze's eliminative deduction was discussed, as a positive 
selective method which collapses the power operators in a writer, exposing problematic 
undercurrents, and bringing to the surface of his writing patterns which, under the 
covers of law, appear as an undifferentiated or chaotic depth. (It is worth remembering 
this before attempting to read the schizo as such an operator. ) Part of the difficulty of 
reading L'anti-oedine within a strictly philosophical register is that its language and 
relations are assembled from philosophy, science, economics, literature, psycho- 
analysis, politics and art, so reading it solely terms of its connections with Kant is 
undoubtedly a limited exercise. However, Deleuze's work feeds back onto Kant, and 
exposes not a firm ground and a certain unity, but a dynamic, mobile and immanently 
differentiated space. 
This does not mean a space that is unable to function as a basis for a theory of 
mechanism. However, Kant's claims for mechanism have to be re-sited: it no longer 
presents a universally comprehensive theory encompassing the totality of objective 
movements in space, but becomes a limited description of a motions across empty space 
according to ideal principles, following predictable and pre-determined channels. In 
mechanism, the process of individuation, or differenciation, is constrained and 
governed from an external position. That Kant is aware of this is clear from his 
discussion of teleology in the third Critique, where he distinguishes the formation of 
natural bodies from mechanical bodies on precisely the difference between something 
set into operation from the outside, and something which is formed through the 
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relations of forces immanently to it. 10 Deleuze and Guattari formulate a third theory of 
production, or synthesis, which is neither purposive, as is the Kantian understanding of 
a natural body, nor mechanistic, but machinic. 
There are several ways in which the relation of passive synthesis to Kant can 
be addressed. For example, there are three syntheses in both L'anti-oedine and the first 
Critique. the former mapping loosely onto the three categories of relation: the synthesis 
of connection/selection with cause and effect, the synthesis of disjunction/recording 
with substance and accident, the synthesis of conjunction/consumption with 
community/reciprocity. These relations can also be connected with the problem of the 
modes of time specific to each relation - succession, permanence and co-existence 
respectively, as discussed by Kant in the Analogies of Experience. Another possibility 
is looking at the qualities of force which correlate with each synthesis, libido with 
connection, numen with disjunction and voluptas with conjunction. However, because 
the underlying question in this thesis is where women are situated in the theoretical 
structures of philosophy, or more precisely in Kant and Deleuze, the axis privileged is 
that of passivity, women having been situated in relation to this by philosophy, and the 
problem of how passive synthesis relates to Kantian synthesis. 
Kant defines synthesis as an act of combining difference under unity, in which 
elements of knowledge are gathered, whether of pure or empirical origin, and united to 
form the content of a representation. ' l Although he refers to it as a connection `thought 
without identity' 12, amplifying rather than analyzing or explicating the content of 
concepts, he also say that `all combination or separation that constitutes thought 
relates' to a simple "r". It is, in other words, a limited amplification. Thinking turns a 
circle through these two statements on synthesis, from synthesis as relation of 
difference not constrained by the logical formalism of a concept to a relation of 
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difference anchored to identity; this latter understanding of synthesis then serves as the 
model of the possibility of synthesis in general. Synthesis is drawn into the subject, and 
differences in the flow of imagination and variations in qualitative intensities - in 
degree of intensity - are equalized through the concept of magnitude. 
The formulation of synthesis as a process anchored to identity, rather than 
thought without reference to it, is bound up with Kant's argument against confusing 
the apparent heterogeneity of objects of inner and outer sense with a real difference, a 
confusion which leads to the attribution of a separate and substantial existence to the 
purely formal unity of thought. From the thought of a subject abstracted from the 
empirical experience of an existing body an illegitimate epistemological claim is made 
to the effect that `I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendental 
subject. 914 This implies the attribution of conceptual characteristics - such as substance 
or causality - to a subject assumed to exist independently of the body - in other words, 
to the transcendental employment of understanding. One can see the same tendencies 
at work here as were argued against in Chapter Two, with reference to the thing-in- 
itself. 
Kant traces the source of this error to the mistaken assumption that the 
difference between inner and outer objects is something other than the result of the 
sensible limitation of human knowledge, an error which generates the thought of a 
subject with no object as a real, rather than merely logical form. His response is to 
point out that the heterogeneity of body and thinking is a function of the forms of 
intuition - space and time - rather than of any real underlying difference, and that 
`what, as thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], underlies the appearance of 
matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character. '" 
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lead - as Schopenhauer saw - towards a problem of forces which has no conceptual 
formulation, which cannot be thought through the subject, but which is immanent to 
the production of the world as representation. 
Whilst one cannot argue with Kant's point concerning the error of assuming 
that thinking and the body are composed of different "stuff', his solution remains 
formal, in the sense that it ignores the materiality of the body in favour of the identity 
of the subject; it is only in this way that the final solution to the problem can be 
discovered in the form of practical law. When Schopenhauer accuses Kant's view of 
the intellect for being one-sided and ignoring the physiological functions of the brain 
in favour of its formal intellectual functions16 he is moving towards an objective 
consideration of the intellect, not as an object of representation - which is to say, in 
terms of the epistemological structures following from the princip1um individuationis - 
but as thing-in-itself, or will: `In itself-and outside the representation, the brain, too, 
like everything else, is wi11. '11 In Kant's terms this would mean that rather than 
synthesis being subordinated to identity and thus attached to the subject, it is thought 
without identity; his point still holds concerning the error of assuming body and 
thinking to be other than externally differentiated, in accordance with the forms of 
intuition, but the direction in which this points leads is no longer towards the moral 
philosophy, but towards a deeper exploration of the material substrate underlying 
appearance. 
Kant distinguishes two types of synthesis, figurative syntheses of imagination 
and intellectual syntheses of understanding. The former are `the mere result of the 
power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul", whilst 
intellectual synthesis is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation, an act of 
understanding to which `the general title "synthesis" may be assigned'. 19 The former is 
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synthesis proper, and combines intensive qualities, whilst the latter is a function of the 
unity of the `I think' and combines axiomatized quanta of intuition. The former is 
implicated with the production of an actual continuum, with the dynamic commercium 
of machinic synthesis, whilst the latter is associated with an ideal continuity, with the 
conceptual community of human labour. As seen above, the difference is between 
synthesis thought without identity, and synthesis brought in relation with identity, and 
a different direction may be followed from each, one leading towards the problematic 
thing-in-itself and the other towards the noumenon. In the first Critique, imagination 
is annexed to understanding; it schematizes in accordance with the categories and the 
continuous flowing quantities of productive imagination - degrees of intensity - are 
given discrete and extensive formulation through the axioms of intuition. In the 
production of objects of knowledge, the two syntheses operate in conjunction. However, 
imagination is a separate faculty, not merely an adjunct to understanding, as is clear 
from the third Critique in the discussion of the mathematical sublime. 20 
A synthesis of imagination produces continously flowing degrees of 
intensity21, but sightlessly, without prior reference to recognition or concepts: that is to 
say, the production of degrees of intensity is not governed a priori by the formal logics 
of the concepts. Intensity attaches to that element in experience which `can never be 
known a priori, and which therefore constitutes the distinctive difference between 
empirical and a priori knowledge'u and there is no concept of degrees of intensity as 
such for Kant, since sensation is not a concept. In respect of the sightless production of 
continuous degrees of intensity, imagination is connected with intuition rather than 
understanding; `intuitions without concepts are blind'23. A degree of intensity is not a 
quantity in intuition, but the quantity of the quality of sensation, a degree of influence 
on the senses. 24 It thus has no connection with concepts as such; the spatial extension 
of the object to which such a degree of influence is attributed can remain constant, 
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whilst the degree of quality of influence on the senses - the sensation itself - can vary 
without this difference registering conceptually. Deleuze's thought of synthesis results 
from this unhinging of imagination from unity and understanding, and of intuition 
from its modes, and theorizes productive synthesis as a positive intensive difference 
from the empty form of time. 
*** 
In L'anti-oedine, synthesis is passive: 
U desir est cet ensemble de syntheses passives qui machinent les 
objet partiels, les flux et les corps, et qui fonetionnent comme des 
unit6s de production. 
(Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, 
flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production)'. I 
The problem of synthesis is taken back to the question of a relation thought 
without identity, deducted from the act of understanding which relates it to identity. 
The starting point from which to explore Deleuze's formulation of synthesis is the 
subject. In the second of the four poetic formulae summarizing Kant, introduced by 
Rimbaud's phrase `Je est un autre', Deleuze begins by asking under what form 
indeterminate existence -je suis, I am -is determinable by the je pense, I think. And the 
answer Kant gives to this problem arising out of Cartesian subject, is that it is 
determinable in the form of time; "therefore" is not sufficient as a theory of relations 
between the I and its other. Existence is determinable only in the pure form of time, 
`comme 1'existence d'un moi passif, receptif et changeant. (as the existence of a passive, 
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receptive and changing ego. )' 26, and it is the production of this mobile and passive I 
am, rather than the activity of the fixed but spontaneous I think which is, for Deleuze, 
where the real problem of the subject in Kant lies. 
The aesthetic is Kant's most important contribution to philosophy and the 
insinuation of time into the heart of the subject the explosive moment referred to in 
chapter one, so Deleuze addresses this as the critical relation in regard to the subject in 
Kant, rather than the logical vehicle that accompanies representations. The 
epistemological problem becomes subordinate to one of affects and intensities, bodies 
and desires, and ontology gives way to blocs of becoming, or cycles of synthetic 
production. 
The I am is an affect, but passively, rather than actively synthesized, and is 
characterized intensively: Kant himself says that `consciousness itself always has a 
degree, which ... allows of diminution'27, so putting the problem on an intensive 
register. Deleuze focuses on the relation of the degree of intensity to pure empty time, 
rather than to inner sense, the formal appropriation of time into the subject. That is, he 
does not theorize it in relation to modes of time which are analogous to conceptual 
relations. Set into variation through the deduction of the I think, the recognized 
principle of thought, the I am becomes a problem of becoming, in formation but never 
a form, because there is a continuous modulation of intensities through time and a 
continuous transformation in the quantitative degree which composes consciousness. 
This move is immediately of interest in relation to the question of women's location in 
philosophy, since the passivelactive and receptivelspontaneous axes have been amongst 
those used to articulate their difference from men, women being attributed with the 
first arm of each of the two disjunctions. Women are also associated with imagination 
in Kant. Deleuze's shift of synthesis from an active mode of production to a passive 
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producing process, and from understanding as agent of unity to imagination as 
synthetizing continuous flows is implicated with the philosophical positioning of 
women. 28 But a fuller discussion of this follows in the next two chapters; this remark is 
merely to begin weaving women into the discussion -to create an undertow, as it were. 
The relation of passive synthesis to the distinction in Kant between productive 
or figurative synthesis and the intellectual synthesis which subordinates the former to 
unity is not one of opposition, and nor does passive synthesis correlate directly with the 
synthesis of imagination. Firstly, passive synthesis describes a transverse line across 
the oppositional axis, so is not directly associable with Kant's activelpassive 
distinction. As has been said before, Deleuze's subtractive method does not remove 
through exclusion, but is instead a positive privation which removes the belts and 
blockages of limitation and negation. 
In Kant's table of the concepts of nothing, the negation of reality results in 'a 
concept of the absence of an object, such as shadow, cold (nihil privativum)''ý a trace 
of what was real remaining as a negative imprint. Deleuze's use of privation is 
positive, and rather than leaving a shadow of what has been removed, brings to the 
surface what was covered over by the concept. 'Soustraire et mettre en variation, 
retrancher et mettre en variation, c'est une seule et meme operation (subtract and place 
in variation, remove and place in variation: a single operation). '30 Subtraction effects 
the release of variations which do not fall onto either side of the disjunction, but 
include both as potentials, not in the form of binaries, but as elements of a multiplicity 
which cannot be scored down the middle, or reduced to the sum of its parts. Rather 
than the removal of a quality of reality - an intensive magnitude - leaving the shadow 
of itself:, it opens up the quality of distributions which the asiomatization of quantities 
suppressed. The deduction of activity from synthesis does not therefore leave the 
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problem of passive synthesis in a Kantian register, but opens a space for the re- 
formulation of passivity stripped of psychological overtones and cultural constructions 
of women as the "passive (= weaker) sex. " 
It is not that there is a movement between active and passive which cannot be 
exposed, an undecidable median which is neither simply one or the other, and which 
distributes this difference but is not determined by it. What effects a division in a 
multiplicity does not straddle a distance between divided states nor make a clean break. 
In Dialote, Deleuze writes: 
`On ne sort effectivement des dualismes qu'en les deplacant ä la 
maniere dune charge, et lorsqu'on trouve entre les termes, qu'ils 
soient deux ou davantage, un defile etroit comme une bordure ou une 
frontiere qui va faire de 1'ensemble wie multiplicite, 
independamment du nombre des parties. Cc que nous appelons 
agencement, c'est precisement une multiplicite. 
(You can only escape dualisms effectively by shifting them like a load, and 
when you find between the two terms, whether they are two or more, a narrow 
gorge like a border or a frontier which will turn the set into a multiplicity, 
independently of the number of parts. What we call an assemblage is, 
precisely, a multiplicity)' 31 
The border or gorge does not institute a relation between intensity and 
extensity, or active and passive syntheses; to formulate it thus turns the transversal line 
into a diagonal which can be plotted on a plane graph. Intensity becomes subordinated 
to the qualities filling extensity - force becomes relative to distance, for example, or 
pressure to volume. The multiplicity, or in-between, or frontier, however, neither 
distributes dualisms, nor reduces to them, because it is effected by asymmetrical and 
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differential conjunctions which, by including both arms of a disjunction construct an 
assemblage which is not commensurate with the conditions of its production, but 
escapes them, giving relations another direction. 32 A very simple illustration might be 
that of transsexuals: whilst the desire professed by a man might be to become a woman, 
or by a woman to become a man, becoming-transsexual does not result in a simple 
switch - this is an extensive appearance, effected by surgery - but the inclusion of both 
terms, and the creation of a new sex contained by neither. 33 What appears are n-sexes, 
not two sexes; n-qualities, distributed not as the result of the qualification or 
axiomatization of quanta necessitated by the attachment of production to identity, but 
through the connections and relations into which a body enters, and of which it is 
assembled 
This is the logic of empiricism, and of rhizomatics, the principle of which has 
been quoted in relation to deduction in chapter two: subtract the unique from the 
multiplicity to be constituted. Deduction works at the level of principles; it is not 
merely a matter of taking a bit off as if one were removing part of an argument which 
did not contribute to the proof. Every qualification of force resulting from unity and the 
monopolization of power by substance removed shifts the nature of the problem: each 
movement changes space, each change in space effects the direction and speed of 
movement. Evacuation of the principles which structure transcendental matter, or 
intensities, according to unity, and of the principles which regulate the stability, purity 
and upkeep of unity, shifts Deleuze's logic away from one of being, and the 
`subordination des conjonctions au verbe titre (subordination of conjunctions to the verb 
'34tobe). His operator is the AND, 
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`qui fait filer Ies relations hors de leurs termes et hors de l'ensemble 
de leurs termes, et hors de tout cc qui pourrait eire determind comme 
Etre, Un ou Tout. 
(which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set 
of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as 
Being, One, or Whole)' 35 
Consciousness loses unitary sense and is no longer a priori but a posteriori, 
the real effect of a singularity already in action, but in a different form than that of its 
existence 36 Transversality is not a diagonal on a co-ordinate system, but a movement 
which generates new co-ordinates and a different system. Synthesis becomes an 
additive function, rather than a relation with identity. Not, however, the addition of 
equal units, but the addition of difference. Where God is the master of disjunctive 
syllogism, unity is added to differential relations of empirical and heterogeneous 
sequences, and difference is articulated according to the either/or: either production is 
social or it is desiring - either it is public or it is private, familial, secret. The inclusive 
disjunction of machinic production affirms diversity and adds difference, adds value 
without siphoning off profit, breeding flows from flows, breaking and detaching 
elements and setting them into motion in other directions. 
II Passive 
Deleuze fuses the problem of consciousness defined as a degree of intensity, 
and thus as a multiplicity, or assemblage, with the real which forces thought, the 
imperceptible and contingent cycles of the sufficient reason of sense. He does not focus 
on either the I think or the I am, however, but on the `position passive (cc que Kant 
appelle la receptivite d'intuition (passive position [what Kant calls the receptivity of 
141 
Chapter 4 
intuition])' which is implicated with the pure form of time, a nonformal intuition, and 
with the passive syntheses of perception and individuation. 37 This is the vector of 
passivity which does not resolve back into the system of binaries, but brings the 
underlying differences on which it is founded to the surface, so introducing variations 
which cannot be comprehended in biunivocal relations. 
`Une faille ou une felure dans le Je, une passivite dans le moi, voila 
ce que signifie le temps; et la correlation du moi passif et du Je feie 
constitue la decouverte du transcendental ou l'element de la 
revolution copernicienne. 
(Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the 1 and a passivity in the self, 
and the correlation between the passive self " and the fractured I 
constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the 
Copernican Revolution)'. (Ibid. ) 
Deleuze does not find a self in Kant's Deduction: it is this, he argues, that 
betrays the death of God signified by the pure form of time, as condition of a finite 
empirical animal. Starting from a passionate and receptive self, a "me", rather than an 
"r, which is always an effect not an origin, a peripheral residue rather than a source, 
and defined in terms of affects, as a substantial multiplicity replete with faculties, not 
as functions of common sense but of multiplicities it plugs into, Deleuze then asks: 
what are the real conditions of its production? One no longer starts from one, but from 
zero, the pure and empty form of time. 
The problem becomes one of the difference of thresholds and limits and the 
passive becomes a transient limit, a skin immanent to a threshold, rather than an 
existence contained within an I think, or a border distinguishing an inside from an 
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outside. Mobile and ambulatory, the passive "me" is a variable affect, and rather than 
being located behind the eyes, travels a body, changing its qualities as it engages 
different connections and transforms functions, each movement of different order, of 
different relations, different syntheses and times; every change in degree is a change in 
quality. If the passive has an apparent objective constancy or identity, this is a function 
of its empirical circumstances, of the social orders and codes which define it, rather 
than of the real conditions of its production; it is always corporeal, corporealizing, a 
thought of sense not of understanding or reason. Constants are temporary and mobile, 
rather than fixing parameters; relations are explosive and escapist, rather than placid 
and imprisoned. 
The passive is a crack which transmits only itself, and transmission is not 
more or less than this crack: the cracked or fractured subject is its negative inversion, 
its dead consequence, an old transmission from Kant 38 Rather than the crack being 
encased between the I and its other, it is infiltrated by Ideas, abstract material problems 
`emergent constamment sur les bords de cette felure, sortant et rentrant sans cesse, se 
composant de mille manWres diverses (constantly emerging on its edges, ceaseless 
coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners)', which 
do not form a unified totality, but inform the process of individuation which constitutes 
a self, not as a subject, but as a mobile affect . 
39 However, the passive is not to be 
mistaken for a subject nor the self mistaken for a body; a body is teeming assemblage 
of larval selves, bacterial, chemical, electrical, social, sexual affects composing a 
surface; Deleuze's argument against the image of thought is that it inscribes an image 
on that surface, and so precludes exploration of the complexities of the interactions 
amongst all these different orders of selves. Unlike the subject, the assemblage does not 
say "mine": the possibility of possession is bound up with identity, with law, with the 
deduction of right and to say "mine" presupposes I own myself as an object, contain 
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another. The passive without possession is composed of affects, is a crowd, a 
population, units of production, larvae, intensive degrees of imagination at a positive 
distance from the zero of the pure form of time. 
Saying "mine", and expressing possession of a space, is an effect of the 
illegitimate or paralogical use of the third machinic synthesis, conjunction. This has 
already been referred to in its legitimate formulation, as the AND logics of empiricism. 
In its paralogical employment, the actual dynamics of the commercium, the infinite 
proximities of the elements of repulsive force filling space, are contained within the 
boundaries of a subject, and conceptualized independently of real interaction. So the 
subject becomes prior to the lived state, and possesses its body as an object, owning its 
behaviour, rather than being a peripheral effect of the mobile affects which cross its 
surface. An assemblage of larval and swarming selves becomes totalized under the 
name of the agent, as the principle of its definition, in relation to which the dynamics 
of intensive space become passive; not in the sense of passive synthesis as the blind 
generation of real affects, but as inert in relation to the spontaneity of the acting 
subject. 
Kant refers to this difference in the third Analogy, noting that a local spatial 
community has for its real condition the dynamic commercium of real interactions, 
which are co-existing and co-ordinated, but not according to any extrinsic rule. 
However, he turns this relation inside out, by making an ideal community the condition 
of the possibility of knowledge of the commercium, so situating the subject outside, in 
an elevated position; the subject does not then co-exist with the dynamic space, as a 
continuously mobile variant, but becomes the principle of its subordination to unity. 
Whilst the first synthesis, connection, is indicative of the escape of abstract flows 
144 
Chapter 4 
which have neither code or territory, and which effect the deterritorialization of space 
and the decoding of flows, conjunction in its illegitimate formulation 
`indique... leur arret relatif, comme un point d'accumulation qui 
bouche ou colmate maintenant les lignes de fuite, opere une 
reterritorialisation generale, et fait passer les flux sous la dominance 
de l'un d'eux capable de les surcoder. 
(indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that 
plugs or seal the lines of flight, performs a general 
reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a 
single flow capable of overcoding them)'. 40 
It is in the context of the relation of connection and conjunction that Deleuze 
and Guattari come closest to admitting to history: they distinguish between a history 
which takes for its elements classes and segments, and follows the major line 
overcoding the vectors of escape and a microhistory which traces masses and flows -a 
history of populations and packs, flows of money, of sperm, of blood, milk, rivers, 
bodies; history as market, rather than as capital. The former, macrohistory, attaches to 
the conjunction specific to subject as agent of synthesis: it is the acts of men which 
constitute this history, allowing for the claim of this illegitimate use of conjunction - 
Vest donc moi, le roil c'est donc ä moi, que revient le royaume! (so 1 am the king! So 
the kingdom belongs to me)' 41 The subject becomes the single flow overcoding all 
flows, the consumer of time and of history from which both appear to emanate. 
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A Row of Doors 
`Le plan de consistance (grille) est le dehors de touter les 
multiplicites. 
(The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities). " 
In the previous chapter Deleuze's use of passive synthesis was discussed, 
together with the transformations in subjectivity when synthesis is not related to 
identity, nor understood as a spontaneous act of synthetic unity, nor confined within an 
image of thought. The passive "me" is not "other" to an acting I, but a mobile and 
variable affect, impersonal and intensive. In this chapter, changes effected in 
imagination by these shifts in the nature of the subject and synthesis will be looked at. 
This shift has implications for Kant's association of the imagination with a soul, the 
latter being essential to the constitution of the category of the Person, defining a 
cultural body subject to law and capable of faith. Imagination is also involved in 
aesthetic judgements on the sublime, and the effects of the reconfiguration of synthesis 
as passive in relation to such judgements will also be explored. Lastly, the nature of a 
machinic continuum is addressed, in terms of the continuous exportation of the model 
of death, or zero, as the immanent condition of production. 
I Soul 
`C'est l'imagination qui traverse les domains, les ordres et les 
niveaux, abattant les cloisons, coextensive au monde... conscience 
larvaire allant sans cesse de la science au reve et inversement. 
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(It is imagination which crosses domains, orders and levels, 
knocking down the partitions coextensive with the world... a larval 
consciousness which moves endlessly from science to dream and back 
again). '2 
In Mille Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari remark on the complementarity of 
impotence and power and their mutual reinforcement `dann une sorte de satisfaction 
fascinante (in a kind of fascinating satisfaction) s3 particular to mediocrity and 
definitive of the glory of men of the State. In terms of its relations, this dynamic, 
incorporating impotence and dominant authority as reciprocal correspondants, operates 
very much like the Kantian sublime, in which imagination and reason push each other 
to their limit, the inadequacy of the former resulting from the superior might of the 
latter. In the sublime, the relation of production to reproduction essential to 
recognizing unity is disturbed: imagination apprehends, or produces intensive quanta, 
but there is no general rule appropriate to the comprehension, or reproduction of their 
degree in a determinate objective form. As it was out on the lagoon, the subject 
becomes turned in on itself, disconnected from sensibility. 
Whilst Kant emphasizes that there is neither an interest or liking of reason in 
the sublime, and that it is a purely aesthetic judgement, it is only in the context of a 
cultured mind that the fine line between enthusiasm and fanaticism and the sublime 
can be negotiated successfully. But as was remarked in a previous chapter, that the 
sublime requires culture, `in no way implies that it was initially produced by culture 94: 
its foundation belongs to the human predisposition for `(practical) ideas, i. e., to moral 
feeling' S Thus, whilst imagination and reason are discordant and the play of faculties 
unregulated in the sublime, `imagination is... really part of moral common sense'6 and 
only under the condition of a moral common sense, as a place of safety, are the violent 
agitation and 'sacred thrill '7 of the sublime commensurate with rational faith. The 
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reconciliation of the sublime, of pain subsiding into negative pleasure, its fascinations 
becoming satisfying rather than threatening to reason, and its impotence giving way to 
authority is made possible by the movement out of nature, away from the sensible, and 
into the supersensible strata of Reason and Law. 
It is indeed imagination that crosses domains and demolishes the orders and 
structures of the world; however, for Kant the movement from the world of objects, the 
world of science, to that of dreams is achieved through a relation of inadequacy and 
authority. Imagination in its cognitive role, schematizing relations of production to 
reproduction, or apprehension to comprehension, according to a rule of understanding, 
is inadequate in the face of the superior and incomparable supersensible dreams of 
reason; in the sublime, imagination apprehends or produces quanta which can neither 
be reduced to determinacy through analogy, nor reproduced or comprehended 
according to the axiomatics of extension. But this disordered relation between 
production and reproduction is legitimate only in the context of culture. As Kant says 
in the first Critique. before venturing onto the ocean, one must first be secure in the 
possession of the land. The case is very similar in the sublime: before the natural 
disorder and indeterminacy of faculties can be countenanced as within the ends of 
reason, and the fortitude of imagination, or the soul `raised above its usual middle 
range', culture must first have prepared the ground. 8 
Authority and impotence are hand in hand, but the latter is rationally 
legitimate only if the former is first made certain. This is because the sublime in its 
dynamic, rather than mathematical formulation, testifies to the physical impotence of 
man in the face of nature - not external nature, but the nature of the faculties; the 
chaotic and overwhelming forces of the sublime are expressed in the vastness of nature, 
but the feeling of the sublime itself testifies to the containment of this vastness; man 
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has within him a disorder of immense magnitude, but reason in its cultured form is 
always adequate to this. Reason has `a different and nonsensible standard that has this 
infinity itself under it as a unit' and it is this that prevents the sublime from being a 
degradation of humanity, and evidences instead its superiority over nature. 9 Reason 
contains chaos, but chaos is no match, it seems, for reason. 
In Mille Plateaux the interiorization of intensive natural forces is discussed 
in relation to the war machine and its containment by the State. A war machine is `une 
pure forme d'exteriorite (a pure form of exteriority)' , associated with the science of 
Dispars and with nomos, as full intensive and tactile space distributed without 
reference to law. 1° A war machine has no necessary relation with violence: it is 
characterized rather by its relation to speed and intensity, and by its irreducibility to the 
mechanisms of capture specific to the State. In this respect, it is situated similarly to 
the position in which women have been established - or rather, not established - by 
philosophy, as necessary to the State, but not reducible to its forms and orders. The war 
machine is a pack, a gang of street children, a diffuse and mobile composition which 
cannot be understood in terms of class relations, age groups, sexual proclivities, or skin 
colours. In Brazil, the children are murdered by the State, in Borneo the women are 
prostituted by the State, in all States, the aim is to incorporate the war machine, by 
whatever means and in whatever form, whilst eliminating those elements which cannot 
be reduced to its monopoly. Mockery, murder, prostitution, criminality, the police, the 
army, the church, the academy, the school, the youth club, the hospital, the prison: all 
these ways of producing the war machine as a suicide line inside the State, rather than 
as a pure exteriority. It is noology, the image of thought, which serves as the 
mechanism of interiorization. 
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The war machine is counter-statistical: it is of `une autre justice, un autre 
mouvement, un autre espace-temps (another justice, another movement, another space- 
time)'" which testifies to an exteriority, but not an exteriority which is an outside to 
the State, in the sense that one might think of an outside to representation. As has 
been explained, the thing-in-itself is immanent to sense, produced in relation to it as 
the imperceptible, that which escapes thought but is not beyond it. It is not the 
"unrepresentable", but the imperceptible; not outside the limits of knowledge, but 
immanent to the threshold of sense. It is in this sense that the space-time of the war 
machine is outside the State, as a force which destroys the image, the rule, the law and 
order of the State, not through the exercise of violence, which is a State function, even 
when it appears to act against the State, even when it appears criminal, but by 
shattering and scattering the consistency of the image and forming alliances which run 
counter to the arranged systems. The form of exteriority testified to by the war machine 
is `le devenir-femme du penseur, le devenir-pensee de la femme ... qui ne se laisse plus 
contröler (the becoming-woman of the thinker, the becoming-thought of the 
woman-that refuses to be controlled)'. 12 
Of the aesthetic in the third Critique, Deleuze says `le sensible vaut pour lui- 
meme et se deploie dans un pathos audelä de toute logique (the sensible is valid in 
itself and unfolds in a pathos beyond all logic)' 13 With this remark, he is forging an 
association between the sublime and thought as war machine, where thought operates 
solely through unregulated relations, charged with intensities foreign to the grammars 
of its language. Once more, Deleuze is drawing lines which ally the schizo with the 
explosive moment in Kant, and focusing on the primacy of sensibility and imagination, 
and on thought as potentiated on the basis of `un effondrement central, qu'elle ne peut 
vivre que de sa propre impossibilite de faire forme (a central breakdown, that it lives 
solely by its own incapacity to take on form). 14 If, as said in the previous chapter, this 
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breakdown is given image - Artaud is the one which crops up most frequently in 
Deleuze and Guattari's writing - and the image becomes a model, the sense of the war 
machine is lost. The point is treachery: the treachery of a man is never that of a 
woman, the treachery of a child never that of a mother, the treachery of a philosopher 
never that of a poet. This is what becoming foreign to one's own language means: it is 
not a matter of rebellion, of suicidal daring and a struggle to introduce shock-value 
into an otherwise pedestrian thought. This is why Deleuze and Guattari are so effective, 
and why, for example, to dismiss Difference et Repetition as a work of regular 
academic proportions is to miss the degree of its deviance. 
When the war machine is interiorized by the State, as the sublime is 
interiorized by Reason, the relation becomes that of impotence and authority, the 
inadequacy of imagination and the superior magnitude of the supersensible. The 
central breakdown which potentiates thought is interiorized, made whole, contained 
and controlled within the image, and the pathos of the schizophrenic explosion 
becomes merely pathetic. 
*** 
In practical reason, imagination receives the sentence of the law. Kant's 
identification of imagination with the soul has already been noted in the previous 
chapter, and the schematism is described as `an art concealed in the depths of the 
human soul'15. In the first Critique the conditions for deducing the objective possibility 
of an immortal soul - and thus of an unbounded imagination - are absent, or at least, 
not immediately involved in speculation, and there is an admixture of sensible 
information in the construction of cognition. But practical freedom is antithetical to the 
functioning of imagination on behalf of understanding, at its middle range, where the 
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relation of production and reproduction is stable and determinate. The soul as 
immortal substance is an insoluble problem for finite entities, and speculations on its 
nature lead to paralogisms and claims of a rational psychology (which, despite its 
theoretical illegitimacy, Kant remarks, has a disciplinary use)16 The relation of 
substance (permanence) to force (intensity) is axiomatically extensive, and irreducible 
to a radical unity, matter appears heterogeneous and force diverse. Nonetheless, the 
idea of a fundamental power [Grundkraft] `is the problem involved in a systematic 
representation of the multiplicity of powers'" and imagination is no exception to this. 
With practical reason, the possibility of the soul becomes a legitimate 
postulate of reason, on the basis of the determination of freedom by the Law. Only on 
this basis can immortality be framed without reference to modes of time, imagination 
removed from the framework of permanence and substance, and intensity reconfigured 
in relation to the will, as a drive [Trieb], rather than as a force [Kraft]. This takes the 
problem out of physics and into practical reason. Much as the understanding was 
compelled by practical reason to assume the noumenon in the interests of reason's 
systematic growth's, practical reason commands the assumption of an immortal soul, 
on the basis of the fact of a free will, in the interests of reason's moral growth. 
The practical postulate of an immortal soul is `an inseparable corollary of an a 
priori unconditionally valid practical law'19. Under practical law, the focus 
imaginarius is no longer imaginarius, as it was in the case of speculative reason, a 
subjective idea regulating formal systematic unity, 20 implicated with the negative 
noumenon, but real. The unity of law must be enacted, objectively, not merely posited, 
subjectively. Deleuze emphasizes that `un seul contresens est dangereux, concernant 
I'ensemble de la Raison pratique (a single dangerous misunderstanding regarding the 
whole ofpractical Reason)' is failure to realize that `l'abime entre le monde sensible et 
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Ie monde suprasensible n'existe que pour titre comble (the abyss between the sensible 
world and the suprasensible world exists only in order to be filled)This was seen in 
an earlier chapter one, in Kant's insistence that practical reason was meant to influence 
the sensible configuration of phenomena. The negative noumenon is the medium for 
the conversion of permanence from its sensible and conceptual relation with time and 
causality to its practical configuration as immortality through which the concept of 
substance becomes complete, and physical force discovers its impotence in relation to 
the drives of the will. As remarked above, however, this impotence is permissible and 
indeed predicated upon the a priori magnificence of reason, and the containment of 
immanence, as pure exteriority, within reason. Disassociated from time, through the 
`marks of permanence'22 which reveal its real nature, the imagination fades into the 
immortality of the soul. 
Elevated above sense, man discovers the root of his duty to the Law in 
personality, and (according to the principle of exclusive disjunction and the necessity 
for practical law to be realized) at the same time its empirical counterpart is formed, 
The Person. The subject understanding objects in the first Criitique was for the most 
part a merely logical function; The Scientist. But under practical law, the growth of the 
architectonic is no longer a methodical theorization of a subjective idea but the real 
practice of its objective construction. Kant's three Critiques build a law house for an 
organism with soul. With art on its walls too, for the characteristics of intensive 
permanence and substantive imagination are attached to exemplary works of art and 
their production by genius. 
Speculative reason concerned itself with the plan for the court house - with the 
erection of a structure `just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of 
experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it''3 This vantage 
153 
Chapter 5 
sight has no objective substance independently of the fact of freedom, however, 
remaining merely hypothetical. But postulates of practical reason `give objective reality 
to the Ideas of speculative reason in general'24; all the aggregate unities, the random 
data, the technical methods, the particular schemes, all the loose change of knowledge 
contributes to the supply of the creature which occupies that theoretical house, which is 
the Person. Persons are the objective ends of reason, of absolute value, and do not serve 
`simply as means' 25 Reason is its own end, and everything contributes towards it: 
which legitimates the use of bodies as means, on the grounds that reason is not a body, 
and it legitimates the use of imagination as a means, on the grounds that imagination 
is not a soul, merely its empirical relative. Imagination is objectively legitimated in the 
form of a Person, relinquishing its role as medium between sensibility and 
understanding to take its proper place in the holy trinity of God, Freedom and 
Immortality. The (human) organism becomes a Person, imagination becomes soul and 
their empirical and relative forms become legitimately describable as means. 
Independently of the objective value of an immortal substantial soul, and not 
confined by personhood, imagination does not lose its infinity, instead, it loses its 
reason and good sense. But it is not for that evil. The devil, Kant says, `has reason, but 
not infinity. '26 The simplistic divisions of moral Law require that goodness have its 
devils just as white men need their women and their blacks to retain the vantage point 
of their situation over the business of experience, and Kant's devil without infinity is 
unimaginative and powerless, but nonetheless necessary. The State, as Deleuze and 
Guattari say, needs its impotence, and Persons need to be sinners too, to forget their 
immortality, in order that they might be reminded of it, under the Law. 
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II Imagination 
Imagination is not a faculty of the `I think', constrained to schematize on its behalf; 
like judgement, it is annexed to reason or understanding, in recognition of the 
particular interests of reason involved, but cannot be defined in terms of either. It is in 
between, but not produced by the poles it relates, or reducible to them. When 
imagination is unhinged from law and rule, and synthesis is not bound in a relation 
with identity, it becomes passive, passionate: this bears on the arbitrary freedom 
described in chapter one, since the passions, for Kant, involve the abolition of freedom, 
and the de-restriction of desire from principles of reason. Thus, whilst arbitrary 
freedom provided a space through which to choose against Law, it was only in the 
context of the network of faculties as constituted by Kant. The interzone does not 
remain open, however, the moment was passing and transitory, the door opens and 
passing through it dissolves its conditions. 
Imagination `belongs to sensibility'27, only to sensibility, the conditions of 
which `carry with them their own differences'28; not the difference between subjective 
and objective elements, which sets the separation of sensation in subjective - pleasure 
and pain, and objective - sensibility as the forms of a priori intuition, but indeterminate 
quantities of infinity not accounted for by reason, not contained by its standard unit of 
chaos, which do not substantiate a soul, but a `multiplicit6 de fusion qui deborde 
effectivement toute opposition de l'un et du multiple (fusional multiplicity that 
effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple)' 2`' When 
imagination is annexed to understanding, operating at middle range and contained by 
the generalizations of conceptual cognition, its productive capacities are constrained 
by the condition that anything it generates is reproducible. Contrary to what may 
appear to be the case in the first Critique, the condition of reproducibility is not 
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immanent to the operation of imagination, but rather a function it performs when 
deployed in conjunction with understanding, under its rule, in a theoretical domain. 
What makes reproduction possible, Kant says, is a rule to which appearances are 
subject; in other words understanding, as the faculty of rules, grounds reproduction. 
The difference between the two operations of imagination - apprehension and 
comprehension is not articulated clearly in the first Criti e. That the two functions 
are separable, and that imagination does indeed have an operative capacity 
independent of understanding and the rule which makes reproduction possible is clear, 
however, in the discussion of the mathematical sublime in the third Critique, where 
Kant argues that for imagination to function within an epistemological framework, it 
must perform both acts - that of apprehension and of comprehension. It must both 
apprehend what is given in intuition and provide a schema for understanding. The 
formal comprehension of what is apprehended sensibly allows for the application of 
concepts to intuition and thus for the reproducibility of what is given, where 
reproducibility is a condition for the claim of objective knowledge: a scientific 
experiment which cannot be reproduced, either mathematically or in practice, cannot 
count as objective knowledge, for Kant. In the sublime, however, understanding is of 
no relevance to the functioning of imagination, which is brought into a conflictual 
relation with reason. The logical comprehension of apprehension which forms the 
basis for the reproducibility gives way to an aesthetic comprehension in a singular 
judgement without concepts. So, whilst it may appear as though reproducibility is 
required by imagination, this is only insofar as imagination is annexed to 
understanding, and functioning epistemologically. This does not, however, exhaust the 
power of imagination. 
In the first Critique imagination is a labourer on the assembly line of 
knowledge, making things which could as well have been made by another, under 
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different empirical circumstances. When annexed to reason, its generative capacities 
are necessarily understood as impotent in relation to the supersensible dominion of 
reason. In relation to sensibility, however, imagination is neither under rule nor is 
there a standard according to which it may be judged as inadequate. It is a positive 
intensive distance from zero, the pure and empty form of time. 
The subjective and objective division of sensibility, as has been remarked, are 
functions of understanding, not of imagination, just as the productive and reproduction 
relations of imagination are functions of recognition, not of intensities; when 
understood immanently, imagination has neither image nor schema, destiny nor 
vocation, limit or condition, outside its relation with sensibility. Sensibility is not split 
into subjective and objective elements, but becomes a surface, a plane of consistency 
composed through the descriptions of imagination, populations of intensities, infinities 
of different orders, local absolutes without standard. Intuition is singular, as has been 
seen, and it is in relation to singularities that Deleuze understands imagination, as the 
process through which an idea is actualized, becoming concrete. It draws difference, 
contracting a point, a singularity, not as a unit, but as a complex articulation, which 
does not cancel difference but covers it with more difference, extracting the elements of 
speed from the differences it contracts and releasing them onto the surface of time, like 
spores from a pod.. 
In a sense, imagination might be said to be always sublime; it is intensive, 
objectively indeterminate in relation to identity, infinite and without empirical 
comparison, but nonetheless differentiated, patterned. A process with no relation to 
identity, it becomes divorced from the idea of production. But it is more accurate to say 
there is no longer any sense to the sublime (and it does have sense for Kant, as a 
cultural item), because without understanding to set extensive limits on synthesis, or 
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reason to impose intensive penalities and feelings of respect for the law on 
imagination, convincing persons of their soul, the conditions of the feelings of negative 
pleasure and pain characteristic of the sublime are no longer operative. `Moral law... by 
thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling which can be called pain' 30 and 
pain can be connected with `all presentations in us, no matter whether their object is 
merely sensible or instead wholly intellectual' 31. Different qualities emerge, however, 
from an imagination not pressed by religious or moral ideals, nor rationalized from a 
position of safety through the superior magnitudes monopolized by supersensible 
reason, becoming divorced utterly from the edification of nature into a cultural 
property. 
`[C]omment se prolongent les continuums d'intensite? dans quel 
ordre les series de transformations Sc font-Blies? quels sont ces 
enchainements alogiques qui se font toujours au milieu, et par 
lesquels le plan se construit morceau par morceau suivant un ordre 
fractionnaire croissant ou decroissant? Le plan est comme une 
enfilade de portes. Et les r6gles concretes de construction du plan ne 
valent que pour autant qu'elles exercent un role selectif. 
(How are the continuums of intensity extended? What is the order of 
the transformational series? What are these alogical linkages always 
effected in the middle, through which the plane is constructed piece 
by piece in ascending or descending fractional order? The plane is 
like a row of doors. And the concrete rules for the construction of the 
plane obtain to the extent that they exercise a selective role)' 32 
These questions always have an answer for Kant. In the end, all the doors lead 
to the same ends, to the standardized infinity of reason, because there is no longer 
imagination, only a soul, no longer a body, only an organism with personality, no 
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longer time, only immortality, no real patterns, only a schema borrowed from an idea 
of reason. Imagination and time do not, for Kant distribute a surface, but describe a 
corridor for the delivery of intensities to reason. This is why the sublime appears 
ejaculatory: an accumulation of heterogeneous force vectors constrained to be, whole, 
at the end, channelled along a single route. The critical path is `the only one that has 
remained unexplored', Kant writes. 33 But Kant mistakes its nature and its intellect with 
man's existence and desire, and wraps the route around in a circle, forming nothing, 
as the ground from which nothing escapes. Through the doors, relations fly outside the 
terms related, outside the set which contains them, past One and the totality of being. 
### 
In the Kantian sublime, imagination `strains to treat nature as a schema' for 
Ideas. 34 That is, it attempts to produce a material determination of time which realizes 
the indeterminate object of the Idea, making the standard infinite real. It is necessarily 
the case that it can only fail in this task, however, since to succeed would suggest that 
reason itself was reproducible, and that the infinite could be externalized as a 
perceivable quantity; this is not a possibility of aesthetics, only of Law. To Deleuze's 
comment that the abyss exists only to be filled, must be added the rider: but only by 
moral practices. Filling the abyss is legitimate only under the condition of Law. This 
is why Kant is so careful to insist that it is not nature itself that is sublime, and why 
nature is limited to the function of mirroring the unregulated discord of the faculties. 
There is always, for Kant, a relation of symmetry between nature and the relations 
amongst faculties: in the case of understanding, which gives the law to the relations of 
faculties in cognition, nature mirrors this relation by appearing IawfW; in the case of 
reason, there is no law to the relation amongst the faculties - their accord has to be 
produced, and so nature reflects this, appearing indeterminate, overwhelming, fearful. 
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Were imagination able to schematize ideas in nature, it would mean that the soul itself 
appeared in nature, or god did, or freedom. But this would render faith irrational, the 
soul material, and freedom a natural cause, undermining the theoretical operations of 
reason and allowing ideas a constitutive rather than merely regulative role. Again, this 
is legitimate only in the context of practical reason.. 
In the sublime, a `rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one 
and the same object' checks the breath and threatens the vital forces, producing pain. 35 
But this stammering and stuttering of intensities only resolves into the quality of 
respect associated with the sublime when imagination is qualified as inadequate; where 
there is no standard set, no image according to which the infinite is measured and no 
unit which contains it as an interior form, the stuttering and stammering does not 
resolve inwardly, into the interiority of reason, but outwardly, as the pure exteriority of 
the war machine, of another justice, another space-time, another origin, simultaneously 
making and passing through a door, an arbitrary freedom which is unrepeatable, 
unreproducible, image-free. The place of safety which assures the proper resolve of the 
conflict in the sublime is the Person, the consummate cultured man of State, rather 
than a physical location - though it is that too, since it is only men, for Kant, who are 
capable of the sublime. 
The traits which distinguish women from men are those which `chiefly result 
in making her known by the mark of the beautiful'36 whilst the `noble sex [edlen 
Geschlechtsl', man, has `a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity 
with the sublime' 37 Even if women are in principle capable of the sublime, it is 
neither to be encouraged in them, and nor do they possess the inclination to cultivate it: 
their association is with beauty, a sensation which `proclaims itself through shining 
cheerfulness in the eyes, through smiling features, and often through audible mirth' 38 
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This relation of beauty to visible characteristics of the body suggesting a sunny 
disposition, together with the association of women with beauty, helps to explain why, 
as was remarked in the Intrsoduction, it is girls especially who should be encouraged to 
smile; it functions as a steering mechanism, an element in the training of women (for, 
as Kant says, women are not educated, but trained) towards their proper cultural 
function, and away from the "masculine" pursuit of learning. Women, he says, carry 
books as they carry a watch, `so that people will see that she has one, though it is 
usually not running or not set by the sun. '39 
The cultured man has nothing to fear from the sublime, since culture is 
erected on the interiorization of its unregulated forces and then turns these forces 
against nature, in the specific form under which the State understands force - that is, 
in terms of violence. But from the blind play of imagination consequent on the 
sensible affection of a body emerges a persistence of passion, an intensive unit of 
production positively differentiated from the zero-dimensionality of time, an opening, a 
field of openings, a holey space. At this juncture there is no sense any more in 
psychologizing force with the term imagination. 
Deleuze is not a philosopher of enthusiasm, of affects accompanied by the idea 
of the good, nor, in any simple terms, is his philosophy aesthetics-based The circuitous 
manner in which his deductions operate obviate the distinctions which have isolated 
science from art, history from nature, industry from nature and nature from society, 
and his theory of synthesis is not concerned simply with formulating a science of 
human perception, as Kant defines aesthetics in the first Critique. It is not, in 
Irigaray's words, a specular economy and nor can it be charted on the axis of 
impotence and power. Deleuze takes the machinery of the sublime - the oscillation of 
forces, the chaos of an unregulated network of faculties, the indeterminacy of nature - 
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but instead of consolidating these within culture and according to the ends of reason, 
allows it to function like a electrical charge, a shock which communicates itself 
through all the faculties. So instead of the sublime being a momentary discharge which 
does not effect changes in the formations of common sense and good sense, it is a 
disturbance which trau els through the faculties, in between, operating by relays, a 
weapon of thought rather than a tool of culture, which catches its breath at the 
thresholds of breathlessness, rather than sinking back into contemplation of its own 
magnificence. 
III Continuity 
`Voila cc que sont les machines desirantes: machines formatives, 
dont ics ratts memes sont fonctionnels, et dont le fonctionnement est 
indiscernable de la formation; machines chronogenes confondues 
avec leer propre montage. 
(Desiring-machines are the following: formative machines, whose 
very misfirings are functional, and whose functioning is indiscernible 
from their formation; chronogeneous machines engaged in their own 
assembly)'. 4° 
The continuity of the process of desiring-production is an immanent cycle of 
production, distribution and consumption, three syntheses which produce a model of 
death, a body without organs". Everyone has one, everyone is one and makes one, 
Dcleuze and Guattari write in Mille Plateaux death does not lodge with God any more, 
everyone has death, is death, makes death, continuously evacuating the infinite into 
finitude, making a local absolute, an atheistic infinite. If this process is traced back to 
the sublime, and the discussion of the war machine, it can be seen that it is precisely 
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this that Kant could not allow. Because he named his ideas, giving death images which 
of necessity could not be realized, it necessarily remained contained within reason, an 
infinite virile secrecy which could not be evacuated; the Kantian system disallows the 
possibility of exporting chaos, and thus of differentiating its order, its levels, its 
patterns and its functionings. 
The model of death is converted by desiring-machines, or machinic 
assemblages into an experience of death, conversion being a synthetic cycle, the 
production of production or bloc of becoming through which the model moves up from 
the depths of a body to its surface, simultaneously making and finding a door, and 
exteriorizing the interiority of a body, breaking down its orders and thus beginning 
once again from a different order, repeating infinity according to an infinite pattern of 
variation. This is not a reference to Death: exportation of the model of death into the 
experience of death does not mean that "one dies" - though it can mean that: nor is it a 
matter of an authentic death, the ownmost death of one's self. It is only by breaking- 
down the model of death, evicting the interiority of the body that a body functions: 
breaking-down is the functioning of desiring-machines, a million little demises 
constructing the operations of a body. 
In a thermodynamic model of this process, breaking-down would consist in an 
increasingly homogeneous field, where differences are reduced into unity, as the end of 
the possibility of labour, of the conversion of heat into work. This is not the model to 
which L'anti-oedioe appeals, however. In Mille Plateaux and Logique du Sens Deleuze 
(and Guattari) refer to the emission of singularities, bursting like spores from a pod: 
this is the movement outwards of a model of interiority, an export process which 
conditions the functioning of a body, beginning always from the zero intensity of the 
model as principle of production, but rather than merely exhausting the model, as if it 
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constituted a finite resource, the experience returns to the model, as difference, and the 
circuit repeats, but beginning from somewhere else, with a different model. Death and 
life become mutually immanent and a body is transalivedead, always in the middle, a 
conjunction which destroys the exclusivity of the two terms, together with an 
understanding of finitude as a limit, beyond which is the infinite. 
If the cliche "death of the subject" means anything, it is this: the subject is a 
model continuously exported from the body, the experience of a solution to the problem 
of death, not as a sudden afflux of power, an exorbitant expenditure, but a continuously 
leaky process, a smooth plane of consistency rather than a pipe and an outflow into the 
kingdom of ends. The subject is the residue, rather than the source of this process, 
however, the creature which turns back and reflects on the circuit, identifies, 
recognizes, catalogues. In effect, the subject is death, whilst the process is life, for the 
process is always in advance of the subject, a future potential, an attractor. Because the 
cycle repeats differently, however, and difference repeats differently on each cycle, the 
subject , as the effect of this process, also appears 
differently, only if the attractor is 
zero-dimensional - the model of death as a black hole - does it appear to retain an 
identity, because it is then determined according to a single direction. What sense there 
is to the term subject becomes lost, however, when the only principle common to all 
selves is difference, and there is no model of unity - when the attractor is strange, 
chaotic, and thus unpredictable. 
A body is a plane alive and teeming, populated with intensities, a substantial 
multiplicity, full of holes, not a determinate object. But Deleuze and Guattari advise 
caution: it is better, they say, to remain stuck on the strata than to evacuate the model 
too fast, at the wrong time, without sobriety. 
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`Liberez-le d'un gelte trop violent, faites sauter les strates sans 
prudence, vous vous serez tue vous-meme, enfonce dans un trou noir, 
ou meme entraine dans un catastrophe, au lieu de tracer le plan. 
(If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata 
without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you 
will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards 
catastrophe)'. 42 
If the model becomes experience at speeds not practiced, if distances are 
cornered at too much speed that they are not bearable by the finitude of a body, they 
exhaust its capacity at once, in a sudden movement. It is, they say, a matter of the 
careful disarticulation of an organization, rather than a wild and mad leap into an 
unknown. The problem is not how to make the movement, but rather how to continue 
it, to describe a smooth plane. This caution is evident in Deleuze's philosohy: by 
understanding how a philosopher works, how to mimic him (they are always him), and 
by being meticulously and rigorously involved in his operations, he succeeds in freeing 
w hat is blocked up within them, bringing their depths up to the surface. 
The Freudian colouring of this movement is evident: the circuitous routes 
taken by the organism towards death are, Freud says, misunderstood if characterized as 
self-preservative. Instead, their function is to ensure that `any possible ways of 
returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism 
itself' are warded of: " For Freud, however, the organism seeks to return to an earlier 
stage, the inorganic. The inorganic serves as a model of death retained internally to the 
body, which in turn dictates an organic body be understood as a container, a box for the 
model, and what the organism seeks is to perfect a copy of this model. The route each 
organism takes is individual to it, but the principle governing the route is universal. 
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The movement from depth to surface is also evident in Kant; reason is the 
experience of death exported from a model of nature as massive, immense, conflictual, 
and of chaos as overwhelming through might. But the afflux is resolved in one model 
composed of inter-connected non-conflictual elements - the doctrine of faculties that 
constitutes the real transcendental method - which contribute to one end, that of the 
systematic unity of reason. 
There is mechanism, or more generally, extensively empty and interiorized 
space, logical common sense: aesthetics, or more generally, harmonic reflection on the 
form of an object, resulting in a concept of an aesthetic common sense shared amongst 
men, which serves as the basis of other forms of common sense; teleology, or more 
generally, the reflection of nature as objectively and systematically purposive and of the 
body as an organism, nature's good sense; and, as the instigator of their contributions 
being directed towards a systematic unity, or kingdom of ends, reason - more 
generally, a juridical system based on the exclusion of intensities, which proposes a 
theory of desire as production of an object according to a model represented in advance 
by the law. Once it is established, the return of experience to the model as an intensive 
quantity which effects a transformation in its functioning is precluded. As Kant says, 
the model is produced out of the depths of reason, and by reason, and the completeness 
of this production leaves `no task to our successors save that of adapting it in a didactic 
manner' . 
44 
*** 
The Kantian transcendental functions as a splitting device, which separates 
the problem of experience into two elements, the model which conditions it and the 
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real content which materializes those conditions - the effect of this on sensation has 
been remarked above, its division into objective and subjective elements disallowing 
any reciprocal communication between the empty form of time and the intensive 
magnitudes of sensation. The model expresses its content, but both expression and 
content are themselves divided into form and substance, allowing for two different 
understandings of difference. But because of the master of exclusive disjunction, which 
is the principle of division between content and expression, the two arms of difference 
do not communicate. Reason is borne from chaos once only and then communications 
are cut, and reason constructs its own order, according to its own principles. 
Kant writes: 
`the causality of an alteration in general, presupposing, as it does, 
empirical principles, lies altogether outside the limits of a 
transcendental philosophy, 45 
For Kant, there is no real interaction of the heterogeneous and diverse 
distributions of experience and the homogeneous and unified divisions of the 
transcendental; the potential of experience is limited within the terms of the model, 
which, as an earlier chapter has shown, has for its ground permanent substance. And 
the model of death is contained within reason, by its monopoly over the legitimate 
application of pain. 
Although for Kant, transcendental philosophy cannot answer some questions, 
such as that of the causality of alteration, or the particularity of its contents, it is 
founded on the elimination of the possibility of de facto evidence collapsing the 
structural order it imposes on the empirical, so whilst it cannot explain the particular, 
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it can reduce the relations into which it enters to formally legitimated functions of the 
understanding. Kant knows about the doors; he just thinks they open on to known 
routes, or that passage through them is regulated. A substantial unity, ultimate subject 
of existence and ground of activity, whose genesis is not comprehended by the 
transcendental, but presupposed by it, defines the empirical subject within a limited 
intensive range, and this model of death does not rise. 
The continuity of the process of desiring-production and the continuous 
exportation of the model of death constitute a response to this universe, and to Kant. 
Intensities are implemented as intrinsic genetic elements of the real, differentiated 
immanently and asymmetrically, rather than split according to principles of either/or: 
either phenomena or noumena, either empirical or transcendental, either man or 
nature, either reason or death. L'anti-oedine removes the problem of critique from the 
court-house and transcendental analysis becomes the problem of determining the 
criteria for escape, for production of a line of flight of the smallest interval and the 
sequencing of connections which do not return to the conditions of their origin. Nature 
is no longer massive but molecular. 
`Elles [machines desirantes] fonctionnent suivant des regimes de syntheses qui 
n'ont pas d'equivalent dans les grands ensembles (desiring-machines work according 
to regimes of syntheses that have no equivalent in the large aggregate'46; the relations 
into which they enter are not between objects, but connect partial objects, the elements 
of which desiring-machines are composed. Not as parts which go to make a whole, 
since desiring-machines are also partial objects, the elements of another machine. 
`Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full 
of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop 
of their liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond'. " 
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There are no simples, or ultimate elements, only a nested system of involuting 
differences: partial objects are desiring-machines are BwO's are partial objects. The 
most quoted eimple Deleuze and Guattari give of the relation of partial objects is that 
of the wasp and orchid: the wasp is a liberated element of the orchid's reproductive 
system, whilst the orchid `devient l'objet d'un orgasme de la guepe elle-meme liberee 
de sa propre reproduction (becomes the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated 
from its own reproduction)' 48 The connection is not a link between the wasp and the 
orchid, but a conjugation of the two asymmetrical relations effecting a line of flight, a 
relation not confined by its terms, a bloc of becoming. 
The model of the transcendental is not evacuated in a single output, but 
through an infinitely diffuse repulsion, the tiny intervals or demons leaps of the actual 
continuum, from the depths of a body, which is individuated or corporealized through 
that process but does not pre-exist it, in either principle or fact. A body does not exist 
as an individual, but as a series of variable affects, effected by the connections into 
which it enters, as a process, or bloc of becoming. To define a body is thus to discover 
what machines it plugs into, rather than, in the Kantian manner, as a product in 
isolation of its environment. `Un corps ne se reduit pas ä un organisme (a body is not 
reducible to an organism' 49 And in the absence of the organism, there is no soul, no 
house for the person. 
Subtracting the unique from Kant's theory of forces, Deleuze and Guattari set 
about the construction of a machine in which form and formation and functioning are 
not separable. A body is not defined socially, or biologically, or mechanically, but as an 
individuated band of schizoid intensities, none of which function as structural 
elements, but u hich are continually evacuated and replaced, as part of the process of its 
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formation. There is never The Schizo, only schizoid quanta, break-flows, connections, 
intersections and interactions, transmissions and transformations. Related to unity, the 
system breaks down in a way that is not produced by the system itself. As a positive 
distance from zero, absent of presupposition (which is of course, impossible; a 
completed critique is not possible), a body is only what it does. 
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Becoming-woman 
In the last chapter, the relation of passivity, as Deleuze and Guattari formulate 
it, to the activelpassive difference in Kant's philosophy was teased apart. A question 
arising from this is what instigates the leap? Is there an initiating function which 
drives a system over from the side of mechanism vs. teleology to machinic production, 
c ecting the conjunction of an inclusive disjunction and the generation of 
multiplicities without reference to unity, full of exits, cracks, tiny intervals of difference 
leeching through the strict limits of possibility, and incommensurate with the 
antimonic progress of dialectical thought. There is such a function, which Deleuze and 
Guattari call becoming-woman. Becoming-woman, they say, has a special introductory 
power, as the key or first quantum in all becomings, on the way to becoming-animal, 
rushing towards becoming-imperceptible. In this chapter, becoming-woman will be 
introduced, but largely in the context of readings by those few feminists who have 
engaged with Deleuze. Irigaray's reading of Kant will also be looked at. It will be 
argued that her project is not successful for reasons similar to the limited effectiveness 
of feminist criticisms, in that both adopt an uncritical position with respect to sexual 
difference, in their different ways. A fuller discussion of becoming-woman is found in 
the next chapter, pulling out the relations of this line to themes which have arisen in 
previous chapters. 
I Receptacle, which is now called space' 
Between the two layers of skin, the lower dermis and the upper epidermis are colonies 
of touch receptors. Merkel's disks respond to sustained pressure; Pacinian corpuscles 
respond to changes in pressure, converting mechanical into electrical energy-, 
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Meissner's corpuscles record low-frequency vibrations. On a hand there are flexure 
lines, tension lines, papillary ridges. A tongue is replete with sensory talents, a nose 
collects moistures, sweet and dusty. Irigaray's economy is one of touch. 
`Quand eile y revient, c'est pour repartir d'ailleurs. 
(When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere)'? 
As do Deleuze and Guattari, Irigaray explores difference through the middle; 
not as a medium between two terms, but as distributing a tactile and intensive space. 
Multiple and interconnected, immediately autoerotic with her body, Irigaray's woman 
is before the possibility of distinguishing activity and passivity. `L'homme... a besoin 
d'un instrument pour se toucher, sa main, le sexe de la femme, le langage (man needs 
an instrument: his hand, a woman's body, language... ''), but woman `est dejä deux - 
mais non divisibles en un(e)s - qui s'affectent (is already two -but not divisible into 
one(s) - that caress each other). " Everything begins from a different place. The 
privilege given to sight by philosophy was remarked in chapter three, in the point of 
intersection behind the eyes functioning as the centre of resonance, and principle of 
recognition. Irigaray privileges touch: `La femme jouit plus du toucher que du regard 
(woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking)', she takes pleasure 
`justement de cette incompletude de forme de son sexe qui fait qu'il se re-touche 
inddfiniment lui-meme (precisely from (an] incompleteness of form which allows her 
organ to touch itself over and over again). 'S However, her theorization of touch does 
not describe a simple oscillation between two terms, but a positive feedback which 
continually dissolves the middle, precluding it from functioning as a dividing term 
which would articulate the two lips as different in relation to unity, which could 
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privilege a right over a left side, a one over the two. She keeps herself as a secret, 
nithout knowing it. 
In the contest of a discussion of Freud, Irigaray calls the laws of the 
conservation of energy and of the fundamental dissymmetry of nature, (the move from 
the present to the future, as if from the particular to the general and the first two laws 
of thermodynamics), `isomorphs of masculine rather than feminine sexuality' 6 This 
criticism is coincident with Deleuze's characterization of thermodynamics in terms of 
good sense. She continues: 
`Feminine sexuality would perhaps harmonize better, if you need to 
invoke a scientific model, with what Prigogine calls "dissipative" 
structures which function by means of an exchange with the exterior 
world, which proceed by energy levels and whose order is not one 
that seeks balance but one that seeks passage over thresholds 
corresponding to a movement beyond disorder or entropy without any 
discharge. 0 
In the last chapter, the sublime was characterized in terms of discharge, as an 
accumulation of heterogeneous force vectors channelled along a single route, and 
contrasted with the plane of consistency, as a plane of doors where relations fly outside 
the terms related Irigaray's use of dissipative structures as a model suggest a 
coincident direction, (and Deleuze does refer to Prigogine): in far-from-equilibrium 
conditions, the behaviour of a system becomes highly specific, and there are no 
universal laws from which its overall behaviour, or future, can be deduced. It is in that 
sense a model which is not a model, since to make any further claims about a 
dissipative system, its particular behaviour must be explored The system itself 
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determines its own intrinsic size and distribution, since its future is undetermined, 
which means that although associated with chaotic attractors, it can also return to a 
zero-dimensional or limit attractor, however, it is the implication of chaotic attractors 
and symmetry-breaking properties of dissipative systems to which Irigaray and Deleuze 
alike are drawn. 
Of the tactile economy that she formulates, Irigaray writes that not only can 
the distinction between touching and touched not be upheld, but also that it is mobile 
and ubiquitous: 'la femme a des sexes un peu partout (woman has sex organs more or 
less everywhere)' .8 There is no gap or room for intrusion, and no possibility of 
logically distinguishing what is seeing from what is seen, for the difference between 
them is not extensive with the co-ordinated intersections of space which meet behind 
the eyes. Nor is there a possibility of female sexuality according privilege to genitalia: 
the body becomes sexualized, not through a single privileged term, but as a surface of 
mobile passions. 
For Irigaray and Deleuze alike positive feedback emerges through similar 
moves. Irigaray writes: 
`[S]on sere, qui nest pas un sexe, est compte comme pas de sexe. 
Negatify envers, re%, ers, du seul sexe visible et morphologiquement 
designable (meme si cela pose quelques problemes de passage de 
l'Crection ä la detumescence): le penis. 
([H]her sexual organ, which is not one organ, is counted as none. 
The negative, the underside, the reverse of the only visible and 
morphologically designable organ (even if the passage from erection 
to dctumescence does pose some problems): the penis). '9 
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The comment echoes that of Deleuze, when he calls the negative difference 
seen from below, inverted. 10 By removing the one from the multiple, she seeks to 
describe a specifically female space, which both engages with the philosophical 
tradition, whilst at the same time subverting its directions, by exposing the logical 
tricks, reductions, negations and limitations by which it secures the privilege of the 
subject. She explores the mystification of women, in systems of supposed transparency, 
their positioning as passive "other" to reason, and the primacy accorded to that faculty. 
Her abstract machine, or problem, is the gap, or hole in the system of representation, a 
crack: `son sere repnsente 1 horreur du rieh ä voir (her sexual organ represents the 
horror of nothing to see. )" By opening up this space and materializing it, she 
introduces it to Kant, to the tactility of the actual continuum, and the problem of 
fluidity, but in the process it loses its function as a receptacle. 
Irigaray's early writings in Speculum and This Sex Which Is Not One opened 
up a rich field of problems for feminism. Her method is one of mimesis: through 
detailed re-workings of writers, including Plato, Freud, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Aristotle..., 
she works at jamming their systems and exposing their inconsistencies, incoherences 
and uncritical assumptions: 
`[LJ'enjeu n'cst pas d'elaborer une nouvelle theorie dont la femme 
serait le sujet ou l'objet, mais d'enrayer la machinerie theorique elle- 
meme, de suspendre sa pretention a la production d'une verite et d'un 
sens par trop univoques. Cc qui suppose que les femmes ne se 
veuillent pas simplement les egales des hommes dann le savoir. 
(The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman 
would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical 
machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a 
truth and a meaning that are excessively univocal. Which 
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presupposes that women do not aspire simply to be men's equals in 
knowledge). "z 
The extent to which her method is successful has been argued, and will be 
touched on below, but of primary interest here is her reading of Kant. 
II Turn of the screw 
There are, as has been seen, connections between Deleuze (and Guattari) and Irigaray: 
if there were not, the claims of the previous chapter about the rhizomatic nature of 
machinic production, and of a system in which everything connects with everything 
else, would be demolished. Both draw on the model of dissipative structures; both 
address the problem of third things whose effects are crushed between the terms they 
relate; the rigid hold of the subject on production; the regulation of imagination; the 
role of the copula in a system which has no place for the copulation, except through the 
language of law which belongs only to one member. Both look at the function of pain 
in the constitution of representation, and at the formation of bodies as necessarily 
mutilated in advance of their entry into its system. 
In Speculum, in a piece on Kant called Paradox a priori, Irigaray focuses on 
gaps within Kant covered over by vague mechanisms which have no proper location in 
relation to the two stems of knowledge, or fall on one side or the other of the divide 
between a sensible and supersensible world, or are excluded altogether: schemata and 
transcendental objects. These are the third things that Kant deploys as means of 
moving between domains, without considering the nature and effects of that movement 
except in relation to the two connected terms - in other words, on the confinement of 
relations within the terms related. 
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She identifies the function of the schema, third thing between sensibility and 
understanding, as that of negation: the multiplicity of sensations, of indeterminate 
matters, all the heterogeneous variations of nature, are negated in the formation of the 
passage through which understanding/l think draws on material nature and determines 
it as objective. Her case is illustrated with the example of enantiomorphic bodies, - of 
`differences that are internal as the senses teachi13 - which are affective, rather than 
conceptual, and which Kant relates to intuition. The opening quotes of her paper refer 
to Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts. '4 `I shall call a body which is exactly 
equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as that 
other, its incongruent counterpart. i15 Amongst Kant's examples are left and right 
hands and ears, hair whorls, twining plants and the spiral curvatures of shells, but his 
argument extends to asserting a privilege of the right over the left hand, of the right 
over the left side of the body in terms of skill and strength, and an advantage of power 
that the right side of the body has over the sensitivity of the left. 
So in terms of affective asymmetry, a body is constructed according to 
differences weighted with significances. 16 Kant's solution to enantiomorphic bodies, 
alike in all properties, }, et with unmistakable sensible differences, is to refer the 
problem to extensity, as a whole, in the form of an extensive magnitude, externalizing 
the affective differences in a world of constituted objects. Irigaray calls this mechanism 
of externalization a passage, and the function which she identifies as structuring the re- 
appearance of sensible differences in extensive space is the transcendental object, 
which introduces a symmetry into the world. " Through this object, the paradox of 
sensibly perceived and affective differences enter into the symmetries of a space whose 
planes intersect in the transcendental subject, the correlate of the transcendental object. 
Whereas the schema is integral to the determination of objects, however, the 
transcendental object functions regulatively: 
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`[T]his transcendental thing [Ding] is only the schema of the 
regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, 
extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience. "s 
In the first Critique Kant wavers, sometimes eliding differences between the 
transcendental object and the noumenon and sometimes upholding their separation, 
sometimes referring it to the thing-in-itself, and sometimes isolating it from the 
material problems implicated by this association. Its positioning is very similar to that 
of the schema, both describing an ambivalent and vague distribution between 
sensibility and intelligibility, one of which is incorporated into the construction of 
representation, the other of which functions from the outside, as an Idea. Like the 
noumenon, it is Janus-faced: `regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, [Dinges an 
sich selbst] this object is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an 
appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects. '19 
There is thus an admixture of data compacted in the transcendental object, and 
it is this that leads to its tendency to collapse into either the thing-in-itself or the 
noumenon, the former pointing it outside the system of representation, and the latter 
internalizing it within the subject, as marker of its divided nature. However, it must 
retain its two-fold function, because, like the schema, it indicates a gap between 
sensibility and intelligibility that `can never be filled', only gestured at, 'through the 
ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental object [Gegenstande] which is 
the cause of this species of representations' but `of which we shall never acquire any 
concept. i20 In its relation to appearance, the transcendental object connects with 
intuition, and with the framework of limitation time and space become when instituted 
as axiomatically extensive. 
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On the side of sensibility, from which it cannot be separated, it tends towards 
the thing-in-itself, and to the problem of material causality: `what matter may be as a 
thing in itself (transcendental object [Objekt]) is completely unknown to us'21. This 
problem of matter as thing-in-itself, the transcendental matter referred to in earlier 
chapters, suggests a link between the transcendental object, the concept of reality and 
intensive magnitudes, since it is the latter, as has been said, which indicate the real in 
appearances. And Kant writes that transcendental objects `in our present state appear 
as bodies. '22 Irigaray's point addresses precisely the problem of what is negated in the 
movement from transcendental matter, as the intensive stuff of affects, to the 
transcendental object, whose `permanence as appearance can indeed be observed. '23 
What happens to bodies in the movement from intensive matter to appearances whose 
relations are a function not of the materiality involved but of the `present state' of a 
subject? The word permanence signals a relation of the transcendental object to 
substance; to the negation of intensive differences within the substratum of appearances 
in general; to subjectivity, to the delimitation of sensible intuition as a complex of 
mobile and differentiated intensive magnitudes to logical time; to causality as a 
reference to determinate intensive quanta and to matter re-cast empirically, as a state. 
Implicated with matter but not apparent, apparently but not cognitively causal, 
it must therefore be intelligible, although it is not known as an object: the 
transcendental object is `the purely intelligible cause of appearances', and `can alone 
confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, [Gegenstand] 
that is, objective reality. 'Z° In this respect it is related to the principle of convertibility, 
and Kant allows then it may be called noumenon `for the reason that its representation 
is not sensible. '25 Its intelligible function is to `leave open a space which we can fill 
neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding. In its '26 
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intelligible form it is the terminus of contingency, a thought-entity without reason 
which we `have not the least justification for assuming. %27 
Irigaray's argument is that the schema is a mechanism for disguising the 
transition from intensive, affective differences to extensive, geometric differences, and 
that the transcendental object performs a similar function, but this time the transition is 
between the limits of human knowledge and an intellectual intuition that must be 
assumed but cannot - like the transcendental object - be known or presumed to be 
constitutive of experience.. 
"Comme si" toute cette diversite trouvait sa finalite en une unitd 
superieure ... ä laquelle il importe qu'il se conforme aussi, du moins 
qu'il tente, sans la/le connaitre. 
("As if' all that diversity were directed toward a higher unity ... which it/he also should strive to conform to, even without any knowledge of 
it)' 28 
As the schema allows for the reconciliation of sensibility and understanding, 
so the transcendental object allows for the reconciliation of understanding and reason, 
since in its intelligible form it serves as the object of a transcendent idea, and can thus 
be utilized regulatively, thought not constitutively. And Kant does indeed refer to 
analogies as the `only resource' for making the movement between concepts of 
experience and `some sort of concept of intelligible things' . 
29 
Irigaray's problem is with the nature of time involved in this process, of whose 
time Kant is referring to, and her question is: what is the time of the mirror? `What can 
be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear 
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that their images in a mirror? ' Kant asks. 30 Irigaray turns the question back on him, 
however, asking why asymmetry, rather than symmetry should be problematic, and 
concludes that `Un miroir, donc, ici s'avoue comme supportant dejä 1'apprehension des 
objets (already a mirror turns out to support the apprehension of objects)' 3' This was 
seen in the previous chapter, in the changing faces of nature according to the change 
relations amongst the faculties, nature always reflecting the order or chaos of the 
subject. Why should it be more strange that differences rather than identities are 
reflected? And does it make sense to speak of differences as reflected, in the absence of 
a unifying function which could testify to the fact that yes, indeed, those differences 
reflect these? Irigaray's argument drives towards the inevitable conclusion that 
reflection and difference are incompatible, the former belonging to the specular 
economy of rational insight and the latter to the empirical zones of touch, and that 
attempts at their reconciliation results only in the negation of difference by the cycle of 
the same particular to reflection. 
Kant was concerned, in his argument with Leibniz, not to conceptualize 
spatial relations, and thus referred the sensible differences amongst enantiomorphs to 
intuition: Irigaray's question runs beneath this, and addresses the constitution of 
symmetry itself, the paradox of a world reflecting the identity of a subject, when it is, 
as Kant reflects, full of differences. How does the left side becomes collapsed into the 
right, sensibility into power? In her very different way, she is questioning the relation 
of synthesis to identity referred to in the previous chapter, and the representation of its 
products as a reflection of the legislative power of the subject. 
Irigaray explores women's position in Kant in terms of this gap, or mirror, as 
a surface of reflection presupposed, uncritically, in order to address the problem of 
enantiomorphs. The time is of the subject, the subject is man, and the mirror a refusal 
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of the blindness which, as the last chapter showed, attaches to imagination and 
intuition. 'Aveuglee dans le refus de son aeuglement par tout savoir qui, en son esprit, 
ne trouverait pas sa cause (In its own refusal of blindness, consciousness is blinded by 
all knowledge that does not find its cause in the mind itself). 932 Each third thing, each 
movement from sensibility to understanding, in the schema, or from the sensible to the 
intelligible cause, through the transcendental object, reflects a new facet of a single 
point of convergence, and a different blindness, each of which finds its cure in a 
different configuration of light, a new image of 'un Pere qui n'existe que dann un desir 
de tout legiferer librement (a Father who exists solely in a desire to exercise law freely 
over everything). 933 One blindness is given up for the sake of another, or one blindness 
is constructed in order to prove the necessity of another. 34 
Irigaray addresses the same aspects of Kant as does Deleuze, but for strategic 
reasons concentrates on the internalization of the world within a subject: `la scene se 
passe toujours dans sa maison, son esprit (the action is always inside his house, his 
mind). i35 She understands the indispensable nature in Kant of a detour through the 
world, but attends to the re-formulation of that passage in terms of subjective 
reflection, the obliteration of a tacit symmetry with a spuriously problematic asymmetry 
and the representation of the world as mirror which reflects the laws of that subject. 36 
She becomes the matter inside the system, but speaking with a foreign tonge, she 
subverts its order. Women become the carriers of vagueness, of the gap and the mirror, 
being situated both inside and outside, the material gathered in the detour through the 
world, a smoked and blackened mirror veiling perception, and the surface inverted in 
the mirror, a kind of difference which remains unanalyzed. The paradox a priori of 
Irigaray's heading is this difference, incongruent and incommensurate with the 
representation or reflection of objects. 
182 
Chapter 6 
'Cc qui ne se fait pas sans peine. Ni sans reste. Mais que 1'espace s'y 
resorbe en temps, et 1'espoir subsiste toujours pour 1'esprit de 
parachever cette operation dans un avenir ä perte de vue. 
(This is not achieved without pain. Or without a remainder. But 
provided that space is resorted into time, there is still hope that the 
mind can perfect this operation at some point in the boundless 
future), 37 
Irigaray draws her analysis through Kant's theoretical writing and into the 
aesthetic and the collapse of imagination under the weight of its own inadequacy in the 
face of reason particular to the sublime, noting that it is the soul to which Kant appeals 
as a solution to appearance of the infinite and which paves the way to pleasure and to 
culture. She identifies the over-whelming nature of the sublime with the mother, and 
the culture which confines the legitimacy of the sublime with a site of learned 
resistance to and independence of its basis in that nature. Kant becomes caught in a 
bind, both searching for the presuppositions on which man bases his culture, 
knowledge, science and art, and simultaneously enclosing himself within a cycle of 
reflection which obviates the possibility of any real solution to his search. 
`The thread of a screw which winds round its pin from left to right 
will never fit a nut of which the thread runs from right to left. i38 
Irigaray's claim is that it is precisely this that Kant does allow; whichever way 
that subject turns, the nut will take the screw, nature will take the laws of the subject. 
This is the paradox of symmetry, the possibility of a space, or gap, sufficiently plastic 
to be moulded to the demands of representation, providing its real nature is not taken 
into account, providing the one difference which cannot be analyzed does not enter the 
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house of the subject on its own terms, unmoulded, rather than as one of the building 
blocks of its erection. Providing it remains a means to the achievement of a value 
outside itself. It is the cruelty of this operation she challenges. 
`Et, dans la souffrance que necessite son plaisir, mettrons-nous lä 
Kant avec Sade? Ou, un quart de tour supplementaire - en plus ou en 
moms -r tant donn8 ä la subtilit6 de son esprit, avec Masoch? 
(And, in the suffering made necessary by his pleasure, shall we place 
Kant ne-d to Sade? Or, if the subtlety of his mind is given one quarter 
turn of the screw more, in or out - next to Masoch? )' 39 
*** 
Irigaray is a very difficult writer; her language resists the subtractive moves 
that Deleuze makes on Kant, and in this sense she is entirely successful in producing 
structures irreducible to their parts. She runs very swiftly over an immense field, racing 
in the space of thirteen pages through the three Critiques, collecting as she passes 
snippets from the Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, and from Kant's 
writings on the family, and the rights of its members. This kind of overflight is another 
feature she shares with Deleuze; rather than picking over the bones of an argument, 
they catch what is integral to the machines they are building and incorporate it in the 
mechanisms of her escape. Her "method" - and as with Deleuze, this is a difficult word 
to use in relation to Irigaray - is to deploy the abstract machine, two lips which are not 
one, by operating both inside and outside the system simultaneously. However, 
Irigaray's escape is less effective than that of Deleuze; her critique does not quite 
succeed in escaping its negative function of jamming theoretical machinery, and as a 
result its positive consequences tend towards a valorization of the mysterious and a 
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definition of women in terms of motherhood, or in relation to a female divine and a 
feminine ethic. 
Rosi Braidotti characterizes Irigaray's ethics of sexual difference as 
`the recognition that differences among women need not lead to the 
state of disaggregation and hostility that has always played into the 
hands of patriarchy' 40 
This is extremely problematic at an empirical level. Algerian women are shot 
in front of the classes they teach, but in Rwanda women have been implicated in 
massacres: women leave the Philippines for work in Saudi Arabia, but are not paid and 
beaten, by both men and women, whilst in the U. S. and in England, girl gangs thump 
their "sisters", sometimes to death. The dream of women united through their 
differences is a white liberal construct, and does not take account of the real and 
extreme range of differences amongst women, deploying, if only implicitly, an appeal 
to a unified thought of "woman". I prefer to retain a potential hostility. An image of 
sex replaces the image of thought and becomes equally restrictive. The only way out of 
this problem is to characterize those behaviours which do not coincide with the idea of 
universal sisterhood as produced by men: however, this returns women to the status of 
victims. Deleuze and Guattari's characterization of a body in terms of the machines it 
plugs into does not appeal to a base identity in terms of which all relations are 
understood, and so does not meet with these problems. 
Where Irigaray's critique of Kant is most problematic is in its adoption of his 
formulation of nature in the sublime as massive, all-powerful and over-whelming, her 
association of this with the figure of the mother, and of imagination with women. Her 
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mimetic jamming method necessitates this, since it operates by keeping very close to 
the problems thrown up by a writer, as if both in parallel to him whilst at the same time 
cutting across and over, exposing incoherencies and logical trickery. She follows the 
detour of the Kantian subject through the outside, but her method does not allow her to 
build from the outside and away from the structures she criticizes, and so their ground 
does not lose its security. It is in this respect that Deleuze's solution is more effective; 
by attending to the micro-deviations and molecular disturbances in the ground, and 
piecing together elements which in turn exacerbate those disturbances whilst at the 
same time escaping the structures, Deleuze builds a machine, whilst Irigaray constructs 
an image of women, which does not mirror the subject, but nonetheless remains 
biunivocally related to it, in that it retains precisely that mystery which philosophy and 
history have long attached to the fairer sex. Moreover, by reading relations in terms of 
sexual difference, she repeats the very problems for which philosophy is attacked by 
feminism. 
III A Kind of Schizophrenia 
One writer exploring the philosophical and scientific habits of attributing sexual values 
to everything around it is Evelyn Fox-Keller. She points to a `kind of schizophrenia' 
plaguing understandings of science and gender, causing polarized oscillations between 
`fixed natural categories in one moment, and constructed, perhaps even indefinitely 
plastic, categories in another. ' The solution to this impasse, she argues, is 'learning to 
count past two'. 1A first result of this is that matter becomes understood in terms of 
interacting forces, rather than as the content of form. Keller argues that this has been 
scientifically problematic because it seemed to sentimentalize nature; immanently co- 
operative matter self-organizing coherent systems without external direction implied a 
natural altruism of form on the part of individuals, their willingness to 'die' for the 
186 
Chapter 6 
system. 42 A similar problem of balance concerns all trade-offs between group benefit 
and individual cost. The critical question concerns the maximum degree of cost to 
themselves individuals will tolerate before any socially desirable character is 
disinvested. This situation is clearly that of the multiple +1, and so does not correspond 
to the space occupied by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Counting past two, but not by using another one, argues Keller, involves 
paying scientific attention to the middle ground ignored by zero-sum cost benefit 
analysis. She cites Lynn Margulis' work on bacterial sex as doing this; that it has been 
described as `introducing feminism to Darwinismi43 rather than as a piece of "proper" 
science indicates a resistance to the radical differences implied by the breakdown of 
basic taxonomies in her work. It is problematic for feminism because the body as a 
whole object, complete with vagina or penis, womb or testes, is no longer the site for 
discussions of sexuality and reproduction: bacterial sex problematizes sexual difference 
beyond the possibility of its redemption by two bio-socially defined terms, male and 
female. Patterns conceived of as socially constructed, teleologically directed or divinely 
imprinted become understood as self-organizing material functions, and the body is 
merely one amongst many solutions to problems of matter and force. Initial 
explorations of these functions often drag anthropomorphic hangovers with them - 
altruism, for example, or zero sum games. 
But thinking past two involves understanding that `Nature is oblivious of all 
our romances, and knows nothing of our gender roles and distinctions. '44 The 
implication of all this is that feminist categories can only reach so far: a feminist 
epistemology can no more reach back into matter than can a male intellect. A further 
implication of Keller's paper is this: since the impulse towards sexing and gendering 
parts male or female, masculine or feminine is an old scientific habit, an imposition of 
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romance onto nature, its continuation by feminists is a subscription to that romance. At 
bottom her paper addresses the legitimacy of the thought of sexual difference which 
emerges as a question out of the middle. 
IV Out of the middle 
'Bref, une ligne de fuite, dejä complexe, avec ses singularites; mais 
aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumiere avec ses segments; et entre les 
deux (T), une ligne moleculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher 
d'un cöte ou de I'autre. 
(In short, a line of flight, already complex, with singularities; but 
also a molar or customary line with segments; and between the two 
(? ), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or 
the other) . 'S 
In Mille Plateaux the middle line, the line which causes the collapse back into 
an empty space of attraction and common sense, good sense and order, or becomes the 
subject of escape and effects a singular diffusion of intensive quanta and the 
distribution of full space is called becoming-woman. Becoming-woman is the in- 
between of the two systems, machining communications between orders of 
incommensurate potentials, that of the State and that of the nomad, of Compars and 
Dispars, logos and nomos, an itinerant vector. `[D]iffusion procede au milieu, par le 
milieu, comme tout ce qui "pousse", du type rhizome (diffusion happens in the in- 
between, goes between, like everything that "grows" of the rhizome type)'. 6 There is 
thus an explicit connection between tactile, full space, and becoming-woman, the 
transverse line discussed in the previous chapter and the logic of conjunction, of the 
And, not as blockage and accumulation, but as an additive function. However, as seen, 
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the middle is not enclosed within its terms, and so becoming-woman becomes 
associated with the formation of substantial multiplicities with no relation to unity. 
Delcuze and Guattari make no claim about "real women, " and what their 
experience might be. 47 There is no image of women, nor determined direction to 
becoming-woman as line: the plane of doors, as has been said, does not represent the 
outside behind it, but is constituted by moving through the openings. Indeed, Guattari 
writes of becoming-woman in the context of queer politics: `in order to understand the 
homosexual, we tell ourselves that it is sort of "like a woman"'. (G, 1981, p87) 
Women's proximity to but absence of identification with or recognition in terms of the 
biunivocal relations of Law, empty striated space, etc., and the strangeness of their 
sexuality, from the perspective of an economy of desire based on a lacked object and an 
ejaculatory satisfaction, have marked them as dissident, deviant. Caught by the 
mechanisms designed to neutralize this deviance - marriage, domesticity, public 
invisibility, and sexual debt (in this economy, Guattari says, `the woman owes her 
orgasm to the man' [Ibid. ]), women become debtors to a system which uses their body 
to survive. The point is very similar to those made by Irigaray, regarding the position 
of women as necessarily inside and outside the space of representation. 
Guattari argues that by detaching themselves from the profits promised to 
masculinity - power, control, monopolization of violence, etc. - men too become 
`directly linked to a becoming-feminine body, as an escape route from the repressive 
socius' (Ibid. ). (It is claims such as these which have worried feminism and led to the 
accusation of appropriation: a queer man is still a man, it is said. ) In more general 
terms, he argues for the destruction of categories -woman, man, black, white, queer, 
straight, deviant - and for a distributed sexuality, n-sexes, without definition or border, 
temporal endurance or specificity. For a full space, of infinitely proximate and singular 
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sexes. Again, this has been the focus of feminist objections. Rosi Braidotti, for 
example, one of the first women to respond positively to Deleuze and Guattari's work, 
calls it one of `sexual neutrality which does not allow for the fundamental lack of 
symmetry between the sexes'. 48 This criticism reflects Irigaray's concern with the 
unexamined paradox of symmetry; but whilst de-stabilizing the rigid structures which 
form space as a three-dimensional domain of co-ordinating planes intersecting at the 
point of the subject, who provides the fourth dimension in the form of a time constant, 
Braidotti's insistence on sexual difference as an articulation between male and female 
remains co-optable by that space. Difference is not, in her view, an immanently 
differential process which escapes the confines of the binary terms which it relates, 
however asymmetrical that relation might be. 
Becoming-woman, as Deleuze and Guattari use it, is not biologically, 
hormonally, or chromosomally defined. Nor is it a gender theory, gender is a term 
whose field is composed by specific trajectories in the formation of socio-political and 
cultural spaces, which may or may not be attached to biological femaleness, which 
itself is not a transparent or determinate concept. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming- 
woman is not a necessary condition of the possibility of biocultural concepts of 
femaleness or the feminine, but rather an immanent condition of becomings, and a 
positive element in an economics of desire, rather than in its socialization through 
codes and blockages. They refer to it as `le premier quantum, ou segment moleculaire 
(the first quantum, or molecular segment)' 49 of becomings, and the key to a smooth 
itinerant line whose motion can be described neither in terms of convergence or 
rectilinearity, but through the smallest intervals, demon leaps effecting communication 
between the two orders of force, attraction and repulsion, in a patois which belongs to 
neither. 
*** 
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Unlike Derrida, whose work was embraced enthusiastically by feminists, 
Deleuze and Guattari have for the most part been treated with suspicion. Yet Deleuze's 
critique of common sense and good sense, his attack on the image of thought, his 
empiricism and the privileging of materiality and force all suggest connections 
between the direction of his thought and arguments in feminism. A major strand of 
feminisms' criticisms of philosophy is that it has no body; its exclusion, together with 
passions and sensuous interests - all identified by philosophy as "other" to the real 
problem of thought, and as the source of the apparent peculiarity and atheoretical 
nature of `women's' thought processes - has limited and restricted its relevance to the 
approximately fifty per cent of the human population who are male, since it is precisely 
on the basis of this exclusion that the (male) subject has been theorized. So its claims to 
universal and necessary truths are unwarranted. 
Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards 
the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describes herself as 
a Deleuzian, but nonetheless accuses his position on woman on the grounds that it 
comes from a male embodied subject. Criticisms such as these have limited purchase 
on the impulse infecting Deleuze's work, which is to expose the mechanisms by which 
transcendence is produced, as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive 
mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory or as a 
theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or auto- 
critique. 
191 
Chapter 6 
VA Hesitant Discipless 
In Patterns of Dissonance Rosi Braidotti says of Deleuze: 
`He severs the thread which links the puppets to the master and lets 
them circulate freely in space, that is to say no longer activated by a 
central power but through the multiple effects of attraction and 
repulsion of spatial entities, bodies intersecting with each other'. -' '0 
Braidotti understands becoming-woman as a term operating outside bilateral 
oppositions, and as a departure from "the feminine" in its Derridean construction as 
essentially Heideggerian and derivative of a more primary ontological difference. s' 
Locating the starting point of Deleuze's work as the death of the subject52, and noting 
the difference of a philosophy of intensities from one of representation, Braidotti goes 
on to explicate this difference through the body. The puppet body `as the other of a 
divinely-ordained mind' is contrasted with a Deleuzian body defined as a `material 
surface where the codes of language interact... the pure product of cultural and social 
modes of interaction, there is nothing "natural" about them' 53 
Braidotti's formulation of Deleuze is essentially political, and this means her 
analysis of becoming-woman is informed less by its functional operation in the 
transformation of a system of forces, and more by an appeal to "real women"54, where 
this "real" is neither explored or explained This collapses the generation of machinic 
difference and the breaking symmetries of the line implicated in becoming-woman 
onto the side of a politics organized in terms of binary sexual difference, limiting it to 
socio-cultural field, and so contracting the sense of becoming-woman. She is not 
incorrect, but her reading is incomplete, since it tends to operate as a restriction on 
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what she understands by `body'; material bodies - desiring-machines - become written 
and defined in relation to a socio-political space, and it is in terms of this alone that she 
understands becoming-woman. This is a retrograde step in relation to Irigaray. 
Irigaray's force arises from her interrogation and consequent jamming of the 
theoretical bases of the relations into which Western philosophy has slotted women, 
and her simultaneous disengagement of a different woman from the structural orders of 
its systems and so problematizes across different axes, both inside and out. By 
confining her debate to the political, Braidotti is unable to utilize this force. 
Braidotti is critical of Deleuze's `mechanized vision of desire'55 on the 
grounds that it results in a genderless amalgam of sexuality, a `dispersed 
polysexuality'56 which is uninformed by feminism, and she argues that he is caught in 
the paradox of a philosophy of difference which does not take into account the very 
difference that his use of becoming-woman suggests -that is, sexual difference. Her 
claim about dispersed polysexuality is not incorrect, since, as seen above, for Deleuze 
and Guattari sexuality does become a distribution rather than a bilateral disjunction. 
But their project is neither feminist nor prescriptive: `we do not mean to say that a 
creation of this kind is the prerogative of the man', 57 and has broader implications than 
Braidotti's reading suggests. 
However, becoming-woman includes, but is not exhausted by the political 
trajectory of "real women", and machinic process are not limited to sexuality or 
definable in its terms. 
`Noun ne croyons pas en general que la sexualite ait Ic role d'une 
infrastructure dans les agencements de desir, ni qu'elle forme une 
energie capable de transformation, ou bien de neutralisation et 
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sublimation. La sexualite ne peut titre pensee clue comme un flux 
parmi d'autres, entrant en conjonction avec d'autres flux, emettant 
dans particules qui entrent elles-memes sous tel ou tel rapport de 
vitesse et dc lenteur dans le voisinage de telles autres particules. 
(We do not believe in general that sexuality has the role of an 
infrastructure in the assemblages of desire, nor that it constitutes an 
energy capable of transformation or of neutralization and 
sublimation. Sexuality can only be thought of as one flux among 
others, entering into conjunction with other fluxes, emitting particles 
which themselves enter into particular relationships of speed and 
slowness in the vicinity of certain other particles)'. 58 
Sexuality is not equivalent to or a basis of desire, and a body is a geography 
and population of fluxes, a bloc of becoming, defined not in terms of its molar 
components - this one has breasts, this one a penis, this one is black and this one 
scarred, this one beautiful, this one plain - but by its affects and the linkages it effects 
with other bodies, by contiguous intensities which release sexualities as qualities of 
their difference. Deleuze suggests relinquishing the term desiring-machine, which 
comes from Guattari, in order to prevent the confusion of desire and sexuality. 
Amongst the criticisms directed at Deleuze and Guattari is that they 
perpetuate historically entrenched associations of women - with madness, for example. 
History has also devoted much time to reducing women to sexual objects, however, and 
for feminism to perpetuate this attachment and use sexuality as the major defining 
factor of women seems not only to mitigate against their criticism of Deleuze and 
Guattari, but also to privilege one type of flow, rather than addressing the vast 
complexities of `women's' lives and the myriad qualities of the force lines with which 
they connect. 
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Braidotti counteracts her positive response to connections between Deleuze's 
work and feminist interrogations of traditional philosophical tales, both of which are 
engaged in `developing forms of subjectivity and modes of desire at the furthest remove 
from the Phallic model': he is, she writes, `normative by omission' and 
`[Alt no point in his thought does he take into account the specific 
history of women's own attempts to redefine their subjectivity'. $9 
Her position is no doubt strategic, borne out of a reaction against the 
proliferating philosophical use of "woman" as a newly privileged term through which 
to negotiate problems coming out of the "death of the subject. " However, it remains 
within the reach of negative operations connected with a traditional metaphysic of the 
subject, because it continues to search, however disguised that search might be, for 
something essential to women, an exclusive definition which characterizes them as a 
unified group, as "real women". As has been remarked, above, Deleuze and Guattari 
are not claiming either to be feminists, or to be providing a theory of women; as for 
appropriation, the phantom of the victim is buried in this term. Braidotti's criticisms 
might be filled out by examining the economic systems which produce women as 
consumers/subjects; by exploring the different empirical relations which generate their 
various and diverse situations. However, it is, as it stands, unsatisfying as a response to 
becoming-woman. 
Becoming-woman does not, for Braidotti, result in the upheaval of exchange 
between men of women, and nor does she engage with desiring-machines outside the 
realm of metaphor: she quotes Irigaray - `isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men 
can use? '60 Rather than leading to problems of material self-organization, undoing the 
possibility of implementing the schema of subjectivity by dissolving its parameters as it 
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passes through, becoming-woman remains within a representational frame-work, 
where women's bodies are still whole objects, defined sexually, with no critical account 
of this sexuality being provided outside the realm of social, symbolic and cultural 
images; this implies that despite her recognition of the intensivextensive disjunction, 
she continues to conceive of this as exclusive, in order to retain a bilateral distinction 
between man and woman which is as a consequence only extensively legitimate - 
which is to say, illegitimate in Deleuze's terms. Matter remains outside. 
Inside (representation) she is quite correct to say: 
`The `becoming-woman of... 'is a force which appropriates women's 
bodies, an exchange among the master-thinkers of the feminine body: 
it perpetuates an ancestral habit of domination as the trait of the 
masculine discourse on women. It is still a misogynist mode of 
thought. '(B, 1991: 123) 
*** 
Returning to Deleuze's work in a later book, Nomad Subjects, Braidotti's 
hesitance is reduced. Nomadic becoming is seen as expressing Deleuze's `quest for 
postmetaphysical figurations of the subject'61, which is no longer centralized and 
productive, nor even dead, but 'a term in a process of intersecting forces'. The later 
reading is more incisive, in that rather than being concerned with what she sees as the 
starting point - "the death of the subject" -her attention has shifted to the periphery, to 
the point of exit from death, and the question of the exportation and return of the model 
of death, as the immanence of experience, the zero added to each body as an 
assemblage. However, despite being more materialist, characterizing becoming in 
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terms of `sensitive matter, independently of the subjects involved and their determined 
forms'62 her understanding of force as `highly constructed social and symbolic'63 
continues to restrict it to a molar regime. 
For Braidotti, sexual difference 
`cannot be considered as one difference among many but rather as a 
founding, fundamental structural difference on which all others rest 
and that cannot be dissolved easily. '64 
This contrasts directly with Deleuze's remark above, about sexuality being one 
flux amongst others. She is critical of Deleuze for privileging one becoming amongst 
others, that of becoming-women, but seems to want to privilege one difference amongst 
others, that of sexuality. Yet the idea of a fundamental structural difference is 
anathema to materialism: structures are generated, not original, plastic not fixed. 
Appeals to a founding structural difference which grounds all others and which is 
close-to immune from dissolution pushes Braidotti back towards basic bilateral 
disjunctions and a transcendent metaphysic. 
Braidotti closes her chapter on Deleuze's becoming-woman as follows: 
`Speaking as a Deleuzian who believes that desire is the effective 
motor of political change, as opposed to wailful transformation, I 
experience that "I know, but... " mode as a genuine, positive 
contradiction in Deleuze's thinking. '65 
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"I know, but... " expresses her hesitancy in calling herself a Deleuzian because 
- "but" - he's a man. A hesitancy well-placed, since, like sexuality, Deleuze is one flux 
amongst others, and besides, disciplehood is not a condition one associates with his 
writing. Moreover, her understanding of this as a positive contradiction makes it a 
fertile move rather than one which closes down her relation with Deleuze. Whilst he 
(like Kant) privileges following over imitation, to attribute him with mastery of the 
lines he himself follows is in the end to approach his machines with cynicism, the 
capitalist disease. Some strange innocence is needed, 'd'une autre espece, d'une autre 
nature, d'une autre origin (another species, another nature, another origin)' 66 
Her remark above obviates in a sense any need to critique the particulars of 
her argument: it is engaged less with what he writes, than with the difficulties 
feminists discover, when open to engagements with `male' philosophies whose 
direction is not - unusually -antagonistic towards women, either openly or, like the 
work of Derrida, sycophantic - he'd love to write like a woman, he says, even though 
he finds feminism castratingl67 And Braidotti is not as naive in her reading of Deleuze 
as the above criticisms imply: she understands that what is useful for feminism in 
Deleuze's writing is not what is said `about women 68 - which is very little, but in its 
interdisciplinarity, in the abstract nature of the tools it offers. 
In Patterns of Dissonance, Braidotti asks: 
`What is the point of using the term "becoming-woman" in the 
analysis of masculine texts when it is clear that the study bears on the 
vicissitudes and the internal evolution of a system closed -and 
foreclosed - to women, that is, philosophy? '69 
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Several questions could be asked. Since Braidotti speaks as a Deleuzian, but 
claims philosophy is closed to women, where does this mean she locates Deleuze? Or, 
has her understanding of philosophy changed in the three years between the two books, 
between Deleuze as essentially misogynist and herself as hesitantly Deleuzian? Or, has 
she decided that whether or not Deleuze is a philosopher, he is at least a socio-political 
thinker who engages with feminism? Attempting to answer these questions maps one 
into an implied agreement with the basic claim that philosophy is systematically closed 
to women. This reduces philosophy to the canon of its history, to its secondary texts 
and academic institutions. Making it a discipline rather than an exploration. 
### 
Limiting its attention to "female/feminine" centred problems and building 
systems and epistemologies on unexamined concepts of experience, based on 
metaphysically unquestioned assumptions, feminism will be doomed to intellectual 
ghettoization, and close down a potential market for its subversions. If it limits its 
attentions to science to pointing out the intrusion of social theory into scientific claims 
about women, and fails to deploy positively the technological transformations 
immanent to the new models science is producing, whose trajectory suggests the 
collapse of precisely those concepts against which feminism has in the past argued - 
objectivity, identity, idealism and dead matter, - feminism will be a side-line, of interest 
only to women fuelled by the political fluxes of desire. If it is the case that philosophy 
has misconstrued women, positioned them in places they would rather not be, and 
made claims about their intelligence, their bodies, their capabilities, etc., which are 
both disagreed with and are looking increasingly ridiculous, then there is little point 
attached to a continuing argument with reason designed from the position of its victim. 
For if women are not its victim, reason is either empty and impotent, or its function 
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must be understood differently. Feminism becomes normative when it becomes 
incapable of engaging with philosophy beyond the limits of theorizations of gender and 
suggests that such an engagement is anathema to women. Kant says the same: women 
may as well grow beards as learn how to think. 
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Breeding Demons 
`we will call them "demons, " because they are not controlled by a 
master program. ' 
I Changing the Object 
`Warton was held down by wardresses as the doctor inserted a four- 
foot-long tube down her throat. A few seconds after the tube was 
down, she vomited all over her hair, her clothes and the wall, yet the 
task continued until all the liquid had been emptied into her 
stomach. '2 
It is easy to lose sight of the violence to which women have been subjected in 
their struggles to transform their situation, and to which they are still subjected. Jane 
Warton's treatment in prison was a consequence of her protestation against this same 
treatment, which she had seen inflicted on women who, like her, had been imprisoned 
for engaging in suffragist activities. She was in reality Lady Constance Lytton, and had 
disguised her identity in order to illustrate the different treatments meted out to women 
in prison on the basis of their class status; on their visibility as appendages to men. On 
a previous occasion, under her family name, she had been treated more leniently, and 
released after a couple of days. This simple example illustrates that analyses of 
connections amongst women is not comprehended by class determined as a relation to 
modes of production. Warton was on the women's side. 
Yet class relations are only one example of the different orders across which 
women move, at odds with the major directions, passing through them but never at 
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home. This difference is also inscribed in the theoretical operations of philosophy, and 
means that finding where women are distributed within philosophical theories, such as 
Kant's, is problematic: the elements privileged by commentators are for the most part 
those which are explicitly associated with men - spontaneity, superior strength, 
activity, reason, genius, abstract logical thought, firmness and accuracy of judgement, 
moral fortitude, duty, respect, honesty ... the list could be longer, but the idea is clear. 
And it is not only that women are conceptually disconnected from the major concerns 
of philosophy, where those themes with which they have been associated are discussed 
- nature, passion, madness, imagination, beauty, receptivity, lying, sensibility, etc. - the 
relations according to which they are constructed do not emerge from those themes, 
nor indeed distribute them, but are imposed upon them from outside. Understanding is, 
after all, the lawgiver of nature. 
This is why a system such as Kant's appears so different when addressed from 
a perspective whose interest is in the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical 
misogyny, and looks to discover how deeply ingrained they are. Deleuze's philosophy 
is not feminist, but it does not claim to be so: what it does, however, is build a machine 
which does not follow orthodox patterns, which is creatively destructive and rigorously 
and acutely composed, and which, by exploring the structures which support the 
spontaneously acting and judging subject, or man of State, crosses lines with feminist 
thought and provides means of accelerating the collapse of philosophical preciousness 
regarding what is appropriate to it. Deleuze does not provide a model: unlike Braidotti, 
I do not think one can "be a Deleuzian". However, it is an exemplary machine of 
thought, and it is in this that its value for feminism rests, rather than in its explicit 
remarks on becoming-woman. 
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The isolated remarks which Kant makes about women in discussions of 
anthropology and aesthetics are the effects of more deeply ingrained structural and 
systematic misogynies, and it is to these that violence refers for its justifications and 
validations. Fernand Braudel writes: 
`The role of women is always a structural element in any civilisation 
-a test: it is a long-lived reality, resistant to external pressure, and 
hard to change overnight. A civilisation generally refuses to accept a 
cultural innovation that calls in question one of its own structural 
elements. *3 
Transformations in the visible images and operations of women, the collapse 
of the orders of their historical containment, such as the family, together with their 
accelerating infiltration into disciplines and cultures erected on the exclusion of women 
(and blacks, and anyone else who does not fit the model of recognition and image of 
thought) are changing the long-lived reality. In tracking the forces and flows of 
woman independently of the subject, in connection with natural technologies and 
material flows, one seeks to diagnose and generate legitimate descriptions of the future 
tense of women. This is the line of becoming-woman. 
Women cannot simply be identified with objects, although they have been 
objects in part. Irigaray, reading Marx, writes: 
`Merchandises, les femmes sont .. deux chores ä la fois: objets 
d'utilite et porte-valeur. 
(As commodities, women are thus two things at once: utilitarian 
objects and bearers of value). v4 
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In terms of its utility, a woman's body is material, but this is of secondary 
importance to its exchange value, Irigaray argues, which rests in abstraction and in the 
resulting cancellation of material difference. But this abstraction from utility generates 
problems, since it produces a value that lacks location: women do not have the visible 
signs of power, she writes, which are necessary in reflective economies, and thus the 
abstraction can be realised only through exchange, only by measurement in relation to 
a third term, to which neither of them correspond. However, for this to take place, 
horizontal relations amongst women need to be cancelled, or overcoded, the materiality 
of their bodies re-configured, for, in terms of their own affinities, the qualities which 
support abstraction are lacking. 
This move is clear in Kant. Whilst he allows that individual men will have 
preferences for different women - blondes or brunettes, slim or curvaceous, vivacious or 
coy - when it comes to evaluations of beauty, as the quality of women which bears the 
value of abstraction, these differences, since they are based on physical attractions, 
must be discounted All the `other merits of a woman should unite solely to enhance 
the character of the beautiful, which is the proper reference point'. ' However, 
judgements of the beautiful do not locate it as a quality of a body so judged, but refer it 
to a subject, and his feelings of pleasure or displeasure; only thus can a judgement be 
universal, since it is devoid of any specific attraction or agreeability. In such 
circumstances, Kant writes, one 
`must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from 
everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any 
private conditions, on which only he might be dependent, so that he 
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must regard it as based on what he can presuppose in everyone else 
as well. s6 
In the case of judgements of the beautiful on bodies public taste is appended to 
a moral concept, presupposing an idea of what that body is supposed to be, what its 
function or purpose is. And for women, it is reproduction; in terms of this value, 
women's materiality is re-configured, in order to become the repository of an abstract 
exchange value, that attached to the capacity to produce a child. As the practical value 
of women, reproduction is visible, has form and beauty; the image is the Madonna. 
However, as a material and bodily function, it is fearsome and gives rise to disgust: to 
prevent this, which would suggest the tangling of sensible elements in the form of the 
object (the body) and so degrade the judgement both aesthetically and morally, women 
need to develop a sense of shame, which `serves to draw a curtain of mystery before 
even the most appropriate and necessary purposes of nature'. ' Women must thus 
contribute to their production as exchangeable objects, whose abstract value is rests in 
their reproductive capacity. They must, as was remarked in the Introduction, be self- 
pruning. The intensive materiality of their bodies is thus made relative to extension, to 
a public and universally agreed upon quality of form which excites the contemplation 
of a community of subjects whilst simultaneously confirming the function of 
reproduction, which is no longer a messy material process, but a moral duty. Only then 
can this object become related on a plane of equality to other objects of the same type, 
through the medium of a third party, the judging subject. 
Donna Haraway problematizes theorisations of women as objects, by 
complicating the idea objects are inert and passive in the face of judgement. Her 
challenge is directed at Irigaray's critique of specular economies and the privilege of 
touch. As a scientist and primatologist, observation is essential to her work; but her 
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theorisation of vision removes it from the mirrored economy of reflection, so that it 
does not operate as a principle of identification or recognition. Observation ceases to 
be, necessarily, a power move coded in advance through structures specific to a subject, 
but becomes a manoeuvrable and manoeuvring direction, which neither takes charge 
of, nor submits to, an object; it becomes a movement between, echoing Deleuze's AND 
logics, a relation which effectuates both sides as both observer and observed, in a 
manner which carries the logic of Irigaray's two lips, as a positive feedback process. 
The object is no longer the result of formal impositions pressed onto intensive matter, 
but a formation generated through material interactivity which does not arrive at the 
logic of subjectivity, since the conditions of its production are technically incompatible 
with the closed systems protective of a unified (or even fractured) identity. 
`The body, the object of biological discourse, itself becomes a most 
engaging being. Claims of biological determinism can never be the 
same again. When female "seal' has been so thoroughly re-theorised 
and revisualised that it emerges as practically indistinguishable from 
"mind", something basic has happened to the category of biology. '$ 
Haraway's claim is strong. Theories of female `sex' no longer run directly (or 
even indirectly) through the womb; desire connects instead with the intellect, and this 
circuit has effects which bleed beyond the limits of feminism, to the very category of 
biology itself. Feminist discourse feeds back into science, not as an addendum, but as a 
challenge to its basic categories and methodologies. Haraway's demon, the cyborg, 
draws technologically enhanced sensibilities together with female desire, in the 
production of a body whose boundaries are no longer definable through a linear and 
maternal nature, and for whom reproduction is no longer a privileged term. Intensities 
are no longer confined within extensive form, nor re-structured according to moral 
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purposes, and, most importantly, the cyborg dissolves the veil of shame which lingered 
in feminism in its depiction of women as victims. 
Remembering the violence remarked at the opening of this chapter does not 
necessitate an identification with the position of its victims (and certainly not with its 
perpetrators: who wants equality with this? ). This is based on sentiment and turns 
women, once more, into objects of pity, as well as perpetuating an image of nature as 
violence and conflict. The cyborg is not based on identifications between women and 
`nature in the Western sense', Haraway writes, but moves towards an anorganic nature, 
a techno-nature which debunks the privileges of the organism and the human, and the 
mechanistic technologies specific to this latter. Since Haraway's work on primatology 
connects with the cyborg too; the latter does not describe a relation of humanity with 
technology, but a much broader concept, which upsets the easy separation of 
teleological and mechanical orders and human and "other" primates. It is in this 
respect that it connects with Deleuze and Guattari's machinic phylum. 9 
Haraway attacks both the production of women (by women as well as men) as 
victims, and the prescriptive voices which call for a unity amongst women, in the 
interests of some political aim, on the grounds that it attributes a shared identity 
amongst them, which effects the same cancellation of differences which women have 
argued against. `There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women. '1° 
This has already been questioned in the last chapter, with respect to references to "real 
women"; Haraway's cyborg dissolves the possibility of such categories having any 
purchase on bodies, by dispersing sexuality, by dislocating it from discussions of lack, 
and relating it to the positive operations of the intellect. 
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II Making Femininity 
The association of women, or the feminine, or femaleness with passivity and 
man/masculinity/maleness with activity has never been a simple one. The disjunction is 
unstable; as a reproductive animal, woman is conceived of as passive and receptive in 
relation to the activity and spontaneity of the man. Yet sexually she exerts an attractive 
force, although even this is not coherent, being intermixed with repulsion (the man 
feels repulsion, not the woman). The feminine has no necessary theoretical relation 
with women at all, but is rather attached to notions of genius. Christine Battersby, in 
an extended exploration of the relations of genius and gender, exposes the twists and 
turns in the value of the feminine, which are not limited to philosophy. `The medical 
texts imply (without ever making the implication explicit) that the human being who 
possesses genius will have the sexual organs of a male, but will also have feminine 
characteristics'. " Genius feminizes, but females have neither the mental or physical 
stamina for genius; feminine is not the root of feminism, nor attached to the female. 
The parenthetical remark about implication is also important, for it is these 
undercurrents which carry themes whose force is made redundant by the explicit 
structures erected on their ground. Part of the task of feminism in relation to 
philosophy is dissolving the certainty of these erections. Kant gives graphic expression 
to the contraries and contradictions and implications of philosophy's women in a quote 
from Horace appended, inexplicably and unexplained, to a footnote in the 
Anthropology `A beautiful woman above ends foully in a black fish'. 12 
Reconciliation of the wide distribution of functions designated 
female/feminine/womanly with passivity has generated acrobatic thought processes and 
incredible claims. Freud has become a classic example. In his lecture Femininity, he is 
cautious, advising against the decision to make `"active" coincide with "masculine" 
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and "passive" with "feminine" c13, citing the relation between mother and child as one 
in which females are active, and the restriction of activity in male spiders to `the single 
act of sexual unions14 as problematic cases. Yet whilst Freud is prepared to 
accommodate `the influence of social customs, which-force women into passive 
situations"5 he undercuts himself by attributing a preference for passivity to women, 
`on the basis of her share in the sexual function'16 (without questioning to what extent 
this is also socially inscribed), and by making woman's activity relative to `passive 
aims'. His opening summation of the puzzle of femininity reaches its height in his 
description of what is truly feminine as masochistic in nature. Social pressures serving 
only to develop these destructive trends, so making truly feminine passivity that of the 
victim. 
Yet Freud's advice against easy acceptance of the established mapping 
between the woman/man and passivelactive oppositions comes to nothing: however 
complicated the distribution of activity and passivity become in the female - for 
example, the relation of little girls to their mothers is `completely ambivalent, both 
affectionate and of a hostile and aggressive nature'" - nonetheless the `turn towards 
femininity' is signalled by a `wave of passivitys18. The girl turns to her father and, 
`with the help of passive instinctual impulses... which clear phallic activity out of the 
way', may perhaps `turn out to be normal'. 19 Phew. 
In both volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, Deleuze and Guattari talk of 
the theft of little girls bodies, and its necessity as preparatory to the theft of little boys 
bodies. `[C]esse dc to tenir comme ca, tu n'es plus une petite fille, tu n'es pas un 
garcon manque, etc. (stop behaving like that, you're not a little girl anymore, you're 
not a tomboy, etc. )i20. The creation of female femininity appears directly counter to that 
of male femininity. The former is a process of restriction, limitation, repression and 
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prohibition, which serve to introduce the female body to its proper desires, the location 
of its proper sexual being, its truly feminine passivity. The latter, however, attaches to 
expressions of release, to the outpourings of genius and is close to madness. 
But the point of this is not to engage in a debate with Freud concerning the 
development of female sexuality. His words ring bizarre in much the same way as, for 
example, Aristotle's, when he proposes his flower-pot theory of reproduction, which 
also places women as both powerful and active, the potent materiality from which the 
logos grows, and as weak and passive, since women themselves lack the power of the 
logos growing inside her. What these discussions illustrate are the confusions and 
contortions which grow from attempts to reconcile the passive/active opposition with 
sexual or gender distinctions, and the mobility of characteristics attaching to each arm 
of the disjunction, as historical contingencies shift privileges and values. The easy leap 
from passivity to masochism; the assumption that, in children's play, passivity is 
reacted against with activity, which annuls it, the degree to which this is successful 
serving as a basis for `conclusions as to the relative strength of the masculinity and 
femininity that it will exhibit in its sexuality'21; the characterisation of the libido as 
constrained `when it is pressed into the service of the feminine function'22; the 
physiological equivalence of this constraint evidenced by the `small penis', or clitoris23. 
Freud offers these and many more examples of the problems generated by the 
development of girls and women into proper passive feminine persons. 
Kant is no less happy with the equation of woman with passivity. `Her 
philosophy [Weltweisheit] is not to reason, but to sense [Empfinden] . 
24 The critical 
implications of this are not that women lack understanding, but rather that they lack 
the methodological capacity with which to systematise knowledge. 25 The architectonic 
ordering of transcendental relations is absent in the female, so whilst `the fair sex has 
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just as much understanding as the male... it is a beautiful understanding', rather than a 
rational one, and thus not only can she not contain chaos in a unit, as reason was seen 
to do in the discussion of the sublime, but her knowledge remains at the aggregate and 
random level, lacking pattern and systematicity. 26 She can neither build a house with 
an overlook, nor does she have the reason to make the marks of permanence on her 
imagination and confirm the immortality of a soul. There is no rational compulsion 
attendant upon women's understanding which condemns them to formulate objects in 
general or morality, no diktak commanding the conversion of their intellects into Law. 
However, the problem is irresolvable by further interrogation of the intricacies and 
confusions of Kant's comments directly bearing on either the beautiful or woman. 
What is at stake is a break in the understanding of production, which is the focus of 
Deleuzian critique. To return to the flower-pot, there is no account of the production of 
the all-powerful soil from which logos emerges as a secondary mode of production. In 
Deleuze's terms, there is no account of the production of the unconscious - of how, for 
example, Kantian reason came to contain a unit of chaos, and it is this uncritical 
assumption of a power possessed by a subject, still functioning illegitimately in Kant, 
that passive synthesis forces into operation, with rigour and unKantian consequences. 
III Market Making 
6I1 est devenu le temps de la ville et rien d'autre, le pur ordre du 
temps. 
(It has become the time of the town and nothing else, the pure order 
of time)'? ' 
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Deleuze says this of Kantian time. It is not meteorological, rural, governed by 
the seasons, the climate, growing patterns, the reproductive cycles of the animals; nor 
is it cosmic, celestial, referring to the movements of the stars, the turning of the world. 
It is the time of the town. But what does Deleuze mean by this, and how is it related to 
the problem of becoming-woman? 
The problem of the town is one of circulation, of entries and exits, flows and 
polarisation's, frequencies, horizontal integrations and co-ordinations. The town is a 
`point remarquable sur des circuits qui la creent ou qu'elle crde (remarkable point on 
the circuits that create it, and which it creates)', which makes no sense in isolation, but 
exists only as a point in a cycle of flows, a node in a network of transfers and 
transmissions, interactions and associations with other towns. ' 
In Mille Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari draw on the work of Fernand Braudel, 
who writes of towns as `electric transformers', accelerating tensions and rhythms of 
social and economic interaction. 29 Braudel charts a history of the town (and writes that 
history was introduced with the town, with the appearance of the written word); he 
talks of its creating and conquering the countryside and of their mutual reciprocity; of 
thresholds of urbanisation at which self-generated transformations occur, beyond 
which a town achieves a minimum of efficiency; of the divisions of labour implied by 
the town; of rings of stone marking the effort for independence and desire for 
expansion in the middle ages, offering both protection against enemies and 
contributing to the control of the population inside the walls; of the complicated 
networks of Western towns and the regimented order of Roman towns; of the 
emergence of town-planning in the Renaissance; of vertical as well as horizontal 
growth; of taxation, credit, customs and excise. And of much more. But for 
understanding why Deleuze calls Kantian time the time of the town there is one 
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remark which stands out: `every town, wherever it may be, must primarily be a market. 
Without a market, a town is inconceivable' 30 
Braudel differentiates between markets and capital. The former can be 
associated with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the production of production, the 
three syntheses of connection, distribution and consumption as a single cycle; market 
exchange `is both an enclosing circle and a turning hinge', the co-ordinated, but not 
sub-ordinated, effect of a myriad connections, at fairs, shops, at cross-roads, on the 
corner, where prices are mobile but the emergent effect is one of a meta-stable and self- 
regulating system. " From the chaos of the market emerges `the first computer 
mankind ever had'32; but rather than the program being fixed (e. g., as in a price list or 
through subsidies), and functioning as a control mechanism on the relation of input to 
output, or governed by extrinsic conditions it is itself subject to transformations as a 
result of the concrete flows which pass through it. The cycle itself adds difference to 
the potential of its own functioning: more simply, it learns and learning potentiates 
material changes in the routes and connections, distributions and conjunctions of the 
cycle. The space of the market is not striated and segmented by extrinsic operations; it 
has no image, no central memory or general rule, and is an actual continuum, 
presupposing nothing other that its immanent operations, a circulation of states, a- 
central, non-hierarchical, surface 33 
This contributes to understanding why Deleuze and Guattari call synthesis 
passive. The cycles of a market are not effected through the operation of an external 
agent, an identity to which synthesis is related, but through indirect interactions, 
productive connections which are not trades or exchanges (Braudel differentiates trade 
from the self-regulating mechanisms of markets) but break-flows. 
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`[r]oute machine est coupure de flux par rapport A celle ä laquelle 
eile est connectee, mais flux ehe-meme ou production dc flux par 
rapport A celle qui lui est connectee. Teile est la loi de production de 
production. 
([E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the 
machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow 
itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine 
connected to it. This is the law of the production of production). 934 
The continuity of the actual continuum, of a materially intensive full space, is 
conditioned by the breaks or interruptions of the machines. The break constitutes a 
partial object, partial not in the sense of incompleteness, which would return the 
process to an economy of lack specific to capital, and direct desire towards a whole 
object, a complete thing, once more framing the problem in extension (for how could 
an intensity be incomplete? ). But partial (partiaux) in the sense of biased, evaluative, 
`comme les intensites sous lesquelles une matiere remplit toujours 1'espace A des degres 
divers (like the intensities under which a unit of matter always fills space in varying 
degrees')35 Objects become pieces of a journey, directions, tendencies, selective 
principles, elements in a sequence or chain, molecular, rather than molar. In a trade 
and exchange system, each object is complete - in the sense that an object of 
representation is complete - its value determined in advance of the process of 
exchange, through the system of pricing. Exchange serves not only to confirm this 
value which pre-occupies the object but also removes it from circulation, since it's 
value then rests in its utility - that is, it belongs to the consumptive subject, that subject 
to whom the kingdom belongs. In the market, however, each interaction is only partial, 
objects are partial and rather than dropping out of circulation to be consumed, each 
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movement connects them with a different circuit, and different principle of selection, a 
different sequence or chain. 36 
Since the continuum is intensive, and so too are partial objects, the distinction 
between flow and objects -which might be understood as that between money and 
commodity -becomes dissolved. The difference becomes one of relative compressions, 
or contractions of intensities; a break does not mean a separation, a removal of a 
sequence which leaves a hole behind, but is itself a flow, a line of escape, a different 
bias or directionality, which connects with another flow, effects a break or interruption 
else' here. 
Capital, on the other hand, through States as `modeles dc rdalisation 
immanents (immanent models of realization)', 37 imposes external controls, ostensibly 
with the purpose of protecting the consumer - of making things "fair" or "equal". The 
State corporatizes, industrializes, massifies, introduces regulative mechanisms, 
taxation, credit control, tariffs, damaging the autonomous balance of markets, and, 
more importantly, divorcing economic from social life through the medium of politics: 
capital, Braudel says, is a political word. In effect, Braudel argues, capital functions as 
an anti-market, as an inhibitor, or as Deleuze and Guattari express it, as 
antiproduction. Unlike the State as an extrinsic transcendent unity - God, the Despot - 
however, in a capitalist regime, the State as the agent of anti-production becomes 
immanent to all flows, `une gigantesque entreprise d'anti-production, mais au sein de 
la production meme, et la conditionnant (a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at 
the heart of production itself, and conditioning this production) '. 38 The cycle is thus 
attached to an extrinsic determined image, from which its power and its movement 
appear to emanate, and in terms of which all its relations are understood. 
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In Passive Synthesis, the difference beween conjunction as a blockage, or 
point of accumulation that subjugates all flows to a single flow, and conjunction as 
AND logic was mentioned - the difference between a macro-history of great men, with 
the subject as agent of synthesis, and a micro-history of populations and flows. The 
former, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the conjunction specific to capital, to the 
formation of an abstract attraction-machine, from which all flows seem to emanate. 
Like the Kantian transcendental, like the subject, capital appears as an unengendered 
presupposition of production, as the father of surplus value, folding back over markets 
and regulating the concretization of its abstract axiomatic. 
The complexities of the relations between capital and the State, capital and 
the market, the difference between the social economics of a market and the political 
economics of capital, which re-describes social relations according to its own needs, 
are too intricate to explore here: another thesis would be needed. What is important for 
understanding the above comment of Deleuze's about Kantian town time is the double 
aspect it implies. The town faces both ways; in one direction, it faces the State, and 
capitalist axiomatics and in the other it faces the market. Deleuze and Guattari call 
money and the market 'la vrai police du capitalisme (capitalism's true police)'; 39 
however, Irigaray's question concerning what would happen if commodities learned to 
speak can be shifted sideways, and re-asked in relation to money and markets. What 
happens if money learns to speak, not with the voice of capital, as an expression of 
purchasing power, of hedonistic potential, of luxury and excess and of the expansion of 
power, but of its own behaviour, as a flow which resists accumulation, which always 
escapes, which effects movements, rather than buying things, potentiates mobilities 
and interactions which cross through capital zones, but never remain inside. 
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Community or commercium. From one perspective the town and the flows of 
trade appear organized by the capital and the State, and the town and its markets 
appear to depend for the flows that circulate through it on the resources these supply. 
In the other direction, the town is fundamentally a market in contact with other 
markets, from which emerges a world-economy different to the capital economy 
between States; indeed, Deleuze and Guattari write that not only did the towns not 
create capitalism, but that they anticipated it and warded it off. They point to the 
mechanisms of anticipation and inhibition referred to in Forces and Deductions, in 
relation to the warding off of the State by primitive and nomadic States; these 
mechanisms `jouent dans les villes "contre" l'Etat et "contre" le capitalisme (are at 
play in the conflict of towns "against" the State and "against" capitalism'). Whilst 
capitalism won, however, the horizontal networks of the towns were not demolished as 
a result of this; for capitalism requires the markets, requires the release of flows it 
effects and the cycles it turns, just as reason needs time, in order not to be god, and 
men need women, in order not to die. But something always escapes. 
Like the town time faces both ways: in one direction it is the chronological 
line of succession, defined by the unit, the corporeal present measuring actions and 
causes, to which past and future are relative, indicating only the relation between two 
presents. Here is formal time, the concept of time, physical and cyclical, concrete: time 
as money. In another direction, however, it is the pure empty form of time, the 
labyrinthine line which divides into itself, incorporeal, imperceptible, autonomous, 
divested of matter, and the time with which Deleuze credits Kant, in the first of the 
four poetic formulae; time unhinged from the cardinality of capitalism, which adds its 
coins one by one by one by one and keeps them in the bank, measuring its wealth 
relative to its history and the dreamed prospects of its future. The market is the turning 
hinge of the cycle; unhinged from the State and from capital, the market becomes. 
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IV Becoming-imperceptible 
`Bref, une ligne de fuite, dejä complexe, avec ses singularites; mais 
aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumiere avec ses segments; et entre les 
deux (? ), une ligne moleculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher 
d'un cote ou de I 'autre. 
(In short, a line of fight, already complex, with singularities; but 
also a molar or customary line with segments; and between the two 
(? ), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or 
the other)' (DG, 1980: 249; 1988: 203 - translation amended). 
Deleuze and Guattari position becoming-woman as the first quantum, the first 
demon flash which tips the balance of becoming away from the strata, from customary 
orders and patterns and towards the molecular line. It is in this respect that becoming- 
woman relates to the town, and to time, as an itinerant movement which is in-between 
the State and the market, simultaneously facing onto and away from the strata. 
Precisely, it seems, as philosophy has always positioned women, as neither inside or 
outside, not properly one thing or another. 
It is the potential for positioning women in relation to the town, rather than to 
nature, and for becoming-woman as a movement towards the market which effects the 
release of monetary flows from the accumulative tendencies of capital; it is this relation 
of women to the economy, as a bias of escape, rather than as an object exchanged 
between subjects in state capitalism, which includes socialism as well - that is missed 
by a purely politico-sexual analysis. For in the movement the balance tips from the 
molar to molecular, and women cease to be commodities, or even, as Irigaray says, 
commodities which speak, and instead begin to function as partial objects, biases, 
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evaluations. Whilst their interactions are not regulated from any external position, the 
combined effect - to those who remain outside, in the rare air of the State, capital, the 
subject - the movement appears purposeful, directed, the biases appear correlated, 
caused. If it is this latter, it is in the sense spoken of before, of reverse causality without 
finality, testifying to an action of the future on the present. Becoming-woman is this 
movement, a future not yet synthesized, but whose effects are becoming concrete today. 
Both Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, in their readings of becoming- 
woman refer to a Cartesian model of the subject, which has no relation with either time 
nor town. Not only does this make life much easier, for the Cartesian subject is 
something of a straw-dog against which to pitch an argument, but it also misses the 
philosophical forces on which Deleuze draws. The labyrinthine lines of the pure form 
of time feed throughout his work, and philosophy becomes a market-place without 
rules, with no historical pre-conditions determining the directions one can take, the 
associations and alliances one can make. Kant argues against Leibniz? Deleuze makes 
them bargain for space. Against Spinoza? He draws a Spinozist substance together 
with the critical demand for immanence. There is no truth, only ideas, no profit, only 
surplus flows to return to the horizontal integrations and latitudes of the market. 
Deleuze and Guattari call this `communication d'ä-cote (side- 
communication)'; 40 side-communication is surplus but not profit, composed of 
transferable fragments, `supplements dann l'ordre d'une multiplicite, plus values dans 
l'ordre d'un rhizome (supplements in the order of a multiplicity, surplus values in the 
order of a rhizome) 41 which transfer information from one order to another, from one 
species to another, in an aparallel evolution - like the wasp and the orchid mentioned 
in an earlier chapter. It is perhaps because there is no grandeur or magnificence in 
these tiny connections that they have been overlooked, and so little thought has gone 
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into the patterns they follow and the systems they effect. Where nature is conceived of 
as red in tooth and claw, or a subject of rape rather than of passive exploration, its real 
patterns remain imperceptible. It is these movements which this thesis has showed are 
necessary to the construction of the extensive theatre of representation; singular 
asymmetrical connections, horizontal side-communications, intensities escaping points, 
money escaping the banks, sexuality escaping biology, desire escaping sexuality, 
everywhere a shifting drifting flow of mobile distributions on the body of the earth. 
Side-communication relates also to Deleuze's method of theft; because the 
market is not driven by ideology - as are state capitalism/socialism - the history of 
philosophy itself becomes a market, the tendencies and directions of which are not 
fixed, but which can be broken into, pieces and fragments stolen, taken elsewhere, 
connected with other machines. What counts is only if something works, which is to 
say, only if something releases flows, rather than containers, accounts in which to keep 
them. Because women have been characterised as both inside and outside, their 
movement - as Irigaray saw - is double; inside, on the strata, which corresponds to 
Irigaray's occupation of the philosophical body, to her careful and elegant tracings of 
its magic geographies and logics - inside, women move in perceptible, and sometimes 
apparently recognisable ways. 42 But through their relations with the outside, they are 
also and simultaneously imperceptible, their movements disappearing, becoming 
secret, only to re-appear elsewhere, different, re-configured, transformed. This is what 
deterritorialization means: the connection of leaps, tiny intervals, demons breeding 
demons, in a smooth continuous line of escape which re-territorializes somewhere else, 
differently - as Irigaray says, when she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. 
`Mais que signifie devenir-imperceptible, ä la fin de toes les devenirs 
moleculaires qui commencaient par le devenir-femme? 
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(But what does becoming-imperceptible signify, coming at the end of 
all the molecular becomings that begin with becoming-woman)? '43 
Elizabeth Grosz's response to becoming-imperceptible, or an-organic, is to 
situate it within a molar political context and refer it to the potential `obliteration or 
marginalization of women's struggles. '44 She argues that, by the `uncritical 
internalization of perspectives and interests devised and developed by men', women 
fail to notice the pit-falls of a movement which suggests, once more, that women 
function as a means towards the ends of men. 45 Not only does becoming-woman not 
have any intrinsic or essential relation to women (that is, it is not an empirical concept, 
in the sense that it has the apparent stability of the concrete present - it does not "look 
like" a woman), but moreover, Deleuze and Guattari are explicit in saying that women 
must become-woman in order for men to be able to become-woman, and that sexuality 
goes by way of this latter becoming - `par le devenir-femme de 1 'homme (by way of the 
becoming-woman of the man)'. 46 Grosz equates becoming-imperceptible with the 
invisibility of women in a molar domain, and with the annexation of their desire to 
systems whose interests are elsewhere - in other words, with a failure of recognition. 
However, that is to mistake the nature of becoming: it is not women who 
become imperceptible, or anorganic. Imperceptibility refers to the nature of movement, 
rather than to something that moves. To Irigaray's secret movements, to intensive 
distributions, connections amongst women and men, women and women, men and 
men, and all with machines, which have shattered the categories, broken the codes, 
dissolved the restrictions and emptied the bodies of meaning, effecting a release of 
sexuality from binary distinctions, effecting n-sexes, a million tiny sexes, and have 
released women from sexuality, by making it a quality of desire, rather than the 
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defining characteristic of their bodies. Because the problem is one of relations which 
escape their terms, and relation which effect biases, partial objects, not of how fully 
constituted whole objects are related. Becoming-imperceptible is sliding a body into 
machines, camouflaging movements and appearing, as if from nowhere, in the 
middle. 
Deleuze notes that biologists have often questioned why life is effected 
through carbon, rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that `la vie des 
machines modernes passe par le silicium (the life of modern machines runs through 
silicon)'. 47 This is where becoming-women moves, where money released from capital 
moves, where life becomes non-organic, nature becomes a thinking machine, infinities 
of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated and fluid movement, eroding the statues 
of power, the historical . Becoming-woman moves towards becoming-imperceptible, 
but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is rather than life itself 
becomes mobile, because it is not longer in the womb nor arranged in the organisms 
which emerge from them, but instead becomes a movement, a cycle that turns on its 
hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged class, but the surrogate reproductive 
machinery of a machinic phylum which is passing across into a different base, in a 
movement which effects the conjunction of teleology and mechanism, and 
transforming the nature of intelligence. 
V Breeding Demons 
'... when demons are allowed to barter, bid and compete among 
themselves for resources, they begin to form "computational 
societies" which resemble natural ecologies (like an insect colony) or 
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Philosophy and two thousand years of society built on the principles with 
which it has covered thought like a caul, has designed women as weak, passive, 
sensitive, mad, imaginary, material, natural, disgusting, prudish, whorish, virginal, 
Amazonian, foolish, untrustworthy, ammoral, childish and incapable of learning (Kant 
says that educating women is `a malicious strategem of men'49, and done only in the 
interests of male vanity). But, despite all this, men have still wanted to possess these 
peculiar, confusing and contrary animals they have been both fearful of and attracted 
towards. At times, philosophers have displayed apparent generosity towards women - 
one might use Plato's suggestion in the Republic that women too might be guardians 
in the ideal State, despite their natural weakness in relation to men. However, the move 
is duplicitous on two counts. Firstly, it is designed to introduce women as contributing 
members of a State whose orders and laws are established in the absence of women; the 
participants in the dialogue are men, and the functions and potentials of women are 
articulated from the perspective of men. The case is similar to that of passivity, as it 
functions in Kant in relation to activity: its characteristics are determined through the 
lens of an active, spontaneous and legislative subject - which, as the Introduction has 
shown, women are not. Secondly, the move is incorporative: that is, it does not 
envisage any transformation in the State effected by women through their introduction 
within it. 
Looking elsewhere, one finds the same problem. Spinoza, for example, 
argues that `women have not by nature equal rights with men'. -50 His argument 
functions similarly to those more recently proposed, which exhort women to avoid 
dark places and "provocative" clothing on the grounds that they open themselves up to 
attack from men; women's spaces are limited and defined not through their own 
desires, but by those of men. Moira Gatens says of Spinoza's remarks on women that 
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`women's political exclusion not on the basis of the qualities or predispositions of 
women, but rather on the basis of men's predispositions', calling them a `"scar" on the 
body of his work. '51 There are historical nuances and variations in the qualities 
attaching to women; as a philosophical entity, woman is designed to be fluid, and to 
operate in the problematic interstices which escape the ordered and segmented world of 
the subject. However, it is less the qualities themselves than their relative value in 
regard to the subject which is important: as has been remarked earlier, femininity 
attached to a man has associations of genius, whilst in relation to women, it attaches to 
passivity, defined through the lens of the active subject. So tracing transformations in 
the historical trajectory of philosophy's women exposes not only the fluidity of 
movement and qualities through which she is designed, but also the shifting values in 
those qualities, effected by historical changes in the subject. Nonetheless, their 
situation remains defined by and through the privilege of the subject: philosophy's 
woman is never so dangerous nor so mobile as to be able to either destroy or escape the 
defining perspective of the (male) subject. Kant says that even in a state of nature, 
women are domestic animals - already tamed, and useful if only to carry the bags. The 
wilder aspects of designed women are- like the sublime - always situated in a context, 
in the socio-cultural context of women, that of domesticity and reproduction. 
A demon is a figure in the process of generating independence from design 
principles - in other words for an element in a learning system, a bias towards 
concretizing real solutions, like a market, which operates not through the accumulation 
of information, as goods, but through interactions with other demons, in a 
heterarchical space (a Pandemonium), which is continuously mobile, and perceptible, 
although the principles of its mobility are imperceptible, escaping recognition. The 
survival of a demon is a function of its interaction with other demons in its locality, 
where locality is not a geographical position given in advance, but the consequence of 
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connections generated amongst demons in the process of developing problem-solving 
strategies. The problem-solving strategies depend in part on what Manuel DeLanda, 
from whom this information on demons comes, calls "trust. " 
Words such as this are dangerous, implying moral sensibilities dictating 
material interactions. Evelyn Fox-Keller has already been quoted in regard to this 
problem, of imposing human romances on nature. Fox-Keller located the critical 
question behind the apparent altruism of natural systems (their willingness to `die' for 
the system) as a problem of quantifying the maximum degree of cost to themselves 
individuals will tolerate before any socially compliant character is disinvested - social 
in a bacterial, rather than human, sense. However, this is not sufficient, since it 
suggests there is an option for disinvestment through which the individual is retained, 
but in an isolated state. In systems where function and formation are inseparable, and 
where interaction generates a partial object, as an intensification of a movement or 
direction, disinvestment is equal to death, or more accurately, the complete eradication 
of the parameters in terms of which the inital problem was understood. So absence of 
tolerance to a system on the part of any element generated by it results in the extinction 
of that element, which in turn transforms the nature of the system. 
The movement is that of the actual continuum, the basis of Kant's dynamics, 
the material force of synthesis, the resource on which the subject draws, the detour he 
takes into the outside. What is missed when the position of women in philosophy is 
read solely in terms of their exclusion is precisely this movement, right at its heart. For 
philosophy has not simply been an abstract theoretical discipline, but has been 
instrumental in the organization of social, political, cultural, sexual, economic, legal, 
educational etc., etc, orders. In order to function as a real description of space - as Kant 
demands of transcendental philosophy - it has to have some account of real relations; 
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in order for him to declare with confidence that from the court of reason `nothing can 
escape us', it must understand where the possibilities of escape lie. 52 However, this is 
an impossible demand; something must always escape, unless the system is dead in 
advance, because life is an escape art, an art of destruction and creation, which is 
theorized under the name critique. 
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No Tribunal 
`You think my gait "spasmodic. " I am in danger, Sir. 
You think me "uncontrolled. " I have no Tribunal.... " 
Bacteria borrow genes from plants, animals & fungi: bacterial fungi find their way 
into animals and plants; animals and plants pass genes to each other. A body does not 
recognize itself from something not itself. There is only side-communication. Kant's 
arborescent schema, the law of continuum specierum, which `recognise[s] a relationship of 
the different branches, as all springing from the same stem' is unnatural? Transposons, as 
these jumping genes are called, come in different types: there is the P element, which invades 
fruit flies, the mariner, spread amongst species as diverse as earwigs and beetles. 
Molecularity. 
Meanwhile: 
'Over the past twenty-five years, a stack of laws has transformed Britain 
from a country that welcomed people to one that it is virtually impossible to 
get into. i3 
Molarity 
The difference in regime illustrated by these two examples is stark. On the one hand, 
an order built on the myth of nationhood, or heritage, on memory and history, on xenophobia 
and fear, a molar regime of regulation, dreams of sovereignty and independent agency. On 
the other, fluid communication, migrations without regard for the clumsy geographies of the 
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political world, a market of tendencies and directions rather than objects and exchanges. A 
capitalist economy feeds through the State, which imposes its dogmas and fears, its racism 
and hatreds on the movements of people and money; a market is open; its principles 
immanent to its operation. Money doesn't recognize boundaries any more than bacteria do; it 
is this difference which Deleuze and Guattari are pointing up in their distinction between 
rhizomatic and arborescent regimes, between molecular flows and molar structures. 
The indifference of nomadic distributions to concepts and ideals is not wise and 
paternalistic, equal and fair, racist or misogynistic, but naive and cruel, with a strange 
innocence. This is not to say that royal science does not have vicious observational habits 
amongst the tools of its wisdom: 
`pure cultures... in Petri-dish concentration camps, are just bacteria whose 
social and community behaviour has been reduced to the level that we 
investigators can manage. '4 
There are gaps through which things escape, solving problems without recognition, 
unless they are trapped on the Strata, deadened by a society with a hypertrophied conscience 
and little imagination. Breeding Demons has shown a relationship between Kant and Deleuze 
which is folded in gaps in Kant over which the tracks of third things - schema, 
transcendental objects, noumena - run, without thought that the intensive depth beneath them 
involves differently to the straight lines and segmented space of the subject. The degree to 
which it might be called a feminist thesis is the degree to which it indicates a potential for 
escaping the history of philosophy as an institutionalized and exclusively male domain, and 
making it work across different dimensions, according to different privileges. Woman the 
Object is an effect of the subject; but becoming-woman as the process of moving in-between, 
with AND logics and eliminative deductions suggests a different way out of the problem than 
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seeking to constitute one more theory of subjectivity. Schopenhauer (a misogynist but not to 
the core, for like Fox-Keller he does not suppose nature shares our romances), and the first 
Kantian, speaks of a direction towards the imperceptible. Representation, he says, offers no 
route, for it places the thing-in-itself, or will, outside itself, and constructs its reality through 
ideal forms, the secondary functions of the brain which large and feeble organisms such as 
man require in order to negotiate the complexities of their world. He suggests, however, 
another way: 
`It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by 
treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by 
attack from without. '5 
This is very similar to a remark Irigaray makes about science, about the need to 
appear within it, in the middle; rather than adopting once more the external perspective and 
critiquing the surface structures she suggests finding the subterranean passages. Kant knew 
also of these tunnellings, or Mauhvurfsgange as he calls them. His critical response, however, 
was to block them off, since they threatened the ground and the `security of the 
superstructures' .6 However, as his trip on the lagoon shows, and his theorization of repulsive 
forces, he too can be in the middle, without recognition. 
`Il arrivait ä des penseurs, dit-on, d'expliquer clue le mouvement etait 
impossible, et cela n'empechait pas le mouvement de se faire. 
(It is said that there were thinkers who explained that movement was 
impossible, but that this did not prevent movement from occurring)'. ' 
It is said that there were thinkers who explained that women thinking was 
impossible: but this did not prevent the thinking from occurring. 
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philosophy, through Difference et Repetition and L'anti-oedime and on into Mille Plateaux. the difference 
between cardinality and ordinality is a continuing theme. In Mille Plateaux there is a discussion of the 
difference between State and nomadic numbers. The former `gain mastery over matter... control its 
variations and movements', and refer only to a single base. Numbering numbers do not presuppose 
number, but `appear as soon as one distributes something in space, instead of dividing up space or 
distributing space itself They are `ciphered, rhythmic, directional, autonomous, movable' and articulated, 
as opposed to metric, punctuated. (cf. DG, 1980: 483ff: 1988: 387f1) The complexities of this, however, are 
outside the current range of my knowledge; this remark indicates, but does not explain, the difference 
between the numbered numbers of the State and the numbering numbers of the nomos. 
29. K, IV: 517 
30. DG, 1980: 459; 1988: 370 
31. D, 1968: 290; 1994: 225 
32. D, 1968: 288; 1994: 223 
33. D, 1968: 290; 1994: 224 
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36. There is a discussion of the sublime in chapter five. 
37. K, VIII: 169n 
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40. K, VIII: 156 
41. K, V: 245-6 
42. K, VII: 156 
43. K, IV: 520n 
44. K, IV: 519 
45. K, IV: 520n 
46. K, III: A660113688 
47. DG, 1980: 257; 1988: 211 
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50. K, IV: 520n 
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52. K, VIII: 157 
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55. Borrowing methods or principles from other disciplines and deploying them philosophically was not 
something new for Kant: in his paper Versuch den Begrif der negativen Großen in die Weltweisheit 
einzuführen, he borrows a method of quantifying negative magnitudes from mathematics. 
56. F, 1989: 33 
57. D, 1968: 178; 1994: 136 
58. F, 1989: 36 
59. Ibid. 
60. K, V: 16 
61. F, 1989: 31 
62. F, 1989: 37 
63. D, 1979: 93 
64. D, 1980: 13; 1988: 6 
65. DG, 1980: 586; 1988: 469 
66. DG, 1980: 538; 1988: 431 
67. DG, 1980: 537; 1988: 431 
68. DG, 1980: 632; 1988: 507 
69. DG, 1980: 638; 1988: 512 
70. D, 1977: 127 1987: 105 
71. DG, 1980: 537; 1988: 431 
72. D, 1968: 156; 1994: 119 
Attractors are of different types. Zero-dimensional attractors draw whatever falls within their 
basin to a fixed point of rest. A pendulum without a driving motor is drawn to a rest midway in its period, 
slowed by friction. Its phase diagram spirals inwards to a central static point. The State in Deleuze and 
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Guattari's work functions as a zero-dimensional attractor. A limit cycle or periodic attractor describes an 
orbit; a pendulum driven at a constant rate circles continuously, any fluctuations being temporary 
deviations from equilibrium, being returned within a short time to the orbit. In other words, no fluctuation 
is sufficiently deviant to escape the basin of the attractor. A strange or chaotic attractor, which arose out of 
problems in fluid dynamics, refers to systems with no periodicity, which describe orbits which never 
return to the same point, never intersects itself, and is of infinite depth within finite space. This is because 
of what Gleich calls a `mille-feuille' effect, and he quotes Lorenz: `We see that each surface is really a 
pair of surfaces, so that, where they appear to merge, there are really four surfaces. Continuing this 
process for another circuit, we see that there are really eight surfaces, etc., and we finally conclude that 
there is an infinite complex of surfaces, each extremely close to one or the other of two merging surfaces. ' 
(G, 1987: 141) This has clear connections with the paradox of surface and depth in Deleuze's writing, and 
with the infinitely involuting differenciation of intensities. See also: DG, 1991: 1994: 206; and Prigogine 
and Stengers, Order out of Chaos. 
73. B, 1987; 124 
74. D, 1980: 460; 1988: 371 
75 K, VII: 113 
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1. DG, 1972: 26; 1984: 19 
2. DP, 1977: 13; 1987: 7 
`Rencontrer, c'cst trouver, c'est capturer, c'est voler, mais il n'y a pas de methode pour 
trouver, rien qu'une longue preparation. Voler, c'est le contraire de plagier, de copier, 
d'imiter ou de faire comme. La capture est toujours une double-capture, le vol, un 
double-vol, et c'est cela qui fait, non pas quelque chose de mutuel, mais un bloc 
asymetrique, une evolution a-parallele, des noces, toujours «hors» et «entre». 
(To encounter is to find, to capture, to steal, but there is no method for finding other 
than a long preparation. Stealing is the opposite of plagiarizing, copying, imitating, or 
doing like. Capture is always a double-capture, theft a double-theft, and it is that which 
creates not something mutual, but an asymmetrical block, an a-parallel evolution, 
nuptials, always "outside" and "between"). ' 
3. DG, 1984: xii 
4. G, 1994: 190 
5. D, 1968: 192; 1994: 148 
6. DG, 1972: 266; 1984: 224 
7. D, 1968: 176; 1994: 135 
8. DG, 1972: 19; 1984: 13 
9. K, III: A78B 103 
10. '[Al machine has only motive force [bewegende Kraft]. But an organized being has 
within it formative force (bildende Kraft) that this being imparts to the kinds of matter 
that lack it (thereby organizing it). This force is therefore a formative force that 
propagates itself -a force that a mere ability to move (Bewegungsvermögen) (i. e., 
mechanism) cannot explain. ' (K, V: 374) 
Kant's third Critique was influential not only on the naturphilosophische movement emerging 
around Jena, but, more broadly, helped to shape the theoretical foundations of nineteenth century German 
biology; Blumenbach, an anthropologist and comparative anatomist, provided empirical confirmation of 
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problems on which Kant had been working, and Kant in turn influenced the course of Blumenbach's own 
work. 
In the third Critique Kant eliminates analogs for the formative force of natural bodies. To call 
organisms analogs of art is, for Kant, to suggest an external design agency, a rational power which can in 
principle be isolated from matter. Natural self-organization is implicated with a force which, whilst 
strictly unknown, is inseparable from matter and `preformed virtualiter in the intrinsic purposive 
predispositions imparted to the stock (Stamm). ' (K, V: 423) Influenced by Blumenbach, Kant calls the 
force Bildungstrieb. Unlike mechanical or aesthetic relations, where the form of possibility is extrinsic to 
their sensible configuration, the reciprocal relations of force in a natural product are not formalized in 
advance of their dynamic distribution, and their qualities cannot be qualified and equalized in extension. 
The direction in which this force develops, the nature of the material filling of space, is not 
determined mathematically, as is the space-filling force in mechanistic dynamics, but is, Kant argues, the 
function of a purpose - at least for the purposes of judgement. A natural purpose (Zweck) is an order 
manifest in a particular arrangement of the parts, from whose interrelation a result eventually emerges. 
Each part not only exists for the sake of every other part, but each part also stands in a mutually reciprocal 
productive relation to every other part. 
Variations in the result can become hereditary, as mechanical feedback from the concrete 
situation of a body potentiates different aspects of the pattern of virtual preformation. However, the 
concept of intrinsic purposiveness requires that localized changes are conceived of as no more than the 
capacitation of `undeveloped original predispositions' (K, V: 420) in the virtual pattern. If this were not the 
case, the separation of mechanism and teleology would be compromised, if mechanical action were 
understood as a primary function in the material organization of the body, rather than simply a 
consequence of local selective pressures, or as Kant puts it, `a subordinate cause of intentional effects' 
(K, V: 414), then the door would be held open to suggestions of animism, to mystical internal forms, or the 
`alien principle (a soul)' (K, V: 375) as explanatory principles for the workings of a body which has been 
reduced back to mechanism. 
The concept of a natural purpose holds teleology and mechanism, and the distribution of forces 
each implies, apart: understanding a maggot as a natural purpose gives no reason to `count on there being 
a mechanical way of producing it' (K, V: 412). But once a maggot is understood mechanistically, and 
disassembled through putrefaction, the idea of a purposive causality will not put the elements back 
together, and reproduce the same product. The forces of mechanism and teleology - gravity and 
Bildungstreib - are materially incompatible, non-communicating distributions. 
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When discussing the character of natural organization, Kant differentiates the causality 
implicated in it from that which determines mechanical relations. In the latter, causal connectivity is 
progressive, `constituting a descending series' (K, V: 372) of efficient causes; a cause conditions an effect 
and the necessity of the relation is enclosed within them, as between two points or states. When the will is 
implicated, dependency is both progressive and regressive, and any connection is both caused and 
effected. The general idea of reason covering the systematic and collective unity of this doubled causality 
is purpose. It is tempting to see a connection between Kant's theory of self-organization and purposive 
causality and the immanent distribution and reverse causality referred to by Deleuze and Guattari. 
However, they emphasize that reverse causality is without finality, and equate teleology with good sense. 
Whilst Kant's concept of teleology introduces the problem of self-organization, his solution is reconciled 
with the universality and necessity of mechanism, through the supersensible principle of convertibility, it 
is this collapse into unity which Deleuze and Guattari argue against, together with the exclusive 
disjunction which separates the zones of teleology and mechanism. In L'anti-oedipe they gloss the 
problem in the following terms: in both systems `the machine and desire... remain in an extrinsic 
relationship, either because desire appears as an effect determined by a system of mechanical causes, or 
because the machine is itself a system of means in terms of the aims of desire. '(DG, 1972,1980: 284) 
An additional incidental point is that Kant's relation with Blumenbach illustrates his ongoing 
reference to empirical data. 
11. There are clearly arguments to be had concerning what Kant means by the content of a concept: if it is 
taken to mean partial concepts conjoined under one more general concept, the definition is purely logical. 
In this discussion, howeNeer, it is to be understood as the heterogeneous manifold of intuition (empirical 
and/or a priori) combined according to a rule of synthesis given by understanding. It thus involves 
references to matter and to time and space. A real definition of concepts involves `descending to the 
conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearances' (K, III: A240-41B300) which separates logical 
content from real content, and contributes to the objective validity of a pure concept. 
12. K, III: A71B 11 
13. K, III: B420 
14. K, III: B427 
15. K, III: B428 
16. S, WWVII: Chp. XXII 
17. S, WWVII: p273 
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18. K, III: A78B103 
In the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. in Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof of the 
Permanence of the Soul' (K, III: B 142), Kant argues against the possibility of proving a continuity of 
existence of a soul by any of the following means: negative arguments to the effect that since it cannot 
disappear or vanish, or be annihilated, it must be permanent; rational arguments seeking to prove the 
inexplicability of the I think based on a heterogeneous ground, logical arguments appealing to 
contradiction; materialist arguments based on the dynamical division of intensive quantities. His own case 
is based on a difference between intensive magnitudes of existence and the real. The real, 'the supposed 
substance - the thing [das Ding]', he argues `may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but 
by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted use of the term, by 
elanguescence. '(K, III: B414). However, the real is no less real for this remission of powers. This is 
important in relation to Deleuze's argument against possibility, as a logical intervention which produces 
paralogisms by separating the real from what it can do. In Difference et Repetition, he writes: `Le virtuel 
ne s'oppose pas au reel, mais seulement ä ! 'actual. Le virtue! possede une plein realfite, en Cant que virtue! 
(the virtual is not opposed to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is 
virtual)'. (D, 1968: 269; 1994: 208) (Also cf. Deleuze's Bergsonism, where the relation of the virtual to 
memory is explored) 
Elanguescence, or the remission of intensities, is a relaxation or diminution in the the density of 
intensive magnitude, a difformation of qualities, and comes out of early work on the problem of calculus. 
(The term "difformation" rather than the more obvious "deformation" is used here, and below, in order to 
avoid the privative implications of the prefix "de-" and the generally negative sense of deformation. 
"Difform" carries the sense of diversity, asymmetry, non-uniformity and irregularity of form which 
deform does not and it is this positive dimension of intensity which is important for Deleuze. ) In a brief 
discussion in Superpositions, Deleuze refers to attempts by physicists in the middle ages to theorize the 
multiplicity of types of qualitative variations in intensive forms, calling the geometry arising from this 
`une gesometrie des vitesses et des intensites, des affects'(D, 1979: 115); he mentions Nicholas Oresme 
(c. 1323-1382), who investigated the latitude of forms. Boyer's The History of the Calculus and its 
con l Development, refers to the use of the word `form' here in the following terms: `There seems to 
be no scientific term which correctly expresses the equivalent of the word form as here used. It refers in 
general to any quality which admits of variation and which involves the intuitive idea of intensity - that is, 
to such notions as velocity, acceleration, density ... In general the latitude of a form was the degree to which 
the latter possessed a certain quality, and the discussion centred about the intensio and the remissio of the 
form, or the alterations by which this quality is acquired or lost. '(B, 1949: 73) The connection with 
Deleuze's theory of intensive magnitudes is quite clear: in Mille Plateaux, it is mentioned explicitly: 
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`Noun distinguons: 1) les CsO, qui different comme des types, des genres, des attributs 
substantiels, par exemple le Froid du CsO drogue, le Dolorifere du CsO masochiste: 
chacun a son degre 0 comme principe de production (c'est la remissio); 2) ce qui se 
passe sur chaque type de CsO, c'est-ä-dire les modes, les intensites produites, les ondes 
et vibrations qui passent (la latitudo); 3) 1'ensemble eventuel de toes les CsO, le plan de 
consistance (1'Omnitudo, qu'on appelle parfois le CsO). 
(We distinguish between: (1) BwO's, which are different types, genuses, or substantial 
attributes. For example, the Cold of the drugged BwO, the Pain of the masochist BwO. 
Each has its degree 0 as its principle of production (remissio). (2) What happens on each 
type of BaO, in other words, the modes, the intensities that are produced, the waves that 
pass (latitudo). (3) The potential totality of all BO's, the plane of consistency 
(Omnitudo, sometimes called the BwO))'. (DG, 1980: 195; 1988: 159) 
Other references include discussions of. intensive latitudes as `diformement difformes 
(diffonnedly difformed)' - Oresme's latitudo difformiter difformis, (DG, 1980: 310; 1988: 253); Spinoza's 
question of what a body can do, where latitude is defined as 'faite de parties intensives sous une capacitd 
(made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity)' (Ibid. 314/256) - which draws connections between 
the Omnitudo or "ailness" of the plane of consistency and Spinoza's substance, central to Deleuze (and 
Guattari's) work; Ou'est-ce aue la Philosophie?. p35ff, where Omnitudo is associated with fractals and 
immanence. 
19. K, III: B 130 
20. cf. K, V: paras. 25,26,27. Here, Kant explains the two functions of imagination - apprehension and 
comprehension - which function together in estimating magnitudes by means of number - as is necessary 
for knowledge claims: `imagination performs the combination that is required to present a 
magnitude'. [Ibid. p254] In the mathematical sublime the differential of these two functions exceeds the 
possibility of numerical quantification - the intensive difference cannot be extensively formulated, no 
magnitude can be presented - that is, none which can be reproduced successively as a measurable unit- 
none which can be numbered. Instead, the imagination inflicts violence on inner sense and `makes 
simultaneity intuitable'. [Ibid259] The principle of progression which underlies the psychologistic 
understanding of time as succession collapses, and imagination attempts to comprehend in an instant what 
is, in the theoretical framework, apprehended successively. This suffices to illustrate the independence of 
imagination in relation to understanding, an independence which is implicated, at the very least, in the 
first Critique, most notably in comments such as: 
`Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the 
mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. 
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There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold To this faculty I give 
the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle 
apprehension. '[K, llI: A1211 The importance of this separation of the powers of understanding and 
imagination is great when one is considering Kant not from the perspective of the rational subject, but 
from the position of those associations attaching to women - which include nature, imagination and the 
object. 
21. cf. K, III: A170B212 
22. K, III: A167B209 
23. K, III: A51B75 
24. cf. K, IV: 309n 
25. DG, 1972: 34; 1984: 26 
26. D, 1993: 43 
27. K, III: B414 
28. An essay by Irigaray focuses specifically on matters of fluidity. In This Sex Which is Not One, in The 
"Mechanics of Fluids" she points out `a complicity of long standing between rationality and a mechanics 
of solids alone'(I, 1985E: 107), which leaves unconsidered the specific dynamics of fluids, having various 
"tricks" with which to side-step the problems it generates for a mechanics of solids. The theoretical 
engagement with fluid dynamics has, she argues, detached them from the reality of bodies. Her argument 
crosses Delcuzc (and Guattari) on several points, including the non-denumerability of fluid diffusions, on 
its greater sensitivity to pressure, on the infinite nearness of its elements, and on its instability. It must 
thus also have closenesses to Kant's theory of intensities. Irigaray correlates the exclusion of fluidity with 
that of women: `what she emits is flowing, fluctuating. Blurring. '(Ibid. 112) Like fluidity, she argues, 
women lack definite identification, and are irreducible to the symmetry consecrated between the subject 
and its world in the theatre of representation. 
There is also a connection between Irigaray's questions regarding mathematical analyses of 
fluids and the problem of instantaneous velocity implied by the quantitative study of variation addressed in 
the theory of the latitude of forms (cf. Note 16). Irigaray argues that fluid currents are considered in 
relation to a privileged axis, a point, which leaves some remainder: `Up to infinite: the centre of these 
"movements" corresponding to zero supposes in them an infinite speed, which is physically 
unacceptable'. (Ibidp109) Deleuze's response to this is complex very briefly, it involves the insistence 
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that absolute or infinite speed proceeds by way of relative speeds; in other words, it is immanent to the 
creation of a plane of consistency, rather than transcendent, produced rather than discovered. Absolute 
speed is associated with nomos, or nomadic distributions; `seul le nomade a un mouvement absolu, c'est- 
ä-0ire une vitesse ; le mouvement tourbillonnaire ou tournant appartient essentiellement ä sa machine de 
guerre (only nomads have absolute movement, in other words, speed; vortical or swirling movement is an 
essential feature of their war machine)'; a nomad is `dann un absolu local (in a local absolute)'. (DG, 
1980: 473-4; 1988: 381-2) 
29. K, III: A291B347 
30. DG, 1980: 132; 1988: 104 
31. DP, 1977: 160; 1987: 132 
32. The simplest example is that of convection. Take a cell of fluid which can be heated on the bottom and 
cooled from the top. The difference in temperature (an intensive quantity) controls the flow, heat being 
conducted towards the top of the cell; as the heat increases the fluid expands, becoming less dense, lighter, 
and the molecules move more rapidly, colliding as they push towards the surface. The system becomes 
chaotic. However, further increases in heat give rise to behaviour which is counter to assumptions possible 
from the point of view of the two constraints on the system, gravity and the second law of 
thermodynamics. A cylindrical role develops, heated fluid rising and cooling fluid falling in a continuous 
cycle, and the system displays a consistency and activity beyond the thresholds of behavioural possibility 
defined by the two constraints on the system, gravity and the second law of thermodynamics. cf. Massumi, 
A User's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari , p58ff. 
33. Sandy Stone notes the ultra-femininity of both pre- and post-operative male to female transsexuals. The 
imperative which defines them is that of passing: they must pass as women both in order to be considered 
suitable candidates for the medical procedure and to minimize the difficulty of settling into the socially 
defined ways of a woman once they have been physically reconfigured. In the `60's, when these operations 
became economically and medically interesting, a single book outlined the criteria according to which 
suitability was determined. Strangely, all applicants fulfilled these criteria: they had the book too. 
Stone's point is that the fixation on medical procedures and defined psychological criteria, and 
the willingness of medical institutions and their clients to satisfy them, is socially produced along with 
binary sexual difference and neither have any necessary relevance to the processes implicated in the 
continual invention of a body, processes which the theft of a child's body channel along a pre-determined 
course. Male? Fourteen? Time to be a social nuisance, smash a window, get a gun. Female? Forty? Time 
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to go grey and wear sensible shoes. A molar body is fixed across a set of interconnected criteria whose 
most basic resolution is in terms of a sexual biology and a psychological and intellectual make-up which 
"fits" that sex and which has appropriate phenomena attached to it at any given age and in any given 
socio-economic bracket. Paul Broca, working in the second half of the nineteenth century, laboured hard 
to prove that brain size was correlated with intelligence. Since it was common knowledge that European 
males were more intelligent than women and other lesser human types, Broca's task was to generate 
quantitative data which would confirm this a prior! truth. To do so, `[h]e traversed the gap between fact 
and conclusion by what may be the usual route - predominantly in reverse'(G, 1992: 85). Broca wanted to 
fix a brain which would correlate with the body in which he found it, rather than research the brain as 
such, and Stone's argument aims implicitly at thwarting this insistence on the permitted band of deviation 
dictated by the demand for unity, both historically and of the body. (Cuvier's brain, - which `reflects a 
Euclidean space'(DG, 1980: 63; 1988: 47) - was, incidentally, discovered by Broca to be the largest in 
France. ) 
When expressions of desire become incommensurate with the codes applied to the body, the gulf 
is corrected by pro-tiding the body with a new set of sexual characteristics, making the content fit the 
expression. That is, if psycho-analysis cannot cure this problem it produced first. The misfit of desire with 
the socially coded body is clearly associated with the sex/gender distinction: the proper alignment of 
gender, or social coding and sex, or biological coding, results in the organization of a whole system, a 
whole man or woman. The paucity of this distinction is made clear by Stone, who argues for bodies in 
continual invention, becomings, rather than the medical re-invention of the occasional body so that it 
might properly contain the psychological make-up analysis has exposed. She calls these post-transsexual 
because there are no longer gulfs and gaps and sexual lines to be crossed but n-sexes, bodies machined by 
desire. Not the institutionalized re-arrangement of an object so that its gender and it's sex might once 
more meet, and the facts fit the advance conclusion. 
Stone's desire for post-transsexualism is caught up with discussions in Difference and Repetition 
and A Thousand Plateaus of Geoffroy St. Hilaire's abstract Animal, because both refuse conditions 
extrinsic to the material processes through which bodies are formed as organs of a machinic assemblage, 
and repel the positions and places, images and instincts allotted to them, the fixation of desire on an object 
and the pre-occupation of bodies by imaginary values. Real engineering does not make objects, but 
assembles bits and pieces, partial-objects, transposable elements which, depending on their location and 
their movements transform the timing and control of development. The basic unit is the assemblage, a 
body composed through its own functioning, not organized from on high, and the human body is but a 
part of this, not its controller. 
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cf. Stone, S (S, 1991) `The empire strikes back: A posttranssexual manifesto' in J. Epstein and K 
Straub (ed) Body guards: the cultural politics of gender ambiguity (London: Routledge) 
34. DP, 1977: 71; 1987: 57 
35. Ibid. 
36. cf. Chp. 2, fn. 67 on attractors. 
37. D, 1968: 117; 1994: 86 
38. In his Introduction to La Bete Humaine. Deleuze talks of the paradox of heredity, and the confusion of 
what is transmitted with the transmission itself; transmission, he suggests, transmits only itself, not as a 
message, but as transmission, a process not an object. Zola, cinematographic novelist, is caught up in a 
singular process of transformation which cuts through the novel as it does through philosophy and 
cinema. Transmission is the crack [la felure], or fundamental difference itself: the pure form of time, `le 
grand aide interieur'. (D, 1969: 11) Wrecking linearity and installing an abstract core of sterility into 
processes of which a subject is no more than a residue, paradox is removed from the realm of logical 
problem to become a perpetuum mobile, and force of machinic production. The term term used by Deleuze 
(and Guattari) for this problem of transmission in Mille Plateaux is machinic phylum. 
39. D, 1968: 220; 1994: 169 
40. D, 1980: 269; 1988: 220 
41. DG, 1972: 106; 1984: 88 
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1. DG, 1980: 16; 1988: 9 
2 D, 1968: 284; 1980: 220 
3. DG, 1980: 275; 1988: 225 
4. K, V: 266 
5. K, V: 266 
6. D, 1968: 1984: 43 
7. K, V: 269 
8K, V: 261 
9 Ibid. 
10 DG, 1980: 438; 1988: 354 
11 DG, 1980: 437; 1988: 353 
12 DG, 1980: 469; 1988: 3 78 
13 D, 1993: 48; 1984: xii 
14 DG, 1980: 468; 1988: 378 
15. K, III: A141B 180 
16. cf. Paralogisms of Pure Reason, B edition, K, III: B421fi 
17. K, III: A649B677 
18. Architectonically, reason grows `from within (per intussceptionem), but not by external addition (per 
appositionem). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, 
but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its 
purposes. '(K, III: 833B861) The Kantian faculties form delivery systems which remains unchanged by the 
delivery, since their products are absorbed into the ends of reason and fuel the growth of its strength, 
which in turn allows the strengthening of the delivery. 
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40. DG, 1972: 341; 1984: 286 
41. For the moment, this can be read as a transcendental function: however, the distance Deleuze and 
Guattari have moved this from its function in Kant as a condition of possibility for knowledge of the 
object will become clear in the explication of the body without organs, and its relation with desiring- 
machines (see also note 2). 
42. DG, 1980: 199; 1988: 161 
43. F, 1984: 311 
44. K, IV: A., cd 
45. K, III: A171/B213 
46. DG, 1972: 342; 1984: 288 
47.1,1993: 190, pata. 67 
48. DG, 1980: 36Q; 1988: 293 
49. DG, 1980: 453; 1988: 366 
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